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Abstract	
Performance management systems constitute an important area in human resource 
management. However, the way performance management systems affect employees remains 
largely unclear. In particular, little is known about the unintended outcomes that can result 
from performance management systems and the role that the social context plays in 
influencing the occurrence of unintended outcomes at work. The thesis explores the 
unintended outcomes of the three performance management practices of goal setting, 
performance measurement and allocation of rewards. Following data analysis, it derives a 
typology of the unintended outcomes that can result from performance management systems, 
and articulates why and how they occur. Furthermore, through the lens of social learning 
theory, the thesis examines how behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems are displayed by employees in response to such systems, and how these behaviours 
are learned, diffused, adopted or avoided by other employees in organisations. 
 
This thesis employs a qualitative methodology. Data were gathered from 65 semi-structured 
interviews conducted with academics working in 13 research intensive universities in the 
United Kingdom, rated in the top quartile of the Research Excellence Framework in 2014. 
The analysis shows that performance management systems have a strong influence on the 
way academics perceive their job roles and psychologically respond to the systems. In the 
thesis, unintended outcomes are found to be the likely consequence of performance 
management systems and have been categorised as behavioural and psychological outcomes. 
The unintended behavioural and psychological outcomes also influence each other in a 
reciprocal manner. Through social interaction, social learning affects academics’ propensity 
to engage in behaviours not intended by performance management systems because it not 
only enables academics to learn such behaviours, but also motivates a group of them to 
perform the learned behaviours. Those not performing such behaviours refrained from doing 
so through the processes of self-regulation and resisting the redefinition of academic work. 
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	 	
 
1.0 Introduction 
The effects that performance management systems have on employees and organisations has 
been an enduring topic of debate in performance management literature. This topic has 
become particularly important in light of research evidence showing that performance 
management systems not only at times fail to deliver their intended outcomes, but can also 
lead to unintended outcomes not desired by organisations. This research aims to shed light on 
the unintended outcomes of performance management systems by exploring how the systems 
can go awry and lead to unintended outcomes not desired by organisations. It further aims to 
understand, using social learning theory, how behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems are learned, adopted or avoided by employees at work. This is explored 
using a qualitative methodology. 
 
This chapter constitutes the introduction of this thesis. It starts by explaining the two broad 
aims of the thesis. It then discusses the theoretical background to the research topic and 
presents the contributions of the research. The chapter then presents an overview of the 
remainder of the thesis chapters, and provides a conclusion to the chapter.     
 
1.1 Aims of the thesis  
This research has two aims: 
 
The first is to understand the relationship between performance management systems and 
unintended outcomes, identify the unintended outcomes that can result from performance 
management systems, and explore why and how they occur. Understanding the way 
performance management systems affect employees can help to assess the extent to which 
performance management interventions help organisations to achieve their intended goals, or 
whether there are attendant unintended outcomes that need to be considered.  
 
In particular, this research seeks to create a typology of the unintended outcomes that arise 
from performance management systems, which prevent performance management systems 
from reaching their intended outcomes.  
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The second aim of the thesis is to analyse the social context of performance management and 
understand how this context influences employees’ behaviour. To do this, social learning 
theory is used to explore how different types of behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems are learned and practised or rejected by employees at work. Social 
learning theory is particularly relevant for this research as it is one of the most influential 
learning theories that explains how people learn in their social context (Davis and Luthans, 
1980; Van Bommel et al., 2009). Social learning theory includes important contextual factors 
that can help explain what instigates certain types of behaviours in organisations, and also 
what causes various types of behaviours to spread at work. In this research, social learning 
theory is also used to understand how behaviours shift from being an individual activity to 
becoming a group activity.  
 
In particular, this research seeks to explore, through the lens of social leaning theory, how in 
response to performance management systems, employees may be led to engage in 
behaviours not intended by the systems, and to explore how such behaviours are learned, 
diffused, adopted or avoided by other employees.  
 
1.2 Background and contributions 
In an age marked by intense global competition, organisational performance has become 
increasingly important for organisations as they are now faced with constant pressures that 
challenge their survival and potential growth (Den Hartog et al., 2004; Melnyk et al., 2014). 
As interest in organisational performance has grown, the popularity of performance 
management has increased correspondingly (Kinicki et al., 2013). Consequently, performance 
management systems are now widely used by practitioners as a management tool and they are 
commonly researched by scholars as an area of study, constituting an important activity in 
human resource management (Mckenna et al., 2011). Performance management systems are 
popular today because they are considered as indispensable tools that address many pressing 
challenges faced by contemporary organisations including low productivity, performance 
deficiencies (Denisi and Smith, 2014), and external competition (Busco et al., 2008).  
 
However, despite the assertion that organisations implementing performance management 
systems outperform those that do not manage their performance, the results of the research 
exploring the relationship between performance management and organisational performance 
have been inconclusive (Poister et al., 2013). More importantly, research evidence has shown 
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that not only are performance management systems at times of limited usefulness for 
organisations, but they can invite employees to display behaviours that go against the very 
goals organisations seek to reach, leading to a range of outcomes not intended by policy 
makers (Smith, 1995; Hood, 2006).  
 
As a result, there is now a growing scepticism in the literature about the utility of 
performance management systems and a general recognition of the possibility of performance 
management systems leading to unintended outcomes (e.g., Hood, 2006; Denisi and Smith, 
2014). However, despite this recognition, the relationship between performance management 
systems and unintended outcomes remains unclear in the literature (Franco-Santos and Otley, 
2018). In particular, little is known about what exactly these unintended outcomes are, under 
what conditions they are likely to arise, and how prevalent they are. Furthermore, there is 
little information on how the unintended outcomes related to performance management 
systems are caused or controlled by organisations. This limited understanding might be due to 
the overstated benefits of performance management systems in helping organisations to 
achieve their intended outcomes (e.g., Aguinis et al., 2011) and to the understated negative 
unintended effects that can arise from having such systems in place. This means that while 
there is much research looking at the intended outcomes of performance management 
systems in the literature, much less is available on their unintended outcomes. To fill this 
research gap, this project seeks to identify some of the unintended ways in which employees 
respond to performance management systems, explore how outcomes not intended by the 
systems occur at work, and understand how employees socially learn and perform behaviours 
not intended by the systems. In so doing, this research makes five key contributions to 
performance management literature. 
 
The first contribution is that this research offers a more critical account of performance 
management systems, and challenges conventional beliefs about the role of performance 
management in organisations. Although there is a large body of literature discussing 
performance management systems, the topic has been largely reduced to a set of prescriptive 
activities (Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011) that are often assumed to work well if they are 
effectively implemented in organisations (Aguinis, 2014). This research shows how the 
seemingly straightforward performance management practices of goals, measurements and 
rewards do not function as claimed in operation. 
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The second contribution is that this research offers one of the first systematic investigations 
of the unintended outcomes of performance management systems. While there are a few 
studies that look at the unintended outcomes of performance management systems (e.g., 
Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006), this research goes beyond these studies as it is more 
extensive, encompassing a wide range of unintended outcomes, and also providing detailed 
explanations of how each unintended outcome emerged from performance management 
systems. Furthermore, unlike previous research, this research provides important distinctions 
between different types of unintended outcomes that can result performance management 
systems.  
 
The third contribution is that this research identifies different unintended psychological 
outcomes of performance management systems. Literature on the unintended outcomes of 
performance management has focused on the unintended behavioural outcomes of 
performance management systems (e.g., Smith 1995), and largely dismissed the 
psychological ones. This research is the first to identify and examine the unintended 
psychological outcomes related to performance management systems. Furthermore, this 
research shows the relationship between the unintended psychological and behavioural 
outcomes as they manifested in the data. By demonstrating this relationship, this research not 
only helps to understand the unintended psychological outcomes that can result from 
performance management systems, but also helps to understand the reasons behaviours not 
intended by performance management systems take place in organisations. 
 
The fourth contribution is that by using social learning theory, this research offers a novel 
theoretical lens to help to understand how unintended outcomes are disseminated in 
workgroups and across the university sector. Social learning theory explains the influence of 
the social context on employees’ behaviour (Bandura, 1977), and is one of the most 
established theories in organisational psychology (Davis and Luthans, 1980). In this research, 
social learning theory provides a plausible framework for understanding the way academics 
socially learned behaviours not intended by performance management systems in 
universities. 
 
While the first four contributions relate to performance management research in general, the 
fifth contribution relates more specifically to research in the higher education sector. This 
thesis presents an analysis of the specific unintended outcomes related to the higher education 
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sector in the United Kingdom. This is a very important and timely topic because universities 
in the United Kingdom are undergoing various pressures from the government to be 
performance managed and more accountable (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015). The 
implementation of performance management systems in universities is based on the 
assumption that the systems can positively influence academics’ performance (Willmott, 
1995). The findings of this research challenge this assumption, and show that performance 
management systems have had negative unintended effects on academics’ performance. 
While designing the typology of the unintended outcomes, attempts were made to ensure that 
the typology applies to other sectors beyond that of academia.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
After the introduction chapter, this thesis is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 starts with highlighting the popularity of performance management systems, 
reviewing performance management research, defining performance management systems, 
and presenting key debates regarding the utility of performance management systems in 
organisations. It then presents some of the common factors that were found in the literature 
which enable performance management systems to achieve their intended outcomes or 
prevents them from doing so. Following this, the chapter discusses the three performance 
management practices of goals, performance measurements and rewards.  
 
Chapter 3 begins by explaining the notion of unintended outcomes and provides a typology 
from existing research of three likely unintended outcomes of performance management 
systems on organisations, namely gaming, effort substitution and myopia. The chapter then 
discusses the limitations of performance management systems and unintended outcomes. 
 
Chapter 4 constitutes the third part of the literature review. In this chapter, social learning 
theory is defined, and the ways in which social learning theory can help to explain the 
occurrence of the unintended outcomes of performance management systems are introduced. 
Social learning theory is also used to demonstrate how individuals’ performance is much 
more complex than it is typically portrayed as being in performance management literature.  
 
Chapter 5 begins by justifying the adoption of a qualitative methodology and an interpretivist 
paradigm. Next, the reasons for the selection of the higher education sector as the research 
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context for this thesis, and for the adoption of an individual based approach for recruiting 
academics are explained. The chapter then presents the rationale for the selection of semi-
structured interviews (which involves 65 semi-structured interviews) and a summary of the 
participants’ characteristics. The focus is then placed on explaining how, through the use of 
thematic analysis, data are analysed, and how quality in this thesis is evaluated. The chapter 
ends with the ethical considerations that were taken in the course of this project. 
 
Chapter 6 starts by explaining the way academics’ performance was managed in the sampled 
universities and then provides a typology of both the unintended behavioural outcomes and 
unintended psychological outcomes identified in the data. Each unintended outcome is 
defined, explained in detail, and supported with illustrative quotes. Following this, the 
relationship between the unintended behavioural and psychological outcomes is presented.  
 
Chapter 7 first discusses the role of social learning in performance management systems. It 
then explains how academics learned behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems in the sampled universities. Following this, the chapter explains what motivated 
academics to perform, or demotivated them from performing such behaviours. Next, the 
chapter presents how such behaviours were disseminated in the sampled universities.    
 
Chapter 8 constitutes the conclusion of the thesis. It starts by summarising the contributions 
of the research, and discusses the research results in terms of their implications and 
contributions. The chapter then notes the methodological contributions, implications for 
practice, limitations of the research, and recommendations for future research. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter started by describing and stating the research aims of this research. It then 
explained the background to the study, highlighting the importance of examining the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems. Following this, the chapter 
presented the five main contributions of the thesis, and then finishes with a conclusion. 
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Chapter	2:	A	critical	evaluation	of	performance	management	systems	
 
2.0 Introduction 
The study of performance management has dramatically increased in the last decade 
(Moynihan, 2013). It has become an important activity in human resource management 
systems, and a popular subject among researchers (Aguinis, 2014). Despite its popularity, 
both academics and practitioners are still struggling to delineate its parameters and purposes 
(McKenna et al., 2011). The ambiguities of the term (Van Dooren, 2011) together with the 
potentially unintended consequences of performance management processes have raised 
numerous debates in the literature (Heinrich, 2008).  
 
This chapter begins by providing an overview of performance management research 
highlighting some of the reasons for the popularity of performance management systems 
today, detailing the history of performance management research, and presenting certain 
common definitions and possible outcomes of performance management systems. An 
analysis of the various elements that enable performance management systems to achieve 
their intended outcomes or prevent them from achieving such outcomes is then presented. 
Following this, a rationale for the selection and analysis of three key performance 
management processes: goal setting, performance measurement and rewards is given. The 
benefits and associated pitfalls of these processes in terms of improving employees’ 
performance are then discussed with the aim of showing how goals, measurements, and 
rewards do not always lead to their intended outcomes in organisations. A conclusion is then 
provided. 
 
2.1 The popularity of performance management systems 
While research on performance appraisal has a long history that dates back almost 100 years, 
performance management is a comparatively new research area (Denisi and Smith, 2014). In 
the middle of the 1990s, performance management began to appear both as an identifiable 
subject for academic research (Thorpe and Beasley, 2008) and a core management process 
that is able to deliver the vision of a firm and support its growth (Houldsworth and 
Burkinshaw, 2008). Since then, research in the area of performance management has 
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dramatically increased (Busi and Bititci, 2006). The establishment of the Performance 
Measurement Association and the British Academy of Management’s Performance 
Management Special Interest Group is an indication of the growing interest of academics in 
this area (Thorpe and Beasley, 2008).  
 
Currently, performance management systems are very popular with practitioners in 
organisations and among academics as an area of study (Busi and Bitici, 2006; Biron et al., 
2011; Taylor, 2014). Armstrong and Baron (1998) attributed the popularity of performance 
management to the changing economic conditions and the entrepreneurial culture of the 
1980s as during this time, organisations strived to gain better value from their resources and 
obtain a competitive advantage over their competitors. The need for effective performance 
management systems was further accentuated by the increasing global competition faced by 
organisations, putting employees under great pressure to improve their performance 
(Schläfke et al., 2013).  
 
These pressures influenced both private and public organisations, which responded by 
attempting to establish clearer systems for assigning accountability and responsibility to 
employees (Houldsworth and Burkinshaw, 2008). In Aguinis and Pierce’s (2008) view, the 
reason performance management systems have become popular is that they provide valuable 
information required in other human resource management activities. For instance, the 
information generated from performance management systems is used to make important 
human resource management decisions such as identification of training needs and 
distribution of employees’ rewards (Semakula-Katende et al., 2013). In the next section, the 
major trends in the development of performance management research are highlighted as they 
show how research into performance management systems has shifted from exclusively 
studying performance management practices to also examining the social context where the 
systems are implemented and noting the deficiencies of performance management systems in 
achieving their intended outcomes.  
 
2.2 The evolution of performance management research 
Until around 1980, research on performance management emphasised improving efficacy, 
developing valid and reliable rating scales, promoting performance appraisal practices and 
training raters to eliminate rating errors (Ilgen et al., 1993; Denisi and Smith, 2014).  
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In 1980, Landy and Farr published a paper that heralded a change in the course of 
performance appraisal research, arguing that existing literature on rating scales was unable to 
demonstrate the supremacy of one rating scale format over another in terms of eliminating 
rating errors and enhancing performance accuracy (Denisi and Smith, 2014). They stated that 
as ratings are based on the judgments of raters, the ways that raters form their judgments 
should be understood, proposing that future research should explore the cognitive processes 
of raters, including how raters gather information about employees’ performance (Landy and 
Farr, 1980). Following this publication, the focus of subsequent performance appraisal 
research shifted from developing rating scales to issues surrounding rating accuracy (Denisi 
and Smith, 2014), and investigating the way in which performance appraisal ratings could 
objectively and accurately represent employees’ performance (Fletcher, 2001).  
 
However, once researchers started exploring the area of rating accuracy, they highlighted 
certain limitations and complexities associated with performance appraisal accuracy (Denisi 
and Smith, 2014). Ilgen (1993) argued that performance appraisals never meet employees’ 
expectations because appraisees are only satisfied if appraisal ratings are congruent with their 
frequently exaggerated beliefs about their performance, and appraisers, on the other hand, 
consider appraisals to be a time consuming and daunting process. Murphy (1991) added that 
rating accuracy ought not be considered the benchmark for evaluating effective performance 
as performance appraisals that are moderately accurate, yet meet crucial organisational goals, 
such as motivating and providing employees with constructive feedback, are better than those 
that provide fully accurate performance ratings to the detriment of organisational goals. 
Consistent with this view, Aguinis (2014) stated that it is important that performance 
appraisal systems align individuals’ goals with organisations’ goals so that individuals’ 
performance contributes to enhancing organisational performance. 
 
After the focus on performance appraisal accuracy, in the 1990s, the social context slowly 
started to penetrate the area of performance appraisals with the aim of understanding how the 
organisational context in which performance appraisals are implemented affects the impact 
that the appraisals have on employees (Levy and Williams, 2004). Following this, Murphy 
and Cleverland (1991) published a book in which they argued that while existing 
performance appraisal research helped to understand performance appraisal practices, it paid 
little attention to the social context in which the appraisals occur. They explained that the 
impact that performance appraisals have on employees is not only dependent on performance 
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appraisal practices, but on the environment in which they are implemented (Murphy and 
Cleverland, 1995). Likewise, Jones (1995: 426) noted: “rather than manage performance, 
manage the context in which performance occurs”, as employee and organisational 
performance cannot be enhanced unless the organisational context is effectively managed. 
Armstrong and Baron (1998) supported the above viewpoints suggesting that managing the 
organisational context can lead to better performance outcomes than any performance 
management system with a limited focus. As a result, there is now a general consensus in the 
literature that the social environment plays a crucial role in mediating the relationships 
between performance management systems and employees’ performance (Den Hartog et al., 
2004; Levy and Williams, 2004).  
 
However, although there have been different attempts by researchers to understand the social 
context of performance management systems, the influence of the social context on 
employees is still an unexplored area in performance management research (Haines and St-
Onge, 2012). This might be because when studying the social context of performance 
management systems, there are normally numerous contextual variables at play, and given 
that research into the social context of performance has for a long time been overlooked by 
researchers, current understanding of the topic is still limited (e.g., Levy and Williams, 2004; 
Den Hartog et al., 2004; Haines and St-Onge, 2012).  
 
In addition to the social context, researchers began to explore issues such as raters’ 
motivation to intentionally distort performance ratings (e.g., Murphy and Cleverland, 1995). 
Longenecker et al. (1987) discussed the issue of politics in performance appraisals, stating 
that discussions on performance appraisals should fully acknowledge the role of politics in 
appraisals because political considerations are likely to impact appraisers’ rating decisions. 
They defined politics as “the deliberate attempt by individuals to enhance and protect their 
self-interest when conflicting courses of action are possible” (ibid.: 184).  
 
Denisi and his colleagues developed these ideas, proposing that the ultimate goal of 
performance appraisals should be performance improvement (Denisi, 2011). 
Correspondingly, researchers started to consider ways in which individuals could be 
motivated to perform better at work, an area that constitutes the main focus of existing 
research (Denisi and Smith, 2014). The single performance appraisal event was therefore 
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replaced with a wider performance management system, encompassing various activities and 
processes that seek to improve employees’ performance (Dewettinck and Dijk, 2013).        
As researchers have increasingly focused on performance improvement, they have turned to 
testing the relationship between performance management systems and performance 
improvement, frequently reporting the inability of performance management systems to 
improve employees’ performance in numerous organisational settings (Pulakos and O’Leary, 
2011). For example, Biron et al. (2011) argued that performance management systems could 
become a burden instead of a motivational tool that helps to improve employees’ 
performance. Consequently, multiple scholars have started to become interested in and 
question the efficacy of performance management systems in organisations (Furnham, 2004; 
Biron et al., 2011; Poister et al., 2013). This interest was also instigated by the emergence of 
multiple arguments that challenged some of the fundamental activities in performance 
management systems (e.g., Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006; Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011). 
For example, researchers have repeatedly identified issues with goal setting (Pulakos and 
O’Leary, 2011), performance measurement, and rewards (Bevan and Hood, 2006). 
(Discussions on the implications of these three processes are included in section 2.8, 2.9, and 
2.10 respectively).  
 
The findings of research looking at the role of performance management systems in 
organisations have generated much criticism in performance management literature because 
not only do they sometimes fail to lead to their intended outcomes, but have in addition led 
some researchers to observe that they also lead to negative unintended consequences 
(Holloway and Thorpe, 2008). Explaining the discrepancy between the behaviours desired by 
organisations and the actual behaviours displayed by employees has gradually become a key 
challenge in performance management literature and remains a puzzle for both academics and 
practitioners (Taylor, 2014). In view of this, many researchers have contended that the 
behavioural responses to performance management systems are poorly explored in 
performance management literature, arguing that it is vital to fully understand the effects that 
the systems have on employees’ behaviour (Smith and Goddard, 2008).  
 
In response to these debates, researchers have listed a number of potential reasons why 
performance management systems might or might not lead to their intended outcomes (e.g., 
Biron et al., 2011; Den Hartog et al., 2004; Gruman and Saks, 2011). Before presenting these 
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reasons, some key definitions of performance management systems are presented together 
with discussions about the outcomes the systems are expected to achieve   
 
2.3 The definition of performance management systems 
Performance management practices are believed to have emerged from Taylor's theory of 
scientific management (Smith and Goddard, 2002) because both Taylor's theory and 
performance management practices focus on measuring the performance of individual 
employees (Barnes and Radnor, 2008). For many years, the notion of performance 
management was defined as the micro-management of employees’ behaviour, but gradually, 
the concept of performance management has evolved and become a broad term that signifies 
many practices and serves multiple purposes (Smith and Goddard, 2002).  
 
Recently, performance management systems have become increasingly prevalent in 
organisations, constituting a key feature of human resource management (McKenna et al., 
2011). Research has shown that virtually all kinds of organisations have utilised some form of 
performance management system to evaluate the performance of their employees (Aguinis et 
al., 2011), support decision makers with relevant information, and improve organisational 
performance (Schläfke et al., 2013).  
 
In spite of its widespread use, defining the objectives and unique features of performance 
management systems is still posing a challenge for most academics (McKenna et al., 2011). 
Numerous disciplines including psychology, marketing, finance, economics, organisational 
behaviour and accounting have contributed to the definition of performance management 
(Smith and Goddard, 2002). As Smith and Goddard (2002) explained, this diverse 
disciplinary contribution is part of the reason that there is an increasing lack of clarity about 
the meaning and processes of performance management. As a result, numerous authors such 
as Ferreira and Otley (2009) have argued that the concept of performance management is 
hard to define. Likewise, Smith and Goddard (2002: 253) stated that “the literature on 
performance management is eclectic, diffuse and confused. The definitive ‘general theory’ of 
performance management remains elusive, and is unlikely to ever emerge”.  
 
Having said that, a review of the literature indicates that there seem to be some 
commonalities in the definition of performance management. For example, the performance 
management system is frequently described as either a process or an activity (see Table 2.1). 
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Across all the definitions presented in Table 2.1 and in performance management literature in 
general, there appears to be a general agreement between authors that the aim of performance 
management systems is performance improvement at the level of individuals and/or 
organisations. Molleman and Timmerman (2003) added that performance management is 
frequently described as a recurrent process which embraces different stages such as planning, 
appraisals and rewards, and that most definitions relate performance management to various 
levels in organisations (e.g., individual employees, units, organisations). 
 
The difference between authors’ definitions lies in their focus; for example, literature on 
general management emphasises performance management at the unit or organisational level, 
whereas literature on human resource management tends to emphasise performance at the 
individual level (Molleman and Timmerman, 2003). However, in general, there is a 
consensus in the literature that individuals’ performance is particularly important in 
performance management systems (Smith and Goddard, 2002).  
 
The focus on individuals’ performance is also reflected in the one-to-one performance 
reviews that take place between the line manager and appraisee (Murphy and Cleveland, 
1995). Mostly, performance appraisals tend to be conducted at the individual level, and the 
emphasis of the appraisals is on individuals’ performance, effort, and performance outcomes 
(Furnham, 2004). Although some authors have argued that focusing on individual 
performance can undermine team efforts, especially when individual performance is 
measured and rewarded (Samnani and Singh, 2014), understanding individual performance 
remains an important level of analysis (Campbell and Wiernik, 2015).  
 
Researchers studying performance management systems also differ in the core areas 
emphasised and this diversity is evident in the various definitions offered (see Table 2.1), the 
variables studied (e.g., Farndale et al., 2011; Poister et al., 2013), and research proposed by 
authors in their search for an optimal performance management system (e.g., Den Hartog et 
al., 2004; Farndale et al., 2011). For example, while Aguinis (2014) focused on the process of 
aligning individuals’ goals with organisational goals in a manner that supports the 
organisation’s strategic vision, Denisi and Smith (2014) emphasised the idea of aligning 
performance management systems with other human resource management functions such 
that all human resource management activities support and complement one another. Thorpe 
and Holloway (2008), on the other hand, suggested that the topic of performance 
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management be studied from a multidisciplinary perspective so that performance 
management would benefit from the various contributions made by different disciplines. 
Houldsworth and Burkinshaw (2008: 70) offered a different viewpoint, stating that 
“performance is in the eye of the beholder” because the job role of employees could influence 
the way in which employees define performance. In addition to these diverse opinions, 
Armstrong and Baron (1998) stated that there is no correct way of carrying out performance 
management systems because any performance management system needs to be adapted to 
the conditions and requirements of the organisation as well as the needs of individual 
employees.  
 
Table 2.1: Some of the key definitions of performance management 
Author Definition 
Armstrong and 
Baron (1998: 7) 
“Performance management is a strategic and integrated approach to 
delivering sustained success to organisations by improving the 
performance of the people who work in them and by developing the 
capabilities of teams and individual contributors”.  
 
Den Hartog et al. 
(2004) 
Performance management includes aligning human resource 
management activities in order to develop and improve the 
performance of individuals, with the purpose of boosting the 
performance of organisations.   
 
Denisi and 
Pritchard (2006) 
 
Performance management is defined as the broad set of activities 
that seek to motivate employees to enhance their performance, with 
the ultimate goal of enhancing organisational performance.  
 
Ferreira and Otley 
(2009: 264) 
Performance management includes “the evolving formal and 
informal mechanisms, processes, systems, and networks used by 
the organisation for conveying the key objectives and goals elicited 
by management for assisting the strategic process and ongoing 
management through analysis, planning, measurement, control, 
rewarding, and broadly managing performance, and for supporting 
organisational learning and change.” 
 
Aguinis (2014: 2) “Performance management is a continuous process of identifying, 
measuring, and developing the performance of individuals and 
teams and aligning performance with the strategic goals of the 
organisation.” 
 
Denisi and Smith 
(2014: 131) 
Performance management encompasses “all the activities a firm 
undertakes to improve an employee’s performance, beginning with 
the evaluation of performance and subsequent feedback to the 
employee, and continuing through training and administration of 
rewards”.   
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Overall, there have been numerous attempts by researchers to define performance 
management systems and articulate their use. Generally, Aguinis’s definition is one of the 
most adopted ones as it specifically relates employees’ performance to that of organisations. 
Denisi and Smith’s definition is also commonly used, but it has been criticised on the grounds 
that it is too broad and does not eliminate any human resource management practice, which 
then makes it even more difficult to identify what practices performance management 
systems include and do not include (Schleicher et al., 2018). Furthermore, performance 
management systems are not just about practices, they are also about the context in which the 
systems are implemented and the way employees operating within the systems interact with 
them (Den Hartog et al., 2004).   
 
Although there is a lot ambiguity around the boundaries of performance management systems 
(Smith and Goddard, 2002), the purpose of the systems is clear, which is to enable employees 
and organisations to enhance their performance (Biron et al., 2011). However, while the aim 
of performance management systems may be clear in this sense, the process of how to 
achieve the aim is unclear. The reason performance management systems have for a long time 
spurred much research and endless critiques is because they have, on numerous occasions, 
shown that they do not achieve what all researchers agree the systems should achieve. Hence, 
researchers have become split between those who have almost lost faith in the ability of the 
systems to improve performance (Coens and Jenkins, 2000) and those who continue to 
defend their role in organisations (Denisi and Smith, 2014).  
 
However, in light of the growing body of research showing that performance management 
systems regularly do not work as intended, even the most enthusiastic proponents of 
performance management systems have started to acknowledge their limitations (Aguinis and 
Pierce, 2008). There is now a general recognition that the use of performance management 
systems can incur enormous costs for organisations without bringing much financial gain and 
can also engender negative unintended outcomes (Biron et al., 2011; Hood, 2006).   
 
Given that the primary aim of performance management systems is to positively affect 
employee and organisational performance, the next section presents key debates in the 
literature about the relationship between performance management systems and the 
performance outcomes to which they lead. 
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2.4 Performance management outcomes 
It is argued that organisations implementing performance management systems generally 
outperform those that do not manage their performance (Leeuw et al., 2011). However, 
despite the often stated assertion that performance management systems lead to better 
performance (Aguinis, 2014), research that studies the role of performance management in 
enhancing employees and organisational performance is inconclusive (Biron et al., 2011). 
 
While some scholars actively praise the benefits of performance management systems 
(Aguinis, 2014), others express criticism and concern regarding the effectiveness of such 
systems (Biron et al., 2011; Poister et al., 2013). Haines and St-Onge (2012) reported that 
80% to 90% of human resource management departments believed that their performance 
management systems fail to improve organisational performance. Similarly, Coens and 
Jenkins (2000) said that while 80% of organisations in the United States use performance 
management systems, 90% of them are not satisfied with their systems. 
 
Advocates of performance management systems, on the other hand, have proposed that there 
is a positive relationship between performance management and performance improvement, 
suggesting that performance management systems influence individuals’ behaviour, in turn 
helping organisations to achieve their desired goals (Leeuw et al., 2011). Although this 
rationale may appear intuitively appealing, the relationship between individual and 
organisational performance is not as straightforward as it may seem because organisational 
performance is not simply the sum of individual performances, meaning that changing 
employees’ performance alone may not be sufficient to influence organisational performance 
(Denisi and Smith, 2014). For example, the social context and the way the systems are 
implemented can play a vital role in whether the systems are able to affect positive 
performance outcomes on employees and organisations or not (Murphy and Cleveland, 
1995). Moreover, Den Hartog et al. (2004) added that the relationship between individual and 
organisational performance is often assumed rather than tested. This means that the argument 
that there are linear relationships between performance management systems, employee 
performance and organisational performance does not hold well in practice, and researchers’ 
inability to demonstrate such relationship is an indication of this. 
 
Furthermore, while it is argued that performance management systems positively influence 
employees’ performance, there is no general consensus in the literature about how exactly 
  26 
performance management systems influence employees’ performance (Koufteros et al., 
2014). There is also no agreed model for performance management that could be universally 
employed (Davenport and Gardiner, 2007). Instead, there is a plethora of suggestions and 
performance management models that seek to remedy the shortcomings of performance 
management in improving organisational performance (e.g., Den Hartog et al., 2004; Levy 
and Williams, 2004, Denisi and Smith, 2014). These proposed models and systems have in 
turn led to some practices and suggestions that are disconnected from firms’ day-to-day 
activities (Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011).  
 
In the face of numerous debates about the extent to which performance management systems 
bring positive gains for employees and organisations, some researchers have identified a 
number of features that enable performance management systems to achieve their intended 
outcomes or hamper the achievement of such outcomes. These debates are presented below. 
 
2.5 What enables performance management systems to achieve their intended 
outcomes? 
According to Denisi and Smith (2014), performance management systems are more likely to 
improve employees’ performance when they go beyond performance appraisal systems and 
include additional activities such as effective performance goals, adequate performance 
measures and feedback, and regular documentation of employees’ performance. Performance 
appraisals should be part of the wider performance management system because they provide 
valuable information that can be used for purposes such as measuring employees’ 
performance and identifying their strengths and weaknesses, which can be subsequently used 
in performance management systems to improve their performance (Denisi and Pritchard, 
2006). 
  
The behaviour of the line manager (i.e., the appraiser) is also deemed a key factor that can 
largely influence the effects that performance management systems have on employees 
(Pulakos, 2009). This is because it is the line manager who both implements performance 
management systems and to a large degree shapes the way employees perceive the systems 
(Den Hartog et al., 2004). Furthermore, the relationship between line managers and 
employees plays a large part in influencing employees’ job satisfaction and performance 
levels (Maley and Moeller, 2012).  
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Considering the importance of the relationship between appraisers and appraisees, Pulakos 
and O’Leary (2011) asserted that performance management research will only develop if 
scholars pay more attention to the communication process between managers and employees, 
and find ways to enhance  the relationship between the two parties. Jones and Culbertson 
(2011) supported Pulakos and O’Leary’s suggestions, recommending that the authoritarian 
nature of performance management systems (i.e., top down relationships) should be removed, 
calling for a non-authoritarian approach to performance management systems. 
 
Having looked at some of the areas that can help performance management systems to 
achieve their goals, and considering that the focus of this thesis is to examine the negative 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems, the chapter now turns to detailing 
some of the commonly stated factors in the literature that prevent performance management 
systems from reaching their intended outcomes.  
 
2.6 What inhibits performance management systems from achieving their intended 
outcomes? 
Buchner (2007) argued that performance management lacks a theoretical foundation and does 
not seem to be sufficiently supported by theories, adding that given the poor understanding of 
the theories that underlie performance management systems, an inadequate application of 
performance management in organisations could ensue. Similarly, Thorpe and Beasley (2008) 
suggested that researchers should take a critical position and gain an in-depth understanding 
of the theoretical and empirical foundations that underpin the components of performance 
management systems. 
 
Another concern raised by researchers refers to the gap between the theory and practice in 
performance management systems (e.g., Buchner, 2007; Aguinis and Pierce, 2008; Maley and 
Moeller, 2012). Armstrong and Baron (1998) reported that conceptually, performance 
management had greatly developed over time, but practically, performance management had 
not significantly moved away from more traditional performance appraisals. For example, 
new approaches to performance management have recommended that performance 
management be carried out on an ongoing basis throughout the year, and embrace a wide 
range of activities that support employees’ performance (Pulakos, 2009; Aguinis, 2014; 
Denisi and Smith, 2014). However, in practice, many managers have continued only to 
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conduct annual appraisals in order to identify areas for development, review employees’ 
needs, and assess employees’ progress (Armstrong and Baron, 1998).  
 
In addition to the theory and practice gap, the issue of transparency forms an additional 
challenge for performance management systems (Bawole et al., 2013). While it has long been 
argued that the clarity and transparency of performance management is essential (Kearney, 
1978), the processes, mechanisms (Pavlov and Bourne, 2011) and credibility of performance 
management are frequently questioned (Furnham, 2004). Questions in performance 
management literature have been raised particularly in relation to performance measurement 
processes, where numerous issues exist including the adequacy of performance measures 
(Denisi and Pritchard, 2006), the subjectivity in performance evaluation (Van Rinsum and 
Verbeeten, 2010), and the motivation and ability of appraisers to accurately rate employees’ 
performance (Furnham, 2004; Bawole et al., 2013). Due to the complexities of accurately 
measuring performance (Furnham, 2004), a large body of research has focused on the 
accuracy of performance measurements (Den Hartog et al., 2004). However, because of the 
extensive focus on performance measurement, many scholars have argued that other key 
areas of performance management have been overlooked (Denisi and Pritchard, 2006).  
 
Among the often overlooked areas in performance management research are those related to 
the potentially adverse effects of performance management systems when they encourage 
employees to engage in actions that go against organisational goals (Franco-Santos and Otley, 
2018). For example, Denisi and Smith (2014) suggested that the way performance 
management systems can induce employees to engage in inappropriate behaviours is an area 
that demands more attention and additional study because any human resource management 
system that seeks to direct the behaviour of employees can simultaneously generate unwanted 
outcomes. To do so, it may be useful to consider how employees perceive performance 
management practices (Den Hartog et al., 2013) because the way in which employees 
perceive and assess human resource management practices can significantly affect their 
attitude and behaviour (Guest, 1999).  
 
As shown, there are ample arguments that suggest that performance management systems can 
influence employees’ performance in unwanted ways (Atwater and Elkins, 2009). 
Accordingly, this research seeks to explore how performance management systems can result 
in outcomes not originally intended by the systems. In particular, this research focuses on the 
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impact of three major performance management processes: goals, performance measurement, 
and rewards on employees’ performance. The following sections start by justifying the choice 
of these three processes, and then proceed to consider each of them respectively. 
 
2.7 Reasons for the selection of goal setting, performance measurement, and rewards 
There are two main reasons for the selection of these three processes. The first is that 
although performance management systems manifest themselves in numerous processes and 
take different guises (Armstrong and Baron, 1998), the triad of goals, measurement and 
rewards is present in almost any performance management system (e.g., Ferreira and Otley, 
2009; Pulakos, 2009; Aguinis, 2014). This is because the establishment of performance 
management is usually based on a framework of prearranged goals and performance 
standards against which employees’ performance is measured (Hope, 2013). Rewards are key 
in performance management systems because determining employees’ compensation is one 
of main aims of performance management systems (Armstrong and Baron, 1998). 
Furthermore, rewards are probably one of the most important features of performance 
management systems for employees, and therefore determining the right reward to motivate 
employees is inevitable for improved employee performance (Aguinis, 2014). Typically, the 
three performance management practices of goal setting, performance measurement and 
setting rewards are found in combination in performance management systems because these 
practices are normally intertwined in that when goals are measured, they are also often 
rewarded (Pulakos, 2009).  
 
The second reason is that given that this thesis seeks to explore the unintended effects of 
performance management systems, these three processes are frequently targeted in 
discussions surrounding the performance management processes that are likely to lead to 
unintended consequences in organisations (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2004; Kelman and 
Friedman, 2009; Ordóñez et al., 2009). Although these processes are discussed in the 
following sections in greater depth, a broad overview of why these processes could have 
unintended effects on employee and organisational performance is presented below.  
 
With regard to goals, the underlying premise that performance management systems align 
organisational and employee performance has been criticised on many counts. In ideal 
situations, organisations’ and employees’ goals may be in line with each other (Molleman and 
Timmerman, 2003). However, there are numerous occasions where organisations’ and 
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employees’ goals may be in conflict (Furnham 2004), and personal interests may override the 
interests of the organisation (e.g., Kelman and Friedman, 2009). Furthermore, organisations 
nowadays operate in highly complex and continually changing environments, where effective 
strategies and goals may not be easy to identify in advance (Poister et al., 2013), and an 
attempt to set clear goals for employees might prove dysfunctional in practice (Van Dooren, 
2011). 
 
With regard to performance measurement, advocates of performance measurement systems 
suggest that it is essential to measure employees’ performance because “what gets measured 
is what matters” (Bevan and Hood, 2006: 517), meaning that the performance areas measured 
by organisations are the ones that matter to employees. In considering this statement, it can 
be seen that two important assumptions are made. The first is that if an organisation measures 
a certain task, the task will also matter to employees, thus improving employees’ 
performance. The second is that organisations are able to design the right performance 
measures to enable them to assess the way employees and organisations perform. As has been 
historically demonstrated in performance measurement literature, designing the right 
performance measures is difficult to achieve, and the introduction of performance measures 
has motivated employees across different sectors to engage in counterproductive work 
behaviours (Hood, 2006). In view of this, Wisniewski and Dickson (2001) explained that 
because performance measurements direct employees’ behaviour, inadequate performance 
measurement systems can severely harm organisations (Wisniewski and Dickson, 2001). Pidd 
(2005) added that if organisations decide to implement performance measurement systems, 
they need to account for the possible negative consequences that may be incurred and weigh 
the costs and benefits of implementing performance measurement systems, considering 
whether the benefits will be greater than the costs that could be engendered by implementing 
such systems.  
 
With respect to rewards, performance based rewards, also known as performance related pay 
(Kessler and Purcell, 1992) or contingent pay (Ganster, et al., 2011), play a central part in 
performance management systems (Armstrong and Baron, 1998). The argument behind this 
type of compensation scheme is that employees tend to work better when their compensation 
is tied to their effort and performance outcomes, and organisations’ performance increases 
when employees’ incentives are tied to organisational goals (Heinrich and Marschke, 2010). 
For this purpose, numerous organisations adopt performance management systems in order to 
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help them make decisions in areas such as employees’ pay, bonuses, promotion, assignments 
and dismissal (Pulakos, 2009).  
 
However, while rewards can support organisations to achieve the above noted benefits, they 
can simultaneously prompt unintended and dysfunctional work behaviour (Samnani and Sign, 
2014). For instance, Harris and Bromiley (2007) found a positive relationship between chief 
executive officers’ rewards and financial misrepresentation in that rewards (in the form of 
stock options) increased chief executive officers’ willingness to misrepresent their 
organisational reports. Gupta and Shaw (2014) explained that when organisations introduce 
rewards, such as monetary incentives, and relate them to employees’ performance, employees 
are likely to display both functional and dysfunctional behaviour to attain the reward. Hence, 
determining the right reward in organisations is an intricate process, and the influence of 
rewards on various elements of performance can differ depending on the way rewards are 
designed and implemented (Ganster et al., 2011).  
 
In the next sections, goals, performance measurement, and rewards are discussed with the 
aim of illustrating their role and impact on employees’ performance, and also of showing how 
they can give rise to unintended outcomes in organisations. The reason the three practices are 
addressed below individually and not collectively is because the great majority of research 
into the behaviours not intended by performance management systems that employees engage 
in as a response to these three performance management practices is predominantly available 
in related literature such as in organisation psychology and accounting and auditing research 
(Franco-Santos et al., 2012; Power, 1997; Kepes and McDaniel, 2013; Welsh et al., 2015).  
 
The purpose of the three following sections on goal setting, performance measurement and 
rewards is to review the three practices, discuss research that supports them, presents research 
that considers them more critically, and explain how they sometimes do not lead to their 
intended outcomes.  
 
2.8 Goal setting theory 
Goal setting theory is a motivation theory that explains the elements that make certain 
individuals perform better than others in their work-related tasks (Locke and Latham, 2013). 
Goal setting has strongly impacted the behaviour and thinking in organisations since the late 
1960s (Vigoda-Gadot and Angert, 2007). It has been supported by decades of empirical 
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studies and has become a common motivational technique employed by organisations to 
enhance their employees’ performance (Barsky, 2008).  
 
According to goal setting theory, a goal is defined as the object or the purpose of a particular 
behaviour, and it is characterised by two key features: content and intensity (Locke and 
Latham, 2013). The former is defined as the object or outcomes a person strives to achieve; 
the latter refers to the effort required to achieve a goal, the value of a goal in a person’s 
hierarchy of goals, and the degree to which a person is committed to reaching the goal (ibid.). 
In terms of goal content, until 1990, research examined the impact of the degree of goal 
specificity and difficulty set for many tasks in different contexts. In terms of goal intensity, 
until 1990, research mainly considered what determines goal commitment and the impact of 
goal commitment on individuals’ performance (ibid.).  
 
In 1990, Locke and Latham conducted a meta-analysis of approximately 400 empirical 
studies and found a direct relationship between the level of difficulty and task performance 
(Locke and Latham, 2013). They also found that specific and difficult goals lead to better 
performance rather than having no goal, or vague and unclear goals such as “do your best”, 
arguing that when people are asked to do their best, they do not because “do your best” does 
not have an external reference point, and as result it can be interpreted differently by different 
people (Locke and Latham, 2002).  
 
Hence, it is important that goals are established in organisations as goals enable the 
determination of the performance standards against which individuals’ performance is 
assessed (Locke and Latham, 2002). Then, if employees’ performance falls short of the goal, 
their performance may be perceived as a failure (London and Oldham, 1976). Locke and 
Latham (2013) proposed that in order to help individuals reach their goals, it is helpful if they 
are provided with feedback on their performance so that they are aware of how their current 
performance can be rated relative to the goal, and information on current performance can 
help individuals to identify whether extra effort or different work strategies are needed if their 
goals are to be attained. Before discussing in greater depth the relationship between specific 
difficult goals and employees’ performance as described by Locke and Latham (2013) and 
others, the prevalence of goals in performance management systems is discussed. 
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2.8.1 The prevalence of goal setting in performance management  
Performance management scholars have enthusiastically endorsed goal setting, and they often 
describe goals as “the most important aspects of any performance management system” 
(Denisi, 2011: 269). Results from a survey in 2011 showed that 62% of companies in the 
United Kingdom used goal setting in their attempts to manage the performance of their 
employees (Bipp and Kleingeld, 2011).  
 
It was suggested that performance management systems start by determining the performance 
goals that the organisation seeks to attain, which are then cascaded down to group and 
individual levels (Denisi, 2011). Through this process of linking organisational goals to 
individual goals, the performance management system is believed to strengthen the types of 
behaviour desired by organisations (Aguinis, 2014). Furthermore, by demonstrating the way 
in which the work in organisations is coordinated, there may be more chances that individuals 
collectively work towards the firm’s strategic vision and priorities (Schleicher et al., 2018).  
 
Although this practice of cascading goals from the upper echelon of management down to 
employees at the lower organisational level is popular today, it has been questioned for 
numerous reasons (Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011). Pulakos (2009) argued that while the process 
of relating organisational goals to various organisational levels may sound feasible, in reality 
the practice of cascading goals is much more complex than described. This is because 
organisational goals are often broad and ambiguous, so managers generally struggle to 
cascade them to individual employees (Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011). Furthermore, employees 
might not be able to clearly understand and relate the goals of the organisation to their 
individual work (Pulakos, 2009). Hence, in practice, organisational goals seldom traverse the 
highest organisational divisions to reach lower level employees (Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011). 
 
2.8.2 Specific difficult goals and high performance  
As mentioned earlier in this section, Locke and Latham (2013) proposed that it is important 
for individuals to have specific and difficult goals at work. This section explains how specific 
and difficult goals can positively affect individuals’ performance.  
 
Having specific goals can equip employees with information regarding the specific outcomes 
to be achieved, and therefore enable them to identify potentially effective ways of achieving 
those outcomes (Steers and Porter, 1974). However, Locke and Latham (2002) argued that 
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unless specific goals are also difficult, they may not result in improved performance. Difficult 
goals improve performance by encouraging people to exert more effort and work harder 
because if people have difficult goals, they need to work hard to achieve them whereas if they 
have easy goals, they do not need to work as hard (Locke, 1968). Similarly, London and 
Oldham (1976) stated that performance is better when the minimum performance standards 
for a task are high as opposed to when the minimum performance standards are low.  
 
However, London and Oldham (1976) added that high minimum standards enhance 
individuals’ performance only if the task is perceived by those individuals to be possible to 
complete because if the minimum standard is perceived to be too high, it may have adverse 
effects on performance. Therefore, it is important that goals are accepted by individuals 
(Locke, 1968), and viewed as possible because if people think that goals are very difficult, 
they will likely reject them (Garland, 1983). 
 
The above views suggest that goals can be most effective in improving individuals’ 
performance when they are both specific and difficult (Terborg, 1976). Specific difficult goals 
can help people focus their attention and energies on relevant tasks instead of irrelevant ones 
(Locke and Latham, 2006), and encourage them to develop strategies for achieving their 
goals and increasing their persistence in attaining them (Schiebener et al., 2014).  
 
In terms of persistence, specific difficult goals can motivate individuals to prolong their 
efforts (Locke et al., 1981). For example, in a study of prose learning, it was found that 
difficult goals encouraged participants to spend considerably longer time studying the given 
passages than those who were assigned general or easy goals (LaPorte and Nath, 1976). With 
regard to strategy development, specific difficult goals can motivate individuals to develop 
strategies that can help them to achieve their goal (Campbell, 1991; Schiebener et al., 2014). 
For example, in order to increase employees’ performance, Latham and Baldes (1975) set a 
specific difficult goal for truck drivers by increasing the load that trucks should carry from 
the woods to the mill. They found that specific difficult goals not only increased drivers’ 
performance but also encouraged drivers to develop work strategies by making modifications 
to their trucks, and changing the way they loaded wood in the trucks (ibid).  
 
However, while multiple researchers have found that when employees engage in the process 
of developing work-related strategies, it enhances their performance (Locke et al., 1981), 
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others have found that goal setting did not lead to this outcome, and instead had opposing 
unintended effects (Earley et al., 1989). In their research, Earley et al. (1989) found that 
specific difficult goals encouraged people to look excessively for strategies that would enable 
them to do their tasks, and so reduced their performance. In light of these findings, Earley et 
al. (1989) challenged the assumption that specific difficult goals lead to higher performance 
by arguing that the process of searching for performance strategies does not necessarily mean 
that effective strategies will be found, which led them to conclude that specific difficult goals 
may not increase individuals’ performance, especially during the learning stage, where 
effective strategies are yet to be identified.  
 
Considering the different debates surrounding the efficacy of goal setting theory, the next 
section presents certain key arguments and research findings which do not support the 
findings of Locke and Latham’s (2013) meta-analysis that specific difficult goals improve 
individuals’ performance so that a balanced view of the various implications of implementing 
goal setting theory is provided.  
 
2.8.3 Specific difficult goals and low performance   
Although the idea that specific and difficult goals enhance people’s performance is popular 
today (Locke and Latham, 2013), there is research that challenges this idea (Mowen et al., 
1981). For example, Forward and Zander (1971), among others (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2004) 
found that specific difficult goals had unintended effects on their participants as they 
negatively affected the performance of participants in their research.  
 
Mowen et al. (1981) reported that one reason for these contradictory findings could be that 
goals considered difficult by certain researchers were not considered difficult by the 
participants in the research. Another reason might be that researchers utilised various 
incentive structures, for instance, certain researchers paid participants for their input 
regardless of whether the participants achieved their goal or not whereas other researchers 
rewarded their participants only if they attained their assigned goals, hence, introducing 
different incentive systems may have had different effects on participants’ performance 
(ibid.).  
 
Another explanation for goal setting not leading to its intended outcomes and having adverse 
effects on organisations is offered by Ordóñez et al. (2009), who challenged the notion that 
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goals should be specific and difficult, arguing that when managers set specific goals for their 
employees, managers frequently do not consider the implications of their instructions. 
Ordóñez et al. (2009) explained that while specific goals can motivate employees to achieve 
the specified goals, specific goals militate against achievement in other performance areas 
that are not specified by managers. For example, in an experiment conducted by Staw and 
Boettger (1990), where participants were given a paragraph that contained both grammatical 
and content errors, but were given instructions to focus on the grammatical errors. The 
experiment showed that goal setting hampered individuals’ ability to correct obvious content 
errors (Ordóñez et al., 2009). 
 
On the other hand, when goals are difficult, there are fewer chances that people will meet 
them, and thus the possibility of failing to achieve the goal is higher (Ordóñez et al., 2009). 
Failing to achieve a goal can have negative emotional and psychological consequences such 
as reducing satisfaction with one’s performance and sense of self-efficacy (ibid.).  
 
Self-efficacy is defined as a belief in one’s ability to achieve certain outcomes (Benight and 
Bandura, 2004), and it constitutes a fundamental part of goal setting theory (Locke and 
Latham, 2013). One of the reasons self-efficacy is important for goal setting theory is because 
people with high self-efficacy, compared to those with low self-efficacy, are more committed 
to their allocated tasks, and more likely to find effective ways to reach difficult goals (Locke 
and Latham, 2002). However, while the impact of self-efficacy on improved performance has 
been substantiated by a large number of empirical studies, there are also studies, primarily 
conducted by Vancouver and his colleagues that have found a negative relationship between 
self-efficacy and performance (Vancouver and Kendall, 2006). One of their main arguments 
is that self-efficacy may trigger a sense of overconfidence and complacency, and as a result, 
individuals become less motivated to dedicate their resources to performing work related 
tasks, which leads to decreases in performance (Vancouver et al., 2002). 
 
In summary, while there has been much support for goal setting theory, there has also been 
growing criticism of it on the grounds that goal setting does not always lead to its intended 
outcomes and can instead have adverse effects on organisations (Welsh et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, goal setting theory has largely been tested using simple manual tasks (e.g., 
Latham and Baldes, 1975). However, these tasks perhaps do not reflect the nature of 
performance in most work settings, where job roles are more complex.  
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2.9 Performance measurement systems  
The process of measuring performance is prevalent in all types of organisations as employees 
often judge their own actions based on informal criteria, perhaps for their own personal 
development (Pidd, 2005). However, the process of measuring performance can also be 
formal when performance measures are used by managers to enhance organisational 
performance (Brignall, 2008). Performance measures are increasingly employed in 
organisations to help managers make work-related decisions and manage their employees’ 
performance (Pavlov and Bourne, 2011). Performance measures play two important roles. In 
prospective terms, performance measures allow organisations to determine and make links 
between the goals, the means of achieving them and performance outcomes they wish to see. 
In retrospective terms, performance measures allow organisations to assess their performance 
outcomes (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003). 
 
Considering the value of measuring performance in enhancing organisational performance 
(Brignall, 2008), organisations have increasingly started to present a large number of their 
performance variables in numerical form (Ridgway, 1956). Ridgway (1956) noted that the 
growing interest in and use of techniques such as statistical decision making and operations 
research, which all need variables that can be quantified, has encouraged the creation of 
performance measurements. 
 
Performance measurements are defined as “a quantitative or qualitative value of the input, 
output, outcome or level of activity of an event or process” (Radnor, 2008: 317). Typically, 
the practice of measuring performance suggests that the outcome of a task can be assessed 
against specific goals, and that the information gathered can be utilised to manage 
organisational activities, guide employees’ efforts (Hofstede, 1981), and allocate 
organisational resources (Waggoner et al., 1999). Performance measurements are considered 
successful when they facilitate the attainment of organisational goals and unsuccessful when 
they lead to unintended outcomes and prevent such attainment (Vakkuri and Meklin, 2006). 
To achieve organisational goals, organisations often design their goals in the form of 
performance indicators (Keasey et al., 2000).  
 
2.9.1 Performance indicators 
Performance indicators are defined as an objective estimation of performance that is not 
possible to measure directly (Jackson, 2011). Performance indicators are important in 
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organisations because they clarify for employees what performance areas will be measured 
and the level of performance required (Douwe et al., 1996). Furthermore, effective 
performance indicators can help organisations to identify problematic performance areas by 
indicating the gap between the current organisational performance and desired performance 
(Muchiri et al., 2011). Performance indicators can be used by managers as a tool for 
management control in that they focus employees on the performance areas that are 
considered important by managers (Jordan and Messner, 2012). 
 
Performance indicators have been embraced in much management literature including 
principle/agent literature (Smith, 1990). Principle/agent literature places great emphasis on 
the power division between the principle and agent, arguing that agents should be 
accountable for delivering a number of performance outcomes to their principal(s) based on 
performance indicators (Jackson, 2011). Although a detailed discussion of accountability is 
beyond the bounds of this research, the main argument is that those in possession of capital 
should have the ability to assess their agents’ performance and punish them if required, and 
that by having effective information systems in place, principals should be able to adequately 
control their employees (Smith, 1990).  
 
While such a perspective emphasises the idea of adequate performance information systems 
for measurements and control (Smith, 1990), other researchers have criticised the use of 
performance measurements, arguing that the process of measuring performance is 
challenging and it is not always clear what measures an organisation should employ (Neely, 
1999). Additionally, people may have different views about what elements of their 
performance should be measured and, as a result, they may not equally agree about the 
relevance of the performance measures used and/or the value allocated to each performance 
indicator (Bentes et al., 2012).  
 
Guilfoyle (2012) added that not everything that influences an individuals’ performance is 
within his/her control, for instance, although it is often assumed that the police have full 
control over reducing crime, police interventions are just one factor amid many other factors 
that could reduce the crime rate in a society. Therefore, inadequate measures that do not 
account for the external factors that are beyond the control of employees may pose problems 
for employees and managers if it is difficult to ascertain whether performance attainments are 
due to employees’ performance, or to other external factors (Heinrich, 2007).  
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Another criticism of performance indicators relates to the static and limited information they 
provide. For instance, in the secondary education sector, exam results might be considered as 
an indication of improved performance (Smith, 1990). If there is additional investment in 
education in one particular year, and exam results are better in that year, it could be 
erroneously assumed that the better results are due to the additional investment when high 
exam grades might not only be due to the current year’s investment, but the result of many 
years of investment in education (ibid.).   
 
These viewpoints seem to be supported by a number of researchers who have questioned the 
adequacy of performance measures in assessing employees’ performance and criticised their 
implementation in organisations (Keasy et al., 2000). They have argued that individuals’ 
performance is multifaceted and complex (Jackson, 2011), and a single performance measure 
that fully represents employees’ performance does not exist (Cocanougher and Ivancevich, 
1978). Discussions surrounding the multidimensional nature of employees’ performance and 
limitations of using performance measures to assess employees’ performance are presented 
below.  
 
2.9.2 The multidimensional nature of employees’ performance  
Research on performance measurement is firmly grounded in theories of rational and planned 
behaviour of individuals and organisations (Vakkuri and Meklin, 2006). In the majority of 
cases, the focus of performance measurement is on quantitative and numerical data, with the 
purpose of offering unbiased, consistent, and rigorous performance information (Marr, 2008). 
The major limitation of this type of research is that it presumes that the challenges of 
measuring individuals’ performance can be satisfactorily addressed by developing advanced 
performance measurement methods and performance indicators (Vakkuri and Meklin, 2006).  
 
In reality, organisational activities are complex, intertwined and multifaceted, and an attempt 
to focus on single performance measures can negatively impact organisational performance 
and lead to unintended outcomes not wanted by organisations (Keasey et al., 2000). 
Sometimes, improving performance in one area can only be achieved by lowering 
performance in another area (Bentes et al., 2012). This, for example, can occur if an 
employee valorises measurable performance areas such as performance costs instead of less 
easily measurable ones such as service quality (Jackson, 2011). 
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Furthermore, while quantitative performance measures are certainly useful (Vakkuri and 
Meklin, 2006), they appear to be more relevant to certain types of performance than others 
(Marr, 2008). This is because there are some aspects of performance that can be measured 
and others that are impossible to quantify (Jackson, 2011). An example of measurable and 
unmeasurable performance dimensions includes profit versus customer relations (Marr, 
2008).  
 
Considering the challenges associated with adequately measuring individuals’ performance, 
many researchers such as Fearfull and Clarkson (2008) have contended that a broader 
spectrum of performance areas and performance outcomes should be considered. This could 
be achieved, for example, if managers do not only focus on the results of employees’ 
performance (i.e., what is achieved), but also consider the behaviour employees display (i.e., 
how results are achieved) (Conanougher and Ivancevich, 1978). When managers 
predominantly emphasise the performance results of employees, managers risk making 
imperfect performance evaluations because they may give insufficient attention to how 
employees attain those results (Pulakos, 2009). Employees may achieve positive performance 
outcomes, but their behaviour could be seen as problematic if employees achieved these 
outcomes by acting in dysfunctional manners (Smith, 1995) such as being unhelpful to 
colleagues and causing problems at work (Pulakos, 2009). 
  
In addition to the multidimensional nature of employees’ performance, there are other 
challenges associated with performance measurements. Research has demonstrated that the 
process of rating employees’ performance is often tainted by numerous factors such as raters’ 
motivation to accurately measure employees’ performance because raters’ self-interest may 
override the organisations’ goal of providing valid and accurate performance ratings for 
employees (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995).  
 
2.9.3 Raters’ motivation to distort employees’ performance ratings  
Numerous researchers have asserted that managers often find the process of accurately rating 
employees’ performance to be challenging (Khan, 2013). However, despite the challenges of 
measuring employees’ performance, organisations still require accurate performance 
information that adequately reflects their employees’ performance, especially if the data 
collected from performance measurements will be used to make organisational decisions 
(Ilgen, 1993).  
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Traditionally, it was assumed that managers are usually motivated to provide accurate 
performance information about their employees (Levy and Williams, 2004). However, this 
assumption has been challenged by numerous researchers who found that raters intentionally 
distorted their ratees’ performance scores (Longenecker et al., 1987). Murphy and Cleveland 
(1995) argued that, in many cases, it is not the ability of the raters that influences their 
performance rating accuracy, but the motivation of the rater that plays a major role. Raters 
can be capable of accurately measuring their employees’ performance, yet may choose not to 
do so for numerous reasons (Poon, 2004). 
 
Some of the reasons that can motivate raters to distort the ratings of their employees’ 
performance may be related to the consequences that could result from the ratings they 
provide (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995). For example, Murphy and Cleveland (1995) 
explained that raters may gain personal benefits when inflating the performance ratings of 
their employees as employees’ ratings may reflect managers’ performance in terms of 
managers’ ability to effectively manage and support their employees in achieving good 
performance results. On the other hand, when managers constantly give employees low 
performance scores, managers may be perceived as poor performers in that they are unable to 
help their employees improve their performance (ibid.). Similarly, Longenecker et al. (1987) 
conducted a study in which they found that raters valued the consequences of their 
performance ratings more than they valued the provision of accurate performance ratings, for 
instance, raters inflated their ratings to ensure that their ratees received rewards, and deflated 
their ratings to punish insubordinate employees, or pressurise employees to leave the 
company.  
 
Having said that, it is important to note that there are scholars who are of the view that 
subjectivity in performance management is positive (Van Rinsum and Verbeeten, 2012). Van 
Rinsum and Verbeeten (2012) argued that subjectivity can increase employees’ motivation 
provided that the rater is capable of generating informative feedback for employees, adding 
that subjectivity in performance evaluation can give raters some leeway in accounting for 
additional performance dimensions such as the quality of the relationship between an 
employee and his/her customers. 
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However, on balance, subjectivity is often found to be unproductive as it can adversely affect 
employees’ motivation and reduce trust between raters and ratees (Van Rinsum and 
Verbeeten, 2012). When raters manipulate their ratings owing to personal reasons or to 
penalise employees, employees may think that the ratings lack justification and fairness, 
which can have the adverse unintended effect of lowing employees’ satisfaction and 
increasing staff turnover (Poon, 2004). 
 
The above sections on performance measurements have attempted to offer an overview of the 
debates around the merits and demerits of implementing performance measurements in 
organisations. It has been shown that there are numerous concurrent challenges associated 
with performance measurements. These challenges, however, have not discouraged 
organisations, in both the public and private sectors, from actively searching and 
implementing performance measurement systems (Keasey et al., 2000).  
 
Performance measurements are commonly employed in performance management systems 
and they are often used as a tool to evaluate employees’ performance and allocate rewards 
(Fisher and Downes, 2008). If employees’ performance is positively assessed, rewards are 
usually the outcome that follow performance measurements (Ferreira and Otley, 2009). The 
next section discusses the role of rewards in organisations, and shows how rewards can play 
an important part in shaping employees’ behaviour (Pfeffer, 1997). 
 
2.10 The role of rewards in organisations 
Rewards are considered to be very powerful tools that can influence employees’ performance 
and help organisations sustain their competitive advantage (Chiang and Birtch, 2012). A 
reward is defined as “something that increases the frequency of an employee action” 
(Aguinis, 2014: 281). The way in which employees are rewarded can affect their satisfaction, 
trust, perceived equity, and other attitudes to work (Ganster et al., 2011).  
 
Rewards inform employees about the goals that their organisation prioritises and the 
performance outcomes they are expected to achieve (Aguinis, 2014). In this vein, rewards are 
crucial to goal setting because goal setting also emphasises the importance of indicating to 
employees what is expected of them; in most cases, when organisations introduce rewards, 
they also offer information regarding the expected level of performance required from 
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employees, through the use of, for example, performance standards or other employees’ 
performance as a benchmark for comparison (Pfeffer, 1997). 
  
Typically, organisations design different types of rewards, both financial and non-financial, to 
motivate their employees to meet the performance standards desired by organisations (Otley, 
2008). Financial rewards are the monetary payments employees receive such as salaries and 
benefits, while non-financial rewards may include job recognition, and employees’ training 
and development (Chiang and Birtch, 2012).  
 
Although financial rewards are undoubtedly important in influencing employees’ motivation 
and behaviour (Jenkins et al., 1998), the benefits of non-financial rewards should not be 
overlooked as they can be as powerful as those of financial rewards (Howards, 2008). This is 
because different types of rewards motivate different types of behaviour and serve different 
functions that are important for organisations to consider (Chiang and Birtch, 2012). For 
example, bonus systems can motivate employees to make decisions that generate short-term 
profitability (Galbraith and Merrill, 1991). On the other hand, training and development can 
motivate employees to improve their knowledge and capabilities, and job recognition can 
promote employees’ self-esteem, hence, in order to for organisations to achieve their goals, it 
is important that they offer the rewards that best fit their goals and strategies (Chiang and 
Birtch, 2012). 
 
In addition to financial and non-financial rewards, organisations can also reward their 
employees using traditional reward systems or contingent reward systems (Aguinis, 2014). 
The meaning and utility of these two reward methods are discussed in the following section. 
 
2.10.1 Traditional rewards versus contingent rewards 
Traditional rewards mean that people are rewarded for their work as described in their job 
description (Aguinis, 2014). Traditional rewards usually include basic payments that are 
related to particular job roles, and they focus on the desire of employees to receive equal pay 
as well as their desire for competitive salaries in the marketplace (Kerrin and Oliver, 2002). 
Contingent rewards, on the other hand, emphasise the idea that employees are rewarded in 
relation to their level of performance (Aguinis, 2014). The time of the contingency varies 
from one job to another. For example, in certain sales job roles, the lapse of time between 
performance and rewards is short compared to other job roles such as university academics, 
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whose performance is normally rewarded over much longer time cycles. In performance 
management literature, contingent rewards are favoured by scholars in the field (e.g., Denisi, 
2011; Aguinis et al., 2012). Considering that the topic of this research is performance 
management, what follows focuses on contingent rewards. 
 
One of the arguments for contingent pay plans is that they facilitate the retention of top 
performers in organisations as these employees are very sensitive to whether or not they are 
paid adequate salaries for their work (Aguinis et al., 2012). Furthermore, tying individuals’ 
pay to organisations’ performance can help increase employees’ commitment and encourage 
them to identify with their organisation, which can in turn reduce conflict between 
shareholders and employees (Kurdelbusch, 2002). As a result, contingent pay plans have 
become a popular reward strategy embraced by many organisations (Ganster et al, 2011). 
Among the most popular contingent pay plans used in organisations is performance related 
pay (Pulakos, 2009). Pay is also considered to be one of the key rewards offered by 
organisations to employees (Pfeffer, 1997). 
 
2.10.2 Performance related pay 
Virtually every organisation rewards its employees with monetary payments for their input 
(Mattson et al., 2014). However, when organisations adopt performance related pay systems, 
employees’ level of pay hinges on their performance (Armstrong and Baron, 1998), which 
means that employees can gain higher pay when they reach the predetermined performance 
goals set by their organisation (Otley, 2008).  
 
Performance related pay is commonly used by human resource managers as a means of 
increasing the input of their employees (Mcnabb and Whitfield, 2007). Kurdelbusch (2002) 
found that 70% of his sample, which consisted of large manufacturing and service sector 
firms in Germany, implemented performance related pay in their reward systems. 
 
Performance related pay is based on the notion that employees increase their efforts when 
they know that there is a close relationship between their performance and payment (Mattson 
et al., 2014). Proponents of performance related pay have offered a number of reasons why 
implementing performance related pay in organisations is beneficial (Armstrong and Baron, 
1998). For organisations, performance related pay allows organisations to reach their goals; 
for employees, performance related pay provides an opportunity to gain higher salaries, feel 
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motivated, feel that their contribution is being acknowledged, and want to stay in the 
organisation (Bhattachryya, 2013). Bhattachryya (2013) added that when organisations relate 
employees’ pay to their performance, employees have a greater sense of identification with 
their organisation and feel more committed to it as they start to consider increasing their 
company’s revenues, decreasing costs, and augmenting organisational profit.  
 
The above sections have discussed the benefits that can be gained from implementing 
rewards in organisations. However, while it is possible for organisations to achieve these 
benefits, organisations must also attend to the negative unintended consequences that can 
arise from rewards (e.g., Kerr, 1975; Samnani and Singh, 2014). 
 
2.10.3 Arguments against the use of rewards 
Among the major arguments against rewards is that rewards often lead to outcomes that are 
not envisaged by those who set the rewards (Kerr, 1975). Ganster et al. (2011) reviewed 
several studies on performance based rewards, and found that contingent rewards can 
constitute a major source of stress and frustration for many workers because people may 
become prone to negative feelings about contingent rewards such as employment and income 
insecurity. Similarly, Samnani and Singh (2014) argued that rewards, especially individually 
based rewards, have the potential to motivate employees to engage in workplace bullying and 
dysfunctional work behaviour such as unproductive competition and non-collaboration.  
 
In addition to the above critiques, Kerr (1975) presented a detailed account of the limitations 
of reward systems as implemented across various disciplines and sectors, and illustrated how 
the use of rewards by decision makers can produce undesired outcomes at different levels in 
organisations. For instance, Kerr (1975) argued that while in business organisations, 
managers frequently emphasise ideas of group work and united team spirit, employees are 
mostly rewarded on the basis of their individual performance. However, when managers 
emphasise individual rewards, employees may be less willing to cooperate with their co-
workers (Lazear, 1989).  
 
Furthermore, when organisations reward individual performance, employees may be less 
motivated to share their knowledge with their colleagues, even in cases where withholding 
information from others can have detrimental effects for the organisation, and consequently, 
it was suggested by some scholars that equal pay may be the antidote to the resultant reward 
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tension between employees (Lazear, 1989). However, this suggestion is at odds with the 
arguments made by advocates of contingent rewards (discussed in sections 2.10.1 and 
2.10.2). Furthermore, superior performers may be dissatisfied with such systems (Lazear, 
1989).    
 
In addition to this, Kohn (1999) argued that any reward system implemented to enhance 
performance is doomed to be unsuccessful, one reason being that rewards only work in the 
short-term, and if a manager wants to motivate employees to maintain performance at the 
same level, the manager needs to maintain the reward as well. Hence, any scheme that seeks 
to improve individuals’ performance through the use of rewards should be expected to 
function only insofar as rewards are available, however, while in theory it may be possible to 
imagine rewards being distributed endlessly, in practice, this is not only infeasible, but also 
impossible (ibid.).  
 
The other frequently noted critique of extrinsic rewards is their potential to thwart employees’ 
intrinsic motivation (Gagné and Deci, 2005). Deci and Ryan (2000) argued that when 
individuals are intrinsically motivated to perform certain work tasks, the introduction of 
extrinsic rewards can frustrate the intrinsic motives employees originally had. In other words, 
by introducing extrinsic rewards, employees’ motivation can shift from being internally 
driven by intrinsic motives to being externally driven by extrinsic motives (Gagné and Deci, 
2005).  
 
On balance, findings of research testing the relationships between rewards and employees’ 
performance have been mixed (Downes and Choi, 2014; Rao, 2007). Over the years, the 
impact of rewards on employees has come under scrutiny and the negative unintended 
negative effects of rewards on employees have been more frequently reported by researchers 
(Harris and Bromiley, 2007, Heinrich, 2007). For example, Harris and Bromiley (2007) found 
that the rewards structure of managers in the United States General Accounting Office 
motivated them to misrepresent their financial statements and engage in other questionable 
behaviours. As a result, numerous researchers have suggested the cautious use of rewards as 
they could induce employees to engage in improper behaviours, generating negative 
unintended outcomes for organisations (Heinrich, 2007; Kohn, 1999).    
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2.11 The interdependence between goal-setting, performance measurements and 
rewards 
Although goal setting, performance measurements, and rewards have been presented here as 
three distinct processes, in performance management systems, these processes are usually 
interrelated, complementing one another (Pulakos, 2009). This interactivity is key to 
performance management because the outcome of each process often paves the way for the 
next coming process in that the goals set normally influence the way in which employees’ 
performance is measured, and the outcomes of performance measurements inform the 
rewards employees receive (Aguinis, 2014). 
 
In performance management literature, goals, measurements, and rewards have frequently 
been extolled as some of the main processes that can help to boost employees’ performance 
(Ferreira and Otley, 2009). However, faced with much disconfirming evidence, where these 
processes have had contrary effects on both employee and organisational performance (e.g., 
Schweitzer et al., 2004; Kelman and Friedman, 2009; Tsui, 2013), it has become difficult to 
determine unequivocally the full impact of performance management systems (Poister et al., 
2013). Consequently, there has been a call by researchers to explore the adverse unintended 
effects of performance management systems (Denisi and Smith, 2014; Franco-Santos and 
Otley, 2018).  
 
2.12 The combination of goal setting, performance measurement, and rewards in 
performance management systems and their relationship to unintended outcomes 
The next chapter discusses the unintended outcomes that can result from performance 
management systems, particularly from the combination of goals, measurements, and 
rewards. Before doing so, it needs to be acknowledged that critiques of goal setting, 
measurements, and rewards have been discussed by researchers for many years (e.g., Luthans 
and Stajkovic, 1999; Mowen et al., 1981; Ridgway, 1956). However, these critiques are 
mostly available in related disciplines such as in psychology and accounting (e.g., Kepes and 
McDaniel, 2013; Franco-Santos et al., 2012), where researchers have tended to focus on one 
of these processes more than others (Mowen et al., 1981; Fisher and Downes, 2008; Jensen, 
2003). For example, some articles have focused on the potential problems associated with 
goal setting (e.g., Ordóñez, 2009), others have emphasised the limitations of performance 
measurements (e.g., Ridgway, 1956), and others have looked at rewards (e.g., Mattson et al., 
2014).  
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What is distinctive about performance management literature is that it gives special 
consideration to the combination of these processes in order to gain positive performance 
results (e.g., Pulakos. 2009). However, as stated earlier, performance management systems do 
not always result in positive gains for organisations (Denisi and Smith. 2014). Hence, while it 
is important to examine how performance management systems can lead to their intended 
outcomes, it is also important to examine how they lead to unintended outcomes and have 
contrary effects on individual and organisational performance (Franco-Santo et al., 2012). 
 
2.13 Conclusion 
As has been shown, performance management has great potential, but also considerable risks. 
Performance management systems are powerful tools that can greatly influence employees’ 
behaviour (Den Hartog et al., 2004). A large body of research on performance management 
has been conducted, which has contributed to its development. However, as research into 
performance management has developed, the limitations of performance management have 
become more prominent. As Radnor (2008) stated, although the purpose of performance 
management systems is to improve employees’ performance, some evidence does not seem to 
support such claim. Consequently, numerous scholars and practitioners have started to 
question the function of performance management systems as well as the unintended 
consequences of implementing such systems (e.g., Heinrich, 2008; Smith, 1995).  
 
Focusing on three major performance management processes: goals, performance 
measurement, and rewards, the chapter discussed general critiques found in research 
examining the effects of these processes on employees, and noted possible unintended 
outcomes and challenges associated with them. However, these studies do not provide a 
systematic analysis of the unintended consequences that can arise from performance 
management systems. As a result, the next chapter aims to provide a detailed review of the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems. 
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Chapter	3:	The	unintended	outcomes	of	performance	management	systems	
 
3.0 Introduction 
The notion that performance management systems can lead to unintended outcomes is not 
new in performance management literature. However, the unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems have been discussed unsystematically across different sub-
disciplines and not analysed in any great detail in performance management literature 
(Franco-Santos and Otley, 2018). Hence, this chapter aims to provide a review of the 
unintended outcomes, and show how performance management systems do not work as 
intended in various work contexts.  
 
The chapter starts by defining the notion of unintended outcomes, and explaining how the 
concept of unintended outcomes is applied in this thesis. Following this, the chapter 
illustrates the adverse effects of performance management systems by discussing certain 
negative unintended outcomes of the three performance management practices of goals, 
measurements and rewards. These unintended outcomes are discussed under the rubrics of 
gaming, effort substitution and myopia, and each outcome is supported by illustrative 
examples and research findings. Finally, the limitations of research in performance 
management systems and unintended outcomes together with a conclusion for the chapter are 
provided. 
 
3.1 The definition of unintended outcomes 
The notion of unintended outcomes, also referred to as unintended consequences (e.g., 
Conrad and Uslu, 2012), or unintended effects (e.g., Hood, 2007), has been used in 
organisational theories for many years (Harris and Ogbonna, 2002). Harris and Ogbonna 
(2002) stated that the concept of unintended outcomes perhaps originated from the Columbia 
School, where it was used to explain how organisational systems do not function in a 
straightforward manner. Unintended outcomes occur because, as Merton (1936) explained, 
management interventions do not normally take place in a social and psychological vacuum, 
but within complex social structures that include various entities, making the effects of the 
any intervention difficult to guess (Leslie, 2018). As a result, numerous organisational 
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theorists have contended that as organisations are complex institutions (Portes, 2000), any 
management initiative will invariably yield unintended outcomes (Harris and Ogonna, 2002).   
 
However, although it is very likely that individuals’ actions will lead to unintended outcomes 
(Portes, 2000), those outcomes are often ignored (Sherrill, 1984). As a result, scholars from 
different fields and disciplines have stressed the need to consider unintended outcomes 
(Harris and Ogonna, 2002). Sherrill (1984) argued that the evaluation of any specific 
outcome is ineffective if evaluators do not consider the unintended consequences that could 
result from it. This is because any purposive action can have multiple outcomes (Baert, 
1991). For example, an employee may volunteer to do additional tasks at work to help his/her 
organisation; however, doing extra tasks may trigger conflict between the employee and 
his/her colleagues if the colleagues feel that the person’s willingness to do more work makes 
others look like laggards (Reynolds et al., 2015). 
 
There are different suggested definitions of unintended outcomes (and unintended 
consequences). Although, as mentioned in the next section, the meaning of unintended 
outcomes is often unclear and at times not defined by authors (Sherrill, 1984), Table 3.1 
presents some of the available definitions with the aim of clarifying the meaning and 
identifying the similarities and dissimilarities between them. As shown in Table 3.1, the term 
unintended outcomes is typically used to refer to actions that are not intended by the doer. 
However, the difference lies in how the effects of the unintended outcomes are perceived. At 
one end of the spectrum, there are those who suggest that unintended outcomes/consequences 
are simply the outcomes that are not intended by the performer of the action regardless of 
whether the unintended outcomes have constructive or destructive effects (e.g., Baert, 1991). 
At the other end, there are those who define unintended outcomes as the unintended negative 
consequences that result from people’s actions (e.g., Harris and Ogbonna, 2002).  
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Table 3.1: Definitions of unintended outcomes 
Author Term used Meaning Categories: 
neutral/ 
destructive 
effects 
Baert 
(1991: 
201) 
Unintended 
consequences 
The “particular effect of 
purposive action which is 
different from what was wanted at 
the moment of carrying out the 
act, and the want of which was a 
reason for carrying it out”. 
Neutral 
Giddens 
(1984) 
Unintended 
consequences 
The consequences that would not 
have occurred if an individual had 
acted in a different way, as well as 
not being the consequences that 
were originally intended by the 
individual. 
Neutral 
(Chouvy, 
2012) 
Unintended 
outcomes 
The outcomes that are not 
envisaged by individuals. These 
outcomes are not necessarily 
completely contrary to the 
individual’s original intention, 
they may just be different. 
Neutral 
Harris and 
Ogbonna 
(2002) 
Unintended 
consequences 
The negative outcomes that result 
from unanticipated or unpredicted 
actions. 
Destructive 
Sherrill 
(1984: 28) 
Unintended 
outcomes 
“The side effects of governmental 
policies and programs, not the 
outcomes these actions are 
supposed to produce”. 
Destructive 
Smith 
(1995) 
Unintended 
outcomes 
The outcomes that are undesired 
by decision makers. 
Destructive 
 
Table 3.1 lists some scholars who used the term unintended outcomes/consequences. 
However, there are others who have used other terms such as unanticipated consequences. 
For example, in a paper titled “The unanticipated consequences of purposive social actions”, 
Merton (1936) explained that the effects of purposive actions are those consequences that are 
the result of the action only; the consequences that would not have happened if the action was 
not performed. According to Merton (1936), intended and anticipated outcomes are always 
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desired by the performer of the act (although they may be perceived as undesirable from an 
outsider’s point of view). However, Merton did not note any difference between unintended 
and unanticipated outcomes (Chouvy, 2012). An individual may anticipate that certain 
outcomes could happen as a result of his/her actions; however, this does not necessarily mean 
that the person intends to be subject to those outcomes (Helm, 1971). For example, Helm 
(1971) explained that a person may anticipate that by doing some work in his/her garden, the 
person may feel tired; however, this does not mean that the person intends to make 
him/herself tired by working in his/her garden. In the context of performance management 
systems, it is possible to imagine how an employee who engages in inappropriate behaviours 
to meet organisational goals may be able to anticipate the damage their actions could cause to 
their organisation, but it does not automatically mean that the person intends to damage the 
organisation. In this sense, unintended outcomes can be anticipated and unanticipated by the 
performer. 
 
The next section discusses some of the challenges associated with the study of the concept 
unintended outcomes. 
 
3.1.1 The importance of taking into account different stakeholders’ perspective when 
considering the meaning of unintended outcomes 
There are a number of challenges associated with the concept of unintended outcomes 
(Dahler-Larsen, 2014). One of the main discussions around unintended outcomes pertains to 
the issue of intentionality (e.g., Baert, 1991; Dahler-Larsen, 2014; Merton 1936). While some 
scholars have stated that it is not sufficient to discuss unintended outcomes without 
considering the intentions underlying individuals’ actions (Baert, 1991), others have argued 
that intentionality is in itself a problematic topic (Helm, 1971).  
 
Problems with intentionality are exacerbated when the intentions of one stakeholder are 
considered in relation to the intentions of other stakeholders (Dahler-Larsen, 2014). Dahler-
Larsen (2014) stated that it is implausible to expect that all stakeholders share the same 
intentions. One reason for this is that different stakeholders generally have different goals, 
some of which may be incongruent with the goals of other stakeholders (Cheng et al., 2007). 
Examples of this incompatibility often arise from performance management systems. For 
instance, an organisation may adopt performance management systems to measure and 
identify employees’ strengths and weaknesses; however, managers may be more concerned 
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with how the performance management system (or the performance ratings they provide for 
the ratees) can help them improve their position in the organisation (Murphy and Cleveland, 
1995). Therefore, managers may inflate or deflate employees’ ratings based on how the 
ratings they provide serve their personal interests (Longenecker et al., 1987). In this case, 
distorting employees’ performance ratings is an unintended outcome of performance 
management systems, but it is an intended action on the part of managers. Therefore, it is 
generally difficult to ascertain whether an outcome is intended or unintended because when 
the intentions of different parties are considered, what one person sees as an intended 
outcome could be seen as an unintended by another (Dahler-Larsen, 2014). Furthermore, 
when managers implement change interventions to manage the performance of their 
employees, employees can also foresee the intentions of their managers and if it is to their 
benefit, employees may act in ways that thwart management intentions (section 3.2 explains 
how employees can play different management initiatives to their advantage), possibly 
leading to outcomes not desired by managers (Smith, 1995). 
 
Another issue highlighted by Beart (1991) is that individuals often have different and 
sometimes interconnected intentions that inform their actions. For example, employees may 
behave in a particular way in order to build a good relationship with their organisation and 
also to improve their self-image in terms of being integrated with their organisation 
(Umphress et al., 2010). Likewise, Merton (1936) argued that it can be challenging to 
determine the real intentions of a particular action because it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between individuals’ own rationalisation of their action and the truth when 
unintended outcomes are subsequently claimed to be intended ones (Merton, 1936). 
Ambiguities around intentionality of actions are also apparent in many studies such as that of 
Benson (1985) on white-collar crimes, in which the participants who were charged with 
defrauding the government through tax violation reported that they did not have any intention 
to cheat the government. Benson (1985) reported that while the participants admitted that 
they committed a criminal action, they argued that the motivation behind their action was not 
to commit a crime.  
 
In addition to the above challenges, Chouvy (2012) explained that it is difficult to group 
unintended outcomes into categories because it is sometimes unclear if and when an action 
has an effect, and if such outcomes are good or bad.  Furthermore, by categorising an 
outcome as good or bad, desired or undesired, positive or negative, it can be inferred that 
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some actions are wanted and others are unwanted; however, little attention has been 
dedicated to these categories and terms are used without being supported by an illustration or 
an explanation of how the term is defined, or what is meant by classifying an action as good 
or bad (Sherrill, 1984). In some cases, employees are blamed for engaging in inappropriate 
work behaviours like gaming (see section 3.2.1 for a definition) when in effect, they only act 
in line with what they are asked to do by their employers and ensure that they complete tasks 
on which their performance is measured (Dahler-Larson, 2014: 973). For example, when 
employees focus on the performance areas that are measured at the expense of the 
performance areas that are not measured by their managers, employees may be accused of 
engaging in behaviours such as effort substitution (see section 3.2.2 for a definition), but 
from employees’ point of view, they might see it as simply following the instructions of their 
managers. Furthermore, as organisations generally have various stakeholders affected by their 
actions, it could be difficult to assess who benefits from unintended outcomes and who does 
not (Chouvy, 2012). For instance, if employees engage in inappropriate work behaviours but 
in so doing achieve organisational goals, the extent to which employees’ behaviour is positive 
or negative can vary for the employee, management and employing organisation as well as 
other possible external stakeholders such as the public and the government.   
 
Having said that, it is important to note that in certain literature, for example, in sociology, 
attempts have been made to define and address some of the problematic areas in the concept 
of unintended outcomes/unintended consequences (e.g., Baert, 1991; Merton, 1936; Portes, 
2000). However, in the context of performance management, performance management 
literature (including performance measurement literature, in which the term is frequently 
used) does not seem to match the progress made by scholars in other fields, nor does it seem 
to respond to researchers’ calls for a more judicious use of the concept (Sherrill, 1984). 
Rather, the term ‘unintended outcomes’ is usually used with neither an accompanying 
definition, nor an illustration of how the term is used (e.g., Sargeant et al., 2007, Smith, 
1995). Although the concept of unintended outcomes is used as an umbrella term to 
acknowledge the possibility that performance management systems can lead to different 
types of outcomes, especially with reference to negative outcomes, a greater focus on what is 
meant by unintended outcomes is required.  
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As a result, this research attempts to provide a systematic review of unintended outcomes 
insofar as they apply to performance management systems. The following sections present 
these unintended outcomes in the form of three overarching themes, highlighting the way in 
which previous research on performance management systems has considered how the 
systems can lead to unintended outcomes. However, before doing so, a definition of the way 
the term unintended outcomes is used in this thesis is provided. 
 
3.1.2 The unintended outcomes of performance management systems in terms of 
research and teaching in United Kingdom universities  
As mentioned in the previous section, unintended outcomes are not always perceived as 
negative and they are not necessarily undesirable (Merton, 1936). It was also stated that 
identifying an outcome as intended or unintended varies with the stakeholder perspective 
taken. Hence, in order to examine the outcomes of any human resource intervention, it is 
important to identify the perspective taken in the analysis when categorising an outcome as 
unintended.  
 
As this thesis examines the unintended outcomes of performance management systems, the 
unintended outcomes are considered from the point of view of the designer of the system. 
Generally, in organisations, the designers of performance management systems are the 
employers because it is the employers who oversee the performance of their organisations 
and ultimately decide the way to manage employees’ performance. One way employers 
oversee the performance of their organisations is through the performance management 
systems they implement. In the case of universities, the employer is the head of the university 
(i.e., the vice chancellor). The viewpoints of vice chancellors are also normally informed by 
the external performance measures they are expected to meet such as the REF, NSS and TEF, 
and they enact these expectations through the various executives they have in universities 
(e.g., research directors, deans and department heads). Vice chancellors also implement 
structures and processes to communicate their performance expectations to employees, and 
these structures and processes could be implemented by, for example, the human resource 
management department and senior management. Hence, this thesis examines the unintended 
outcomes from the perspective of vice chancellors’ intended outcomes. However, for the 
purposes of simplicity and given that performance management systems are a key medium by 
which vice chancellors communicate their intentions to employees, the phrase “unintended 
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outcomes of performance management systems” is used hereafter to refer to the outcomes 
that go against the outcomes intended by vice chancellors.  
 
In particular, the focus of the thesis is on the negative unintended effects of performance 
management systems for either the advancement of scholarship or the quality of education 
students receive. Central to this thesis is the notion that two of the key aims of universities in 
implementing performance management systems are advancing scholarship via quality 
research and providing students with good quality education (Parker and Jary, 1995; 
Willmott, 1995; Power, 1997; Clarke et al., 2012; Ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012; Tsui, 2013). 
This notion is supported by numerous statements made in the publicity material of British 
universities, for example, websites and brochures. Performance management systems may be 
used by organisations for various purposes, and as Dahler-Larson (2014) explained, public 
sector institutions often have a mixture of agendas and interests, some of which are 
concealed. For instance, in the academic context, as universities currently need to generate 
income (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015), their advertising material may sometimes paint a 
more positive picture of their aims and the services they provide than is borne out in reality. 
However, regardless of other agendas universities may or may not have, this thesis focuses on 
the notion that universities use performance management systems to genuinely achieve the 
two aims of quality scholarship and teaching. Therefore, in this study, unintended outcomes 
are defined as the outcomes of performance management systems that negatively affect 
academics’ production of quality scholarship and teaching, and which therefore go against the 
aims of performance management systems.   
 
Of course, the position taken in this research can always be to some extent contested as can 
any research that examines the unintended outcomes of policy interventions (Dahler-Larsen, 
2014). For example, as performance management systems may be implemented differently 
by different executives in universities, the goal of producing quality teaching for students 
could also turn into a policy of just trying to please the students by, for example, not 
providing challenging course material or trying to avoid giving them low/failing grades for 
poor quality work. Hence, while pleasing students in this way might be an expectation from, 
for example, line managers, it is debatable whether ultimately, it is in the interest of 
universities, given that the goal of higher education institutions is to provide quality 
education. Furthermore, as noted in the earlier sections, it is difficult to say with certainty 
what the intentions behind individuals’ actions are and there are always different stakeholders 
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whose perspectives can be taken when examining unintended outcomes (e.g., students, 
academics, line managers, deans, human resource management departments, etc.). Hence, it 
is also debatable whose perspective should be privileged. However, given that the sample for 
the thesis included research driven organisations whose key aim is the production of critically 
informed research and students, the perspective taken in this thesis seems reasonable. 
 
3.2 A typology of the unintended outcomes of performance management systems 
The commonly noted unintended outcomes of performance management systems broadly fall 
into three categories: gaming, effort substitution, and myopia. Gaming and effort substitution 
have been conceptualised by Kelman and Friedman (2009) as the unintended outcomes of 
performance measurement. Myopia has been discussed by Smith (1995) as one of the 
potential unintended outcomes of performance indicators in public sector organisations.  
 
However, it could be argued that these unintended outcomes are not exclusively related to 
performance measurement. As discussed in the previous chapter, goals, measurements and 
rewards are closely related and they greatly affect one another. It is therefore important that 
the unintended outcomes of goal setting and rewards as well as performance measurement are 
collectively considered. The importance of goals and rewards is apparent in how researchers 
have conceptualised the unintended outcomes of gaming, effort substitution, and myopia in 
relation to performance measurement. Although these authors did not explicitly identify goals 
and rewards as a potential stimulus for these unintended outcomes, their discussions treated 
goals and rewards as important processes that could influence the occurrence of unintended 
outcomes. By appreciating that gaming, effort substitution and myopia are linked to all three 
processes, research into these unintended outcomes could move away from the realm of 
performance measurement and feature more in performance management literature. An in-
depth analysis of these unintended outcomes could help answer the commonly posed question 
in the literature of why performance management is not holding up to its promise (Aguinis et 
al., 2011). 
 
3.2.1 Gaming 
The notion of gaming has been predominantly discussed in the area of performance 
measurements, especially with regard to public sector organisations (e.g., Bevan and Hood, 
2006; Smith, 1995). Gaming is commonly described as the process of changing one’s 
behaviour so as to gain a competitive advantage (Smith, 1995). 
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Although most definitions describe gaming as behaviour that is undesired by organisations 
(e.g., Bevan and Hood, 2006; Fisher and Downes, 2008; Kelman and Frieldman 2009; Smith, 
1995), there are subtle differences between the authors in the way gaming is defined. Bevan 
and Hood (2006: 521) defined gaming as “reactive subversion such as ‘hitting the target and 
missing the point’ or reducing performance where targets do not apply”. Drawing on the 
experience of the Soviet Union, Bevan and Hood (2006) identified three types of gaming that 
resulted from their strategy of governance by targets: ratchet effects, threshold effects, and 
output distortion. 
 
Ratchets effects involve the inclination of decision makers to set the following year’s goals 
on the basis of employees’ performance in the last year, and as a result, employees may be 
incentivised to under-perform in their current year, or not to surpass their goals for the current 
year, even in cases when they can easily exceed their goals (Bevan and Hood, 2006). Unlike 
Bevan and Hood (2006), who viewed ratchet effects as a form of gaming, Smith (1995) 
defined gaming as a ratchet effect whereby individuals deliberately manipulate their actual 
behaviour to lower their performance because improvement in their current year would mean 
higher expectations and goals for coming years.  
 
Having said that, Smith (1990) stated that it is common for managers to set goals for their 
employees based on their prior performance. For example, in the context of performance 
appraisals, it is usually hard for any manager to design performance standards for their 
employees without considering the organisation’s previous performance (Smith, 1995). Thus, 
Smith (1990) suggested that it is important for managers to carefully design their reward 
systems, otherwise employees will be constantly motivated to under-report their performance. 
 
Threshold effects refer to the impact of goal setting across different units in a system (Bevan 
and Hood, 2006). Setting goals may pressurise poor performers to meet their goals, but it may 
also give little motivation for employees to excel, or it may even incite top performers to 
decrease their performance to simply meet their designed goals (Hood, 2006).  
 
Output distortion, on the other hand, refers to the concentration on attaining goals at the 
expense of non-measured performance areas (Bevan and Hood, 2006). Employees may 
benefit from gaming by taking advantage of the ambiguities or glitches in the rules or 
systems where they work, for example, if an organisation does not provide a general review 
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of their overall performance, employees may choose to focus on the goals that are given more 
attention by managers, and disregard other goals, even if the disregarded goals are of equal 
importance to those emphasised (Fisher and Downes, 2008). 
 
Another slightly different definition of gaming is provided by Kelman and Frieldman (2009). 
In their view, gaming is behaviour that uses resources without genuinely enhancing 
performance, not even in the performance areas that are measured. Kelman and Frieldman 
(2009) commented (in their footnote) on Bevan and Hood’s definition stating that Bevan and 
Hood (2006) used gaming to mean gaming as well as effort substitution. Kelman and 
Frieldman (2009), however, differentiate between gaming and effort substitution (for a 
definition of effort substitution, see section 3.2.2). Kelman and Frieldman (2009) suggested 
that gaming simply creates additional costs because it both consumes resources and reduces 
the production level of an organisation whereas effort substitution enhances performance in 
the areas that are measured. To illustrate how gaming takes place in organisations, the next 
section provides several emblematic examples of gaming and highlights some of the effects 
they produce. 
 
Examples of gaming in organisations  
Gaming is prevalent in many organisations (Jensen, 2003), and there are multiple available 
examples that evidence its widespread use. In the context of public sector organisations, 
Jackson (2011) stated that the action of introducing targets, performance measurement and 
rewards in a number of United Kingdom public services since 1998 revived employees’ 
interest in gaming behaviour.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
In the United Kingdom in 1998, the Labour government aggressively enforced the 
achievement of targets in National Health Service hospitals (Hood, 2006). Evidence from 
several sources demonstrated that the government’s attempt to improve the performance of 
hospitals through the implementation of targets and performance measurement produced 
different types of gaming behaviour (Kelman and Friedman, 2009). For example, the 
government set a goal for hospitals to begin treating all patients within four hours (Bevan and 
Hood, 2006). Hospitals were required to provide data about waiting times during a one-week 
period set by the government. Hospitals meeting the goal for waiting times were to be 
rewarded with extra funding, and hospitals falling short of the goal were to be investigated 
(Kelman and Friedman, 2009). In order to respond to the government’s goal, Kelman and 
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Friedman (2009) found that many hospitals engaged in various tactics to improve waiting 
times only during the government assessment week. In many cases, patients were left waiting 
in ambulances outside hospitals until the Accident and Emergency department believed that 
patients could be treated within the four hour time limit, which started when they entered the 
hospital (Hood, 2006). During the assessment week, extra staff were employed to reduce 
waiting times and in some cases, hospitals cancelled routine operations to free beds for new 
incoming patients (Kelman and Friedman, 2009). 
 
Further evidence of gaming was found in Florida public schools (Figlio and Getzler, 2006). 
Figlio and Getzler (2006) found that following the ‘No Child Left Behind Act’ in 2001, 
schools were expected to show that students displayed sufficient progress every year, and 
schools that were unable to demonstrate such progress risked severe consequences including 
reallocation or loss of federal funding. In response to this, schools started to game the system 
by, for example, assigning students from lower socio-economic classes and students with 
previously poor school results to special education, which exempted students from the 
accountability system that measured schools’ performance based on students’ results (ibid.).  
 
Furthermore, it was reported by a director of a school in Virginia that the accountability 
system implemented by the state motivated students with low grades to leave school, and that 
schools benefited when poor performers dropped out of school because these students were 
likely to get low marks, which would adversely affect the school’s overall performance rating 
(Figlio and Getzler, 2006). Figlio and Getzler (2006) also added that schools were less 
willing to stop students with lower grades from leaving school because schools might lose 
funding if the students’ grades were low. 
 
Although these types of behaviour are often described as undesirable, Figlio and Getzler 
(2006) noted that gaming may not always be seen as undesirable by decision makers, but 
simply a way of dealing with the accountability systems they impose. Likewise, Bevan and 
Hood (2006) argued that the presence of gaming is widely acknowledged, and it is not 
necessarily in the interest of decision makers to prevent it because when, for example, a 
government imposes performance targets on an organisation, they may be more concerned to 
see that the targets are met rather than questioning the means by which the goals are met. 
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In this section, gaming has generally been described as the manipulative behaviour displayed 
by individuals aiming to gain a competitive advantage (e.g., Smith, 1995). In this respect, 
Jensen (2003) argued that it is possible for gaming to become a fraudulent activity, and one 
example of this is Informix, an Internet software company, which paid $142 million to settle 
court cases that resulted from the company falsely claiming that it earned $295 million more 
than it did between 1994 and 1997. 
 
Weaknesses of the gaming concept 
The concept of gaming is very popular among researchers looking at how performance 
management systems go awry, why the systems do not work as intended, or whether the 
systems lead to their intended outcomes. However, although the concept is frequently used in 
the literature, it is broadly defined to the extent that it becomes difficult to establish what 
gaming is and what it is not. Conceptual clarity is important in any field of study (Griffin and 
Lopez, 2005) and differentiating gaming from other unintended outcomes is essential to reach 
a good understanding of the unintended outcomes of performance management systems. In 
the literature, researchers use gaming to refer to almost any unintended outcome that prevents 
a performance management system from achieving its intended goals (e.g., Jackson, 2011; 
Jensen, 2003; Grand, 2010). The way researchers use gaming in their discussion of effort 
substitution and myopia is illustrated in section 3.3. Hence, in order to advance current 
understanding of gaming in performance management systems, one of the aims of this thesis 
is to arrive at a more precise typology of gaming and of other unintended outcomes related to 
performance management systems.  
 
3.2.2 Effort substitution 
The major assumption underlying goal setting theory is that goals influence both how hard 
individuals are going to work and what elements of a task they are going to focus on (Locke 
and Latham, 2013). While the view that goals focus employees’ attention has been 
substantiated by numerous studies (e.g., Locke and Bryan, 1969; Rothkopf and Billington, 
1979), several concerns have been raised amongst scholars regarding this particular position. 
For example, Ordóñez et al. (2009) suggested that owing to the role that goals play in 
focusing employees’ attention on particular tasks, goals can lead people to overlook critical 
issues that seem unassociated with the goal. Furthermore, Ordóñez et al. (2009) explained 
that when an organisation rewards some activities and not others, individuals will be 
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motivated to focus their resources and energy on the activities that can secure them the best 
rewards. Kelman and Friedman (2009) termed this type of behaviour effort substitution. 
Effort substitution refers to occasions where individuals attempt to increase their performance 
outcomes in the performance areas that are measured (Kelman and Friedman, 2009). The 
notion of effort substitution has some affinities with the concept of tunnel vision introduced 
by Smith (1995). Smith (1995) defined tunnel vision as the focus of employees on the 
performance dimensions that are quantified to the detriment of the non-quantified ones.  
 
In addition to discussions suggesting that the quantifiable performance areas override the 
unquantifiable ones, Jackson (2011) added that performance measurements can also 
encourage individuals to manipulate the way they allocate their resources and distribute 
activities across their organisation. Blau (1955) described an instance where managers in a 
government agency were responsible for processing the cases of a hundred clients each 
month, and in order to achieve this goal, managers asked each employee to complete eight 
cases each month but while some cases took a short time to complete, others took 
considerably longer. Blau (1955) found that in order for employees to meet their monthly 
quota, employees delayed completing cases that required a long time even if they were 
priority cases, and instead prioritised cases that they could finish more quickly so that they 
could achieve their goal.  
 
In this example, employees concentrated on the goal and discounted the other performance 
dimensions that obstructed the achievement of their goal; however, managers did not seem to 
take this possibility into account when setting the goal for employees to complete eight cases 
per month (Blau, 1955). This example demonstrates that even if the overall individual or 
organisation level of performance is superior, this level may not be satisfactory when taking 
into account the original goals of the firm (Pidd, 2005). 
 
Employees’ inclination to focus on what is measured represents a form of what is termed as 
goal displacement (Blau, 1955). Goal displacement is described as the reverse of the means-
ends relationship, where goals are overlooked at the expense of the means of achieving them 
(Warner and Havens, 1968). More specifically, goal displacement refers to cases where the 
“an instrumental value becomes a terminal value” (Merton, 1968: 253). This may occur if, for 
example, an employee overemphasises a specific organisational rule, so the rule becomes a 
goal in itself and not a means to an end (Grey, 2013). For instance, bureaucrats may be over-
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concerned with conforming to organisational rules to the point that their concern with 
adhering to the rules makes them become acquiescent and technicised (Merton, 1968).  
 
Accordingly, Ridgway (1956) argued that while performance measures do indeed prompt 
individuals to exert effort at work, this effort may be unproductive, or even destructive when 
viewed in relation to the overall organisational goals. Therefore, prior to determining what 
needs to be measured, Robson (2004) proposed that organisations consider that the primary 
goal of performance measurements is to improve the effectiveness of all organisational 
processes, and performance measures that do not play a part in enhancing the total 
performance of the organisation should be immediately re-evaluated. The next section 
provides additional examples that highlight the implications of effort substitution behaviour 
in organisations. 
 
Examples of effort substitution in organisations 
The action of focusing on specific areas of performance to the detriment of others has 
become evident in the multiple scandals that have taken place during the last few decades 
across many countries, and in the United States in particular (Barsky, 2008). Examples of 
these scandals include Sears, Roebuck and Co. in the early 1990s, and Enron in the late 1990s 
as in both Sears and Enron, the goal of increasing sales led the staff of Sears to charge 
customers for unneeded repairs, and encouraged Enron staff to prioritise sales over profit 
causing the collapse of the firm (Ordóñez et al., 2009).  
 
Effort substitution is also frequently discussed in the world of academia in terms of research, 
teaching, and impact (e.g., Keasey et al., 2000; Kerr, 1975). The intense pressure faced by 
academics to publish articles in highly ranked journals has shifted some researchers’ goals 
from developing knowledge and improving practice to publishing papers and advancing their 
own career (Tsui, 2013). Tsui (2013) argued that such practices have damaged the reputation 
of science and undermined the intrinsic value of academic work. 
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Weaknesses of the effort substitution concept 
The idea of employees focusing on certain performance areas over others is a common 
unintended outcome of performance management systems that has been highlighted by 
researchers for many years. However, in addition to the idea of employees focusing on 
certain areas and not others being conflated with the unintended outcome of gaming in the 
literature (see section 3.3 for further discussion), it is also not clear whether effort substitution 
means that employees neglect certain performance areas, or completely abandon them, or 
slightly underperform in some areas while still meeting the minimum performance threshold 
of the organisation. 
 
3.2.3 Myopia 
The majority of performance measurement programmes concentrate on short-term projects, 
and often discourage employees from investing in areas that will only show performance 
improvements in the long term (Smith, 1995). Numerous long-term activities, research and 
development being one example, entail immediate costs; however, the performance gains that 
could be obtained from such activities are often unclear in terms of both significance and 
time (Smith, 1990). Similarly, investment in the health care sector might not have an 
immediate impact as the effects of the investment might take many years to show (ibid.). In 
these situations, managers might be seduced into investing less in activities where the costs 
but not the gains appear in their current performance review (Merchant and Bruns,1986; 
Smith, 1995; Zhao et al., 2012). Smith (1990, 1995) described such behaviour as “myopia”, 
which he defined as the focus on short-term goals at the expense of the long-term ones, the 
gains of which may only appear in the long run. 
 
Merchant and Bruns (1986) argued that performance evaluation schemes encourage many 
managers to make decisions that would show them in a positive light in the short term, even 
in cases where managers’ short-term decisions may disadvantage shareholders, long-term 
organisational performance, or the national economy. A typical example of an evaluation 
scheme that lends itself to myopia is one that is based on revenue generation, where in order 
to maximise short-term revenues, managers may be tempted to focus on rapid results without 
paying sufficient attention to quality; furthermore, managers may even decrease costs by 
postponing expenses that would enhance products, distribution, or the long-term prospects of 
the firm (ibid.).  
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Zhao et al. (2012) suggested that these types of practices could also afford incompetent 
managers extra job security to the extent that the evaluation system prioritises short-term 
goals. For example, different departments may produce similar short-term profits in relation 
to a specific evaluation time frame; however, the emphasis on one specific performance 
dimension conceals the means through which the goal is reached (Keasey et al., 2000). 
Keasey et al. (2000) added that an employee may increase the short-term profit of a firm 
while simultaneously decreasing costs to the detriment of product quality or customer loyalty. 
 
Another kind of evaluation scheme that encourages short-term decisions is the quarterly 
guidance issuance (Brochet et al., 2015). Discussions around quarterly guidance suggest that 
it serves the demands of short-term investors (Houston et al., 2010) as short-term investors 
pressurise organisations to increase their short-term revenue (Brochet et al., 2015). As a 
result, managers often respond myopically to these demands by focusing on short-term goals 
and damaging the long-term growth of the firm (Houston et al., 2010). 
 
In a study by Graham et al. (2005), managers reported that there is usually a trade-off 
between the short-term goals (e.g., increasing profit) and long-term goals (e.g., increasing 
value investments) of an organisation. Managers stated that reaching financial targets makes 
an organisation look more credible in the marketplace, and also contributes to sustaining or 
increasing the organisation’s stock price, so they believed that it was legitimate for them to 
forego the long-term goals of their organisation and concentrate on the short-term ones, 
arguing that the costs which could arise from not achieving goals, such as market 
overreaction to the organisation’s missed earnings, could be massive (ibid.).  
 
Further to external pressure to meet short-term goals, Merchant and Bruns (1986) added that 
managers are encouraged to behave myopically because they are rewarded in relation to the 
profit they currently generate. It was reported in many studies that tying tempting rewards to 
employees for the achievement of short-term goals has resulted in different kinds of 
inappropriate work behaviour such as reduced collaboration between employees (Murphy, 
2004). Likewise, Zhao et al. (2012) stated that managers are likely to engage in real earning 
management in order to increase their own rewards; real earning being defined as the process 
of manipulating an organisation’s activities so as to maximise short-term profit. Thus, when 
managers’ rewards are linked to their performance, there is a strong possibility that they will 
concentrate on short-term goals (Brochet et al., 2015). 
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As shown, there is much potential for managers to sacrifice the long-term goals of a firm for 
short-term ones. Additional examples of the long-term impact of short-term decisions are 
shown below. 
 
Examples of myopia in organisations 
An example that shows management focus on short-term goals concerns the Ford Motor 
Company in the late 1960s, when chief executive officer Lee Iacocca set a specific difficult 
goal for employees to produce a new car for under $2000 within a short period of time in 
order to increase the company’s earnings (Ordóñez et al., 2009). This goal accompanied by a 
short deadline resulted in managers ignoring important safety measures, causing 53 deaths 
and numerous injuries (ibid.).  
 
In another study in the United States, Bushee (1998) showed how institutional investors 
impact managers’ decisions to invest in research and development. Bushee (1998) found that 
in organisations where there was a high level of ownership by institutions that prioritised 
short-term earnings, managers had a strong tendency to reduce investment in research and 
development in order to avoid investing in the long-term activities that would reduce their 
short-term earnings. Laverty (1996) suggested that United States organisations’ tendency to 
focus on short-term investment could have disadvantaged them in relation to other countries, 
such as Germany and Japan, which placed a great emphasis on long-term investment by, for 
example, designing products and developing competences that enabled them to gain a 
competitive advantage in the long run. 
 
Weaknesses of the myopia concept 
The long-term implications of myopia in various sectors have been repeatedly noted in the 
literature (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Murphy, 2004; Zhao et al., 2012). Overall, myopia is described 
as employees intentionally engaging in short-term behaviours that bring them personal gains 
(Smith, 1995). However, it is also possible to see how employees can unintentionally engage 
in myopia. By being overly focused on short-term goals, employees may unintentionally fail 
to see the long-term consequences of their actions. Furthermore, it is widely known in the 
psychology literature that when employees repeatedly display particular behaviours, they 
may internalise the behaviour and no longer see the potentially negative outcomes of their 
actions (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). 
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3.3 What actions should be labelled as gaming, effort substitution or myopia? 
In this research, attempts have been made to provide a classification of the common types of 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems found in the literature. While 
different researchers have also provided a taxonomy of various types of unintended outcomes 
(e.g., Kelman and Friedman, 2009; Smith, 1995), gaming appears to be the outcome that is 
particularly prominent in the literature in that researchers have tended to use this term to 
describe different types of outcomes (e.g., Figlio and Getzler, 2006; Radnor, 2008; Jensen, 
2003). For example, Figlio and Getzler (2015) used the term gaming to refer to ideas of effort 
substitution, stating that schools game the system when they dedicate more time to the 
subjects that are measured, and reduce the time spent on the subjects that are not included in 
the measurement scheme. However, although Figlio and Getzler (2006) described this 
behaviour as gaming, if one considers the definition of gaming and effort substitution 
mentioned in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 it becomes unclear whether this example is a 
manifestation of gaming, or it is in fact effort substitution (as performance improvement 
among the performance areas that are measured has been achieved). 
 
This conceptual ambiguity raises important questions as to what types of behaviour should be 
considered as gaming, effort substitution, or myopia. Thus, it can be argued that these 
outcomes may not fall into neat categories. For instance, Jensen (2003) stated that when 
managers are given a specific reward for meeting their current year’s goal, managers who risk 
failing to achieve the goal may, for example, attempt to generate extra revenue in the current 
year by shifting expenses from the current year to the next year, even if this behaviour 
decreases the organisation’s profit in the coming two years. In this instance, although from 
the perspective of Jensen (2003) this behaviour is a form of gaming, it is also possible to view 
this behaviour differently. Given that many scholars define myopia as employees’ focus on 
short-term goals versus long-term goals (Brochet et al., 2015; Smith, 1995), one may also 
interpret this behaviour as myopia.  
 
As can be seen, the distinctions between gaming, effort substitution and myopia remain 
unspecified in the literature. This is important because any attempt to understand the 
unintended outcomes of performance management requires specifying how each unintended 
outcome differs from the others. Hence, this research attempts to examine the three 
unintended outcomes of gaming, effort substitution and myopia, provide a detailed analysis 
of these outcomes, and articulate the distinguishing of features of each one.  
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3.4 Limitations of research on performance management systems and unintended 
outcomes 
There is general recognition in the literature about the possibility of performance 
management systems leading to unintended outcomes. However, for many years, research 
looking at the unintended effects of performance management has been conceptual in nature, 
and only recently has there been a move towards more empirical work (e.g., Bevan and 
Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006). As a consequence, there is scant research that empirically 
examines the unintended outcomes of performance management systems (Franco-Santos et 
al., 2012). The limited work on the unintended outcomes of performance management 
systems is probably due to the long-standing assumption that when performance management 
systems are adequately implemented, they lead to positive intended outcomes for 
organisations (Pulakos and O’leary, 2011). Hence, the focus of researchers has been on 
identifying ways to best implement the systems (e.g., Den Hartog et al., 2004). However, 
researchers’ focus on the intended outcomes of performance management systems has meant 
that the unintended outcomes of the systems have received much less attention, leading to a 
gap in current understanding of the topic, with many important questions left unanswered. 
For example, Franco-Santos and Otley (2018) explained that although performance 
management systems frequently lead to unintended outcomes, little is known about the 
unintended outcomes the systems generate and also how and why the systems lead to 
unintended outcomes. 
  
This research seeks to fill existing gaps in performance management research by 
investigating the relationship between the systems and the negative unintended outcomes 
they generate. Examining the negative unintended outcomes of performance management 
systems is crucial because such outcomes often have perverse effects on employees and 
organisations (Franco-Santos and Otley, 2018) and they therefore warrant serious attention by 
both scholars and practitioners. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began by introducing the concept of unintended outcomes and highlighting the 
conceptual ambiguities associated with it. The chapter then presented a typology of the three 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems, namely gaming, effort 
substitution and myopia. Each unintended outcome was defined and illustrated with 
examples. Following this, the chapter explained how the three unintended outcomes are not 
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well distinguished in the literature, identified the limitations of research on performance 
management systems and unintended outcomes, and ended with a conclusion. 
 
Having explained how unintended outcomes can result from the three performance 
management practices of goals, measurements and rewards, this thesis now turns to 
explaining how the social context influences the occurrences of these unintended outcomes at 
work. In line with Bandura’s (1977) argument that individuals consult their external 
environment to identify what is appropriate and inappropriate conduct, this research utilises 
social learning theory as a means of explaining how unintended outcomes are introduced, 
proliferated, normalised or pre-empted in organisations. 
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Chapter	4:	Introducing	social	learning	theory	and	its	links	to	performance	management	and	unintended	outcomes	
4.0 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in understanding the context of performance 
management systems (e.g., Fletcher, 2001; Levy and Williams, 2004). Despite the importance 
of understanding the way in which the context of performance management systems affects 
the operation of a number of performance management activities (Levy and Williams, 2004; 
Haines and St-Onge, 2012), little effort has been devoted to assessing empirically this effect. 
Among the scant empirical research that exists, most has focused on the individual effects of 
contextual variables such as organisational culture, the nature of the relations between 
managers and employees, and the strategic integration of human resource management (e.g., 
Haines and St-Onge, 2012), rather than on the effect that a set of factors combined have on 
employees’ performance. The context of performance management involves various 
interrelated elements that collectively determine how performance management systems 
operate, and therefore, focusing on variables independently of their relationship with each 
other provides an incomplete picture of the context of performance management systems.  
 
In this chapter, Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory is used to explain the influence of the 
social context on employees’ behaviour at work because it explains how employees learn 
behaviours exhibited by employees in response to performance management systems. First, 
the chapter presents some definitions of the term context. Second, the chapter highlights the 
way context has been studied in previous research as well as the shortcomings of this 
research. Third, social learning theory is defined and its distinguishing features in relation to 
other influential learning theories and research in the field of behavioural psychology are 
provided. Following this, social learning theory is applied to different behaviours that result 
from performance management systems, and its relevance to understanding the unintended 
outcomes of performance management systems is given. Finally, the research questions of the 
thesis and a conclusion are presented. 
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4.1 What does context mean?  
Given that the way the term context is used in the literature in unclear, some authors have 
made attempts to define it (e.g., Johns, 2006). Rousseau and Fried (2001:1) stated that the 
notion of context comes from Latin, and literally means ‘to knit together’ or to make 
associations. Among the existing definitions of context, Mowday and Sutton (1993: 198) 
described it as “the stimuli and phenomena that surround and thus exist in the environment 
external to the individual, most often at a different level of analysis” (Mowday and Sutton, 
1993: 198). Johns (2006: 386), on the other hand, perceived context as the restrictions and 
opportunities provided by the environment that impact the “occurrence and meaning of 
organisational behaviour as well as functional relationships between variables”.  
 
Based on these definitions, it can be observed that the above authors differ in their focus. 
While the first definition focuses on the existence of an environment that is external to an 
individual (Mowday and Sutton, 1993), the second definition emphasises the idea of the 
environment representing barriers and opportunities for an individual (Johns, 2006). On the 
surface, these definitions may seem to be different from each other; however, on closer 
examination, it can be seen that they are, related to some extent. Without acknowledging that 
there is an external environment that surrounds individuals’ behaviour, it may be difficult to 
progress to the next level and appreciate the possibility of the external environment offering 
restrictions and opportunities that influence individuals’ behaviour.  
 
Drawing on John’s (2006) definition, in this research, context is used to refer to the external 
environment that influences the way employees behave and respond to performance 
management practices, including both the opportunities and limitations it provides. In 
particular, as this research seeks to examine the social context of performance management 
systems, context in this thesis refers to the social interactions that take place between 
employees at work which enable employees to socially collect information about the 
performance management systems used by their organisations. Social learning theory 
(explained below in section 4.3) is used here because it explains how individuals socially 
learn from their environment.  
 
Having presented some available definitions of the term context and explained how it is used 
in this research, the next section explains how the term context is employed in performance 
management research. 
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4.2 How has context been applied to performance management in previous research? 
Recognising the role of the social context in performance management, researchers have 
proposed a list of various contextual factors to consider (e.g., Fletcher, 2001; Haines and St-
Onge, 2012; Judge and Ferris, 1993; Levy and Williams, 2004; Pichler, 2012). Wood and 
Marshall (2008) stated that the variety of contextual variables proposed is in part due to the 
way context in performance appraisals has been described, which varies from micro-level 
variables (e.g., the type of work performed), to macro-level variables (e.g., an organisation’s 
climate). Thus, due to the wide range of variables that can be used to denote context, a 
proliferation of contextual variables pertaining to performance management has emerged 
(e.g., Levy and Williams, 2004; Murphy and Cleveland, 1995; Haines and St-Onge, 2012).  
 
While a number of contextual variables in performance management literature exist, a review 
of the literature has shown that research on context is predominantly in the form of 
conceptual papers (e.g., Fletcher, 2001; Kahalas, 1980; Levy and Williams, 2004; Jones, 
1995). Having said that, there are also a few studies that have empirically tested context in 
performance management (e.g., Haines and St-Onge, 2012; Judge and Ferris, 1993; Pichler, 
2012). However, the majority of these studies have used quantitative measures to test specific 
contextual variables (e.g., Haines and St-Onge, 2012; Pichler, 2012). This observation is 
similar to that of Johns (2006), who argued that contextual variables are typically examined 
by researchers in a gradual manner, exploring one variable at a time, for instance, when 
dimensions of contexts such as job design are the main purpose of the research, other 
significant contextual dimensions such as rewards are frequently not measured or even 
recognised.  
 
In performance management research, although scholars have often explored more than just 
one contextual variable, the focus of their research in terms of analysing the contextual 
dimensions of performance management has been very limited, which is also reflected in 
their choice of the contextual variables in question (e.g., Haines and St-Onge, 2012; Pichler, 
2012). For example, Pichler (2012) limited his analysis to explaining the relationship between 
rater-ratee relationship quality, employees’ participation in decision-making, and the impact 
of favourable performance ratings in influencing employees’ reactions to performance 
appraisals. In a study exploring the impact of context on employees’ performance rating, 
Judge and Ferris (1993) suggested that despite researchers’ recognition of the influence of 
social factors in influencing employee rating, contextual variables were usually dealt with in 
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a unsystematic and partial manner, and they argued that this strategy does not seem to take 
into account that performance rating is an activity embedded in numerous environmental 
dimensions and should be studied simultaneously. 
   
An important conclusion that emerges from this short review is that in performance 
management research, the term context has been used to refer to many contextual dimensions 
that can influence the functioning of performance management systems. However, there is no 
consistency among scholars as to what constitutes context in performance management 
systems, or what is the relative importance of, or relationship between various contextual 
dimensions in performance management systems. This inconsistency is, perhaps, due to the 
broad and ambiguous nature of the term context (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995).  
 
This chapter has defined the term context and explained how it has been used in former 
performance management research. The chapter now introduces social learning theory and 
explains how the theory could help to understand the social context of performance 
managements systems. This is important because the way employees behave in relation to 
performance management systems can greatly affect whether performance management 
systems are successful in achieving their intended outcomes or not. Furthermore, as Mowday 
and Sutton (1993) noted, if one wants to go beyond the argument that context is essential, an 
analysis of how contextual factors influence individuals is necessary.  
 
4.3 Social learning theory 
By recognising the role that learning plays in affecting employees’ behaviour at work, the 
field of organisational behaviour has greatly developed (Manz and Sims, 1981). Among the 
existing learning theories that seek to explain people’s behaviour, social learning theory is 
one of the most influential (Davis and Luthans, 1980; Van Bommel et al., 2009).  
  
Social learning theory gives special consideration to the learning that occurs through the 
interaction between individuals (Davis and Luthans, 1980). While many researchers have 
contributed to the development of social learning theory, Bandura is often credited with 
making major contributions to the theory (Davis and Luthans, 1980; Van Bommel et al., 
2009) due to his comprehensive work and insightful interpretations of various factors that 
influence people’s learning. Bandura’s social learning theory also makes significant 
contributions to understanding the processes that influence individuals’ behaviour at work 
  74 
(Weiss, 1977). In this research, Bandura’s social learning theory is employed because the 
theory includes important concepts that can greatly enhance current understanding of the 
unintended effects of performance management and also improve the operation of 
performance management systems in organisations. 
 
The next section highlights some of the ways in which the social learning theory developed 
by Bandura (1977) relates to and differs from certain traditional learning theories suggested 
by other researchers. This is because many principles of social learning theory are the result 
of different learning theories. However, it should be noted that a comprehensive analysis of 
traditional learning theories is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, the focus is placed 
on clarifying the distinguishing features and main principles of Bandura’s social learning 
theory.  
 
4.3.1 Bandura’s social learning theory versus traditional learning theories 
Social learning theory is a behavioural theory that employs the concepts of classical and 
operant conditioning theories; however it differs from the rigid behavioural approach of B.F. 
Skinner (Davis and Luthans, 1980). Classical conditioning is defined as when an “originally 
neutral conditioned stimulus, through repeated pairing with the unconditioned one, acquires 
the response originally given to the unconditioned stimulus" (Atkinson et al., 1987: 658). 
While an unconditioned stimulus is a stimulus that unconditionally triggers a vigorous 
response with no previous training, a conditioned stimulus is a stimulus that after being 
paired with an unconditional stimulus elicits a response that is stronger than the initial 
response (Domjan, 2005). Operant conditioning, on the other hand, is a term that was coined 
by B.F. Skinner, suggesting that behaviour is controlled by its outcomes (Staddon and Cerutti, 
2003). Operant conditioning considers “organisms as operating in the environment but both 
the acquisition and maintenance of behaviour are considered to be controlled by the 
environmental consequences” (Davis and Luthans, 1980: 284).   
 
Behaviourists such as Skinner and Watson argued that science is only capable of 
understanding actions that can be observed, and that the process of inferring behaviour should 
be avoided because people’s actions can have a myriad of explanations, and researchers risk 
inferring incorrect causal connections and offering inappropriate explanations (Mahoney, 
1977). Consequently, most behavioural psychologists at that time ignored the function of 
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cognition because they considered cognitive processes to be metaphysical and so not to be 
included in the study of behaviour (Davis and Luthans, 1980).  
 
Bandura is one of the first behaviourists to demonstrate the significance of covert cognitive 
processes in affecting people’s behaviour (Davis and Luthans, 1980). He stated that “a theory 
that denies that thoughts can regulate actions does not lend itself readily to the explanation of 
complex human behaviour. Although cognitive activities are disavowed in the operant 
conditioning framework, their role in causal sequences simply cannot be eliminated” 
(Bandura, 1977: 19). The inability to understand complex social behaviour based on 
reinforcement-response relationships (i.e., operant conditioning) and stimulus-response 
relationships (i.e., classical conditioning) has over time resulted in a less constrained view 
that appreciates the function of social learning and imitation (Davis and Luthans, 1980). 
Miller and Dollard (1941) were one of the early researchers who explored the importance of 
social learning and imitation. However, their work had a lot of limitations, and offered a 
restricted view of observational learning (Bandura, 1965b).  
 
According to Miller and Dollard (1941), observational learning requires the observer to 
receive a reinforcing stimulus or observe a model receiving one, which means that if people 
are not rewarded for their actions or do not observe others being rewarded, they are unable to 
learn. Miller and Dollard (1941: 33) stated that “in order to get the individual to try a new 
response which is desired that he learns, it is often necessary to place him in a situation where 
his old responses will not be rewarded”. Miller and Dollard conducted a series of experiments 
in which they argued that observers learn to imitate by observing a model, and receiving a 
reward whenever the observer matches the model’s behaviour, and they termed this type of 
imitation ‘matched-dependent behaviour’ (Bandura, 1965b).  
 
Bandura (1965b) argued that Miller and Dollard’s (1941) experiments do not account for 
occasions when new behaviour is acquired simply by observing others. In most types of 
imitation, new behaviour is learned through observation without necessarily performing the 
action of the model during the exposure stage, and without any rewards given to the model or 
the observer (Bandura, 1965a; Bandura, 1965b). Bandura (1965b) explained that there is a 
difference between acquisition and performance and that people can acquire behaviour just 
by observing others. 
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4.3.2 Observational learning: the distinction between acquisition and performance  
Social learning theory differentiates acquisition/learning from performance as individuals do 
not perform all the behaviours they learn (Bandura, 1977). This is because, as Bandura 
(1977) explained, people acquire many behaviours by observing others; however people are 
more prone to perform the modelled behaviour if it leads to the results they desire than if it 
has non-rewarding or punishing outcomes. The difference between acquisition/learning and 
performance is clarified in the next experiment. 
 
In a well-known experiment by Bandura studying aggression in children, three groups of 
children observed a film in which a model who was aggressive to a bobo doll was either 
rewarded, punished, or faced no consequences (Bandura, 1965a). After the film, children 
were guided to a room that had a bobo doll, three balls, a mallet and other furniture, and were 
told by an instructor, who subsequently left the room, that they could play with the toys 
(ibid.). Children who observed the model being punished imitated the model’s aggressive 
behaviour much less frequently than the children who observed the model being rewarded, or 
subject to no consequences (ibid.). After the performance session, which lasted ten minutes, 
the instructor entered the room offering children from all three groups attractive rewards and 
asked them to copy the model’s aggressive behaviour (ibid.). Bandura (1965a) found that the 
provision of rewards eliminated the performance difference between the three groups of 
children because all children copied the model’s behaviour to an equal extent. Bandura 
(1965a) therefore argued that the reinforcement did not affect the children’s acquisition (i.e., 
learning) of the behaviour they observed, but affected their willingness to perform it.  
 
The distinction between acquisition/learning and performance has important implications for 
performance management systems because it shows how, through observation, different 
behaviours can easily be learned by employees at work. In organisations, employees are 
likely to observe others exhibiting both appropriate and inappropriate work behaviours, and 
observers are therefore likely to learn both behaviours. In this case, by observing others in 
organisations behaving in certain ways, it is possible that employees learn behaviours that 
support performance management systems in achieving their intended outcomes as well as 
the behaviours that hamper achieving such outcomes. 
 
Hence, it is important that managers are aware of the powerful effects of observation on 
employees’ learning, and ensure that employees learn the behaviours managers wish to 
  
 
77 
promote in the organisation. Particular attention should also be given to the rewards and 
punishments managers design and administer because, as explained above, rewards and 
punishments can play an important role in influencing whether employees engage in the 
observed learned behaviour or refrain from it.  
 
4.3.3 The role of observation, imitation, modelling, and rewards/punishments in social 
learning theory 
The importance of reinforcement in influencing people’s behaviour is amply documented by 
operant theory (Jablonsky and DeVries, 1972). In accordance with operant theory, social 
learning theory supports the idea that people learn from the outcomes they directly 
experience; however, social learning theory also places a great emphasis on the learning that 
occurs vicariously by observing the consequences of a model’s actions for the model (Davis 
and Luthans, 1980), referred to as vicarious reinforcement (Weiss, 1977). 
 
Bandura (1986) argued that much of the social learning that takes place is based on the casual 
or direct observation of others as they carry out their daily activities. By observing others, 
individuals frequently behave appropriately without personally experiencing any 
consequence, or receiving any explanation of the possible behavioural outcomes of their 
actions (Bandura, 1977). The way in which others’ behaviour is reinforced in various contexts 
can inform observers about the probable consequences of different actions (Bandura, 1986). 
This is due to the role that models play in influencing observers’ expectations of the potential 
outcomes related to certain actions (Manz and Sims, 1981).  
 
Bandura added that in cases where a model’s behaviour does not receive immediate rewards 
or punishments, observers focus on other cues that can transmit information about the 
consequences of the behaviour; for instance, the observer can use the social status of the 
model as a source of information that is used in the assessment of the appropriateness of the 
observed behaviour (Weiss, 1977). Elements such as the model’s status, power, or perceived 
competence can make the observer believe that the behaviour of the model has been 
previously rewarded, and the observer may expect that by imitating the model’s behaviour, 
the observer will be rewarded as well (ibid.). 
 
While people can be influenced by models, they can also be influenced by self-regulatory 
processes (Bandura, 1986). Social learning theorists suggest that people’s actions commonly 
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have two consequences: the first is an external consequence, and the second is an internal 
self-evaluative consequence, meaning that people are not simply influenced by external 
outcomes but are also affected by the outcomes they create for themselves and imagine could 
happen (Davis and Luthans, 1980). For instance, if a salesperson imagines that making a 
sales phone call will be accompanied by positive outcomes (e.g., selling a product and 
gaining a big commission), this could heighten the person’s confidence, and perhaps result in 
a successful phone call (Manz and Sims, 1981). Therefore, social learning posits that people 
are not passive organisms in their environment, but that people and their environment operate 
in a reciprocal fashion determining one another (Davis and Luthan, 1980). Bandura (1977) 
terms this interaction reciprocal determinism. 
 
4.3.4 Reciprocal determinism 
In the self-determinism model, personal, behavioural, and environmental determinants 
function interdependently, affecting one another reciprocally (Wood and Bandura, 1989). 
Reciprocal is defined as “the mutual action between events rather than in the narrower 
meaning of similar or opposite counterreactions” (Bandura, 1977: 194). Based on this 
reciprocal relationship, individuals are not only products of their environment, but they also 
create it (Wood and Bandura, 1989). In most cases, the environment only affects people if 
people decide to engage in certain actions (Bandura, 1986). For example, teachers do not 
affect students if students do not go to their classes, books do not affect individuals if they do 
not choose to read them, and likewise rewards and punishments do not affect people if people 
do not engage in particular courses of actions (Bandura, 1977). Hence, people’s behaviour 
partially controls what environmental influences will take place; environmental influences, 
on the other hand, affect what behaviour people will display in that particular environment 
(Bandura, 1986). 
 
Reciprocity in the reciprocal determinism model does not suggest that the three determinants 
(person, behaviour, environment) are equally powerful because one determinant can take time 
to influence the others (Wood and Bandura, 1989), and the level of influence exercised by the 
three determinants varies across situations (Bandura, 1986). For instance, there are occasions 
when personal determinants exert strong limitations on behaviour, and others when 
environmental determinants have the strongest effects (Bandura, 1977). An example could be 
that when people want to choose which film to watch in a big city with many cinemas, there 
are relatively few restrictions on choice, and so personal preferences may be the strongest 
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factors that determine what they do; however, if individuals are in a deep swimming pool, 
their behaviour will be more restricted regardless of their unique cognitive and behavioural 
composition.    
 
4.4 Applying social learning theory to performance management systems 
Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory has been widely used in various literature and 
disciplines as it explains people’s learning, behaviour and performance across a range of 
contexts. While social learning theory has made important contributions to understanding 
many organisational phenomena and activities, the theory has been much less popular in 
performance management literature. I am not aware of any empirical study that employed 
social learning theory as a framework for analysing performance management systems.  
 
The absence of social learning theory in performance management literature is surprising 
because incorporating social learning principles could make important improvements to the 
theory and practice of performance management systems. In theory, a better understanding 
could be reached of how performance management systems influence employees’ behaviour, 
and the context in which the systems take place. In practice, organisations could become 
more aware of how certain contextual dimensions can impact the operation of their 
performance management systems. Organisations could also gain greater control over their 
performance management systems, and use them as a means both to increase the frequency of 
the behaviours they desire and forestall the occurrence of the behaviours they wish to 
prevent.  
 
In the next section, the relevance of social learning theory to performance management 
systems will be shown by demonstrating how some of the ways in which observation, 
imitation, modelling, and rewards/punishment can affect employees’ behaviour with respect 
to certain performance management practices. For clarity, the processes of observation, 
imitation and modelling, and rewards/punishments are divided and discussed under their 
respective subheadings. However, the utility or effects of each process is usually contingent 
on or determined by other processes. For example, observers may pay attention when 
observing models if observers know that the modelled behaviour is rewarded, and by 
knowing that the behaviour is rewarded, observers may decide to imitate the observed 
behaviour (Bandura, 1977). Hence, discussions of each process require incorporating the 
other processes as well. 
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4.4.1 Observation  
Organisations are faced with the challenge of managing their employees’ performance with 
few opportunities to observe them (Jones, 1995). Typically, managers have numerous 
responsibilities, only a small number of which involve directly supervising employees, 
making immediate contact with employees limited, and information regarding employees’ 
performance frequently incomplete and fragmented (Feldman, 1981).  
 
Considering that one of the major aims of performance management systems has been to 
provide accurate performance ratings for employees (Denisi and Smith, 2014), some 
performance management researchers have emphasised the impact that managers observing 
and interacting with employees has on their performance ratings (Judge and Ferris, 1993). 
Although observing ratees may be helpful in achieving this aim, mainly focusing on this 
aspect of observation disregards the multi-dimensional effects of observational learning (e.g., 
the effects of an employee observing other employees). The effect of observational learning 
in performance management is by no means limited to managers and performance ratings, but 
impacts employees’ behaviour and performance in many ways.  
 
When employees are working within their social context, they customarily observe others 
performing different tasks, which can create the opportunity for those being observed to act 
as role models who can affect observers’ behaviour (Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). For 
example, when observers observe someone who has similar characteristics to theirs being 
successful in completing certain tasks after exerting a certain amount of effort, this may 
strengthen observers’ beliefs in their own abilities, and conversely, when they observe others 
who are similar to them being unsuccessful regardless of how much effort they exert to 
succeed, this may reduce observers’ self-efficacy (Wood and Bandura, 1989). Therefore, 
observing one’s colleagues succeeding in doing or failing to do particular tasks may have 
important implications for how employees perceive their work as well as their ability to do it 
(Bandura, 1977).   
 
Hence, unlike other researchers who focused on the learning that occurs through trial and 
error, Wood and Bandura (1989: 362) emphasised the importance of observational learning, 
arguing that “if knowledge and skills could be acquired only through direct experience, the 
process of human development would be greatly retarded, not to mention exceedingly 
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tedious, costly, and hazardous. Fortunately, people can expand their knowledge and skills on 
the basis of information conveyed by modelling influences.”  
 
4.4.2 Imitation and modelling  
In performance management systems, managers are involved in a continual process of 
planning, coaching, assessing, and reviewing employees’ performance (Haines and St-Onge, 
2012). As a result, much research has focused on the relationship between managers and 
employees (Levy and Williams, 2004). Most of this research has employed leader-member 
exchange theory as a vehicle for articulating the importance of having a good relationship 
between leaders and employees (e.g., Erdogan, 2002; Pichler, 2012).  
 
While a good relationship between managers and subordinates is undoubtedly beneficial, it is 
also important to understand how the role of managers in performance management systems 
can influence the way employees perceive and interact with their managers. For example, 
performance management systems are often used to both measure and develop employees’ 
performance (Pulakos, 2009), where managers are expected to concurrently function as a 
judge as well as a counsellor for employees in appraisals (Kahalas, 1980).  
 
Although the varying roles of managers in performance management systems make it 
challenging to unequivocally determine how managers influence their employees’ behaviour, 
it is still important to understand how managers are perceived by their employees. For 
example, it can be beneficial for organisations to know whether employees perceive their 
managers purely as raters who assess their performance, or as role models who inspire them 
to behave in certain ways, or both.  
 
This information can help organisations to become more informed about the impact of their 
managers on employees, and hence, design appropriate management interventions that 
support performance management systems in achieving their intended outcomes. For 
example, if organisations find that employees perceive their managers as role models, this 
information could have important implications for organisations because employees may 
imitate the behaviour performed by their managers. Alternatively, if organisations find that 
their employees perceive their managers only as raters, organisations could consider 
benefiting from role modelling effects and design their performance management systems in 
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a way that enables managers to act as role models who display and promote the behaviours 
desired by organisations. 
 
The role of managers as role models has been used to explain various organisational issues 
such as corruption (Ashforth and Anand, 2003), and also to explore topics such as 
organisational ethics (Trevino et al., 2014). For example, using social learning theory, Hanna 
et al. (2013) explored the impact of role models in influencing the ethical standards of future 
managers in organisations. On the other hand, Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly (1998) used 
social learning theory to explore how the presence of role models could encourage employees 
to display anti-social work behaviour.  
 
In performance management literature, the impact of managers on employees’ behaviour has 
been emphasised. However, performance management literature has focused more on the 
quality of the relationship between managers and employees (as suggested by leader-member 
exchange theory) than on the impact of managers as potential role models (e.g., Erdogan, 
2002; Pichler, 2012).  
 
Although the role of role models has rarely been discussed in performance management 
literature, the influence of role models on employees’ behaviour should not be 
underestimated. In the social learning view, modelling has powerful effects on individuals’ 
behaviour, for instance, role models can change observers’ moral judgements about different 
situations (Bandura, 1986). Through modelling and voicing opinions, models convey much 
information to observers, for instance, “by favouring certain judgmental standards, models 
increase the salience of morally relevant dimensions. The views they express additionally 
provide justifications for reweighting various factors in making decisions about the 
wrongness of given acts” (Bandura, 1977: 46). 
 
Therefore, by considering the effects of role models in organisations, a richer analysis of the 
contextual characteristics that influence performance management could be achieved. This is 
because while leader-member exchange theory focuses of the dyadic relationship between 
managers and employees (Pichler, 2012), the concept of modelling does not restrict analysis 
to this organisational relationship. While a good relationship between managers and 
employees is necessary, managers may not be the only, or major source of influence on 
employees (e.g., Mowday and Sutton, 1993). Employees may also be affected by other 
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individuals in their organisations. For example, they could be influenced by observing the 
actions of their colleagues, or of another manager who does not have a direct relationship 
with the employee.  
 
4.4.3 Rewards and punishments   
Individuals become motivated when they see people who are similar to them succeeding in 
reaching particular outcomes, and demotivated when they see that certain actions result in 
aversive outcomes (Wood and Bandura, 1989). In other words, by observing someone 
displaying certain behaviour that proved to be successful in gaining rewards, the observer can 
form expectations of the rewards that could be gained if he/she imitated the observed 
behaviour (Bandura, 1977). The costs incurred and gains obtained by others can affect 
observers’ willingness to adopt the observed behaviour and also affect the observers’ 
subsequent behaviour in the same manner as if they had directly experienced the 
consequences (Wood and Bandura, 1989).  
 
In spite of the importance of vicarious learning in influencing observers’ behaviour, managers 
have traditionally been trained to focus on the effects, typically negative, that punishments 
have on the recipient of the punishment (Trevino, 1992). In light of this, Trevino (1992) 
argued that the punished employee should not be the sole centre of attention for managers, 
but that they should also consider the observers’ thoughts, emotions and reactions because of 
the potentially indirect impacts of punishment on observers’ behaviour, as these may be more 
important than the impacts on the recipient of the punishment.  
 
For example, in a desire for retributive justice, observers may want a colleague to be 
punished if they think that their colleague has engaged in behaviour they consider to be 
inadequate, and in this case, a lack of punishment may result in negative reactions on the part 
of observers (Trevino, 1992). Hence, Trevino (1992) argued that punishment should not only 
be used as a way to change the behaviour of the punished employee without considering the 
other potential consequences. 
 
Likewise, the rewards given to an employee can have varying effects on observers depending 
on how observers perceive the rewards given. For example, rewards can have adverse effects 
on other employees if they think that rewards are inappropriately distributed (Aguinis et al., 
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2013). Therefore, analysis of punishments and rewards, or their absence, should also take into 
account their potential effects on observers in organisations. 
 
Rewards and punishments form a critical part of performance management systems (Aguinis, 
2014). However, despite the powerful effects of rewards and punishments on employees’ 
behaviour (Gupta and Shaw, 2014), performance management is in many cases ripe with 
hidden agendas and conflicting interests that influence the rewards or punishments employees 
receive (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995). The prospect of rewards not only affects the 
behaviour of employees, but also that of managers.  
 
Considering that this research seeks to explore the unintended outcomes of performance 
management systems, the remainder of this chapter provides further illustrations of the role of 
social learning theory in explaining different types of employee behaviour which can work 
against the achievement of the goals intended by organisations. 
 
4.5 Applying social learning theory to understanding the unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems 
This section aims to illustrate how employing social learning theory can help to explain the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems. Given the unavailability of 
empirical research that has applied social learning theory to understanding the operation of 
performance management systems, or the occurrence of the unintended outcomes in 
performance management systems, this section has looked at research that has indirectly 
employed social learning principles to explain various types of counterproductive behaviour 
at work.  
 
As suggested by social learning theory, Ferris et al., (1994) argued that employees’ decisions 
to engage in certain behaviours can be greatly affected by their subjective assumption that 
particular behaviours will lead to outcomes they value. Hence, in the context of performance 
management systems, Denisi and Pritchard (2006) argued that irrespective of how well 
performance appraisals are designed, performance appraisals and performance feedback will 
be defective in improving employees’ future performance unless organisations ensure that 
there is a relationship between actions and outcomes (Denisi and Pritchard, 2006). For 
example, when employees are not satisfied with their pay, this can result in many undesired 
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outcomes such as high staff turnover, reduced commitment, unethical behaviour, and 
dysfunctional behaviour (Li-Ping Tang et al., 2008).  
 
Griffen and Lopez (2005) explained that dysfunctional behaviour can also occur if employees 
observe others in their organisation performing inappropriate work behaviours without facing 
any bad consequences. This argument is in line with the social learning principle that 
observing models being punished inhibits observers from imitating the observed behaviour, 
and observing models going unpunished tends to disinhibit observers from imitating the 
behaviour (Bandura, 1965b, 1977). Accordingly, Griffen and Lopez (2005) argued that, in an 
organisational context, if an employee behaves in an inappropriate manner and the employee 
does not receive any punishment from his/her manager, the behaviour could be understood by 
other employees in the organisation as acceptable.  
 
Similarly, in their paper on organisational corruption, Ashforth and Anand (2003) argued that 
as role models, managers who tolerate corruption do not need to do so in a formal and direct 
manner; managers who indirectly support or turn a blind eye to corruption can be understood 
to condone it, which may encourage employees to engage in corruption as a result. Likewise, 
Griffen and Lopez (2005: 998) stated that “[..] the extent to which the social network most 
relevant to that behaviour tolerates or rejects the deviant behaviour may carry profound 
implications for both the actors and others in the group”. 
 
Having said that, in many cases when an employee behaves in a way that is considered to be 
inappropriate by managers, managers choose to punish the employee in private, which means 
that co-workers do not observe the punishments that follow wrongdoing. Although public 
punishment is viewed as humiliating and bad management practice, it may be important to 
know how employees who only observe the bad behaviour but not the resultant consequences 
perceive and assess the bad behaviour. 
 
Considering the above arguments, it can therefore be suggested that the context of 
performance management, including the way managers respond to the behaviours exhibited 
by employees, partly determines whether employees engage in the behaviours they observe. 
 
In this sense, understanding how employees behave in response to the context in which they 
work is key to understanding how the behaviours discussed in Chapter 3, specifically gaming, 
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effort substitution and myopia, are disseminated among employees at work. Analysing 
context is important because, as Magnusson (1981) noted, employees do not function in 
isolation, and their behaviour occurs within and is influenced by their social environment. 
Although employees may be able to make their own moral judgments, the impact of their role 
models, including their managers, accompanied by the influence of their colleagues’ 
behaviour and the employees’ anticipated outcomes of a particular behaviour can influence 
the way employees subsequently perform (Adnan et al., 2013).  
 
These contextual influences can also have implications for the functioning of performance 
management systems in that employees’ engagement in different behaviours can influence the 
extent to which performance management systems are effective or ineffective in achieving 
their goals. The way behaviours such as gaming, effort substitution and myopia can influence 
the operation of performance management systems is discussed in Chapter 3 in sections 3.2.1, 
3.2.2, and 3.2.3 respectively. 
 
This section has so far highlighted a number of ways in which organisational context can 
motivate employees to engage in inappropriate work behaviours (e.g., Ashforth and Anand, 
2003). However, context can also help to forestall these behaviours (Chernyak-Hai and 
Tziner, 2014). Chernyak-Hai and Tziner (2014) stated that in organisational contexts where 
ethical behaviours are emphasised, employees may have fewer tendencies to engage in 
unethical behaviours. The underlying argument is that employees often consult their 
organisational environment to identify what their organisation categorises as appropriate and 
inappropriate, and behave accordingly (Li-Ping Tang et al., 2008).  
 
Tittle (1980) added that according to deterrence studies, the most powerful deterrent to the 
behaviours disallowed by organisations is related to the anticipation of informal punishment 
from other employees at work, especially the fear of losing relational respect or status in the 
organisation. The stigma related to certain behaviours can be stronger, with longer-lasting 
impacts than the sanctions of managers (Trevino, 1992). Thus, following the same argument 
made in section 4.4.3, which refers to the social learning principle that people are usually 
deterred from engaging in behaviours that have aversive consequences (Bandura, 1977), the 
fear of punishment can play a major role in preventing bad behaviours from occurring in 
organisations.  
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As discussed in this chapter, there are numerous contextual factors that affect the way 
employees behave in organisations. Despite the importance of these contextual dimensions, 
performance management literature does not seem to fully appreciate their powerful 
influence on the way employees approach performance management activities. As a result, 
current understanding of the contextual dimensions of performance management remains 
superficial, or rather simplistic.  
 
The need to understand the context of performance management systems is essential because, 
as shown in Chapters 2 and 3, performance management systems do, at times, go awry and 
can result in different types of unintended outcomes, including gaming, effort substitution 
and myopia. It has also been argued that these unintended outcomes are widespread in 
organisations. This raises an important question of how these unintended outcomes are 
learned and disseminated in organisations.  
 
In this chapter, it has been suggested that behaviours are learned in organisations. In order to 
explain how this learning occurs, and also what contributes to making certain behaviours 
performed by employees in organisations, Bandura’s social learning theory has been 
proposed. Social learning theory is particularly useful as it details the mechanisms that affect 
people’s learning as well as their motivation to perform different types of behaviour 
(Bandura, 1977).  
 
4.6 Research questions  
In explaining the deficiencies of performance management systems in achieving their 
intended outcomes, the majority of researchers exploring this area have predominantly 
focused on the idea of reinforcement (i.e., rewards and punishment). Although the concept of 
reinforcement is important (Wood and Bandura, 1989), it is insufficient to explain the various 
factors that influence employees’ behaviour at work. In the social learning view, 
reinforcement does not affect employees’ learning capabilities, but their motivation to 
perform the acquired behaviour through observation (this point is discussed above in section 
4.3.2) (Bandura, 1977). Accordingly, this research suggests that in order to understand 
employees’ behaviour in performance management systems, the focus should not only be 
placed on reinforcement, but also on how, through the effects of observation, imitation and 
modelling, employees engage in various types of behaviour, some of which can result in 
outcomes not intended by organisations. 
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With the exception of certain researchers who have highlighted the impact of managers on 
influencing the way in which employees approach performance management systems (e.g., 
Murphy and Cleverland, 1995), the impact of observational learning, imitation, modelling 
effects, and how they impact the operation of performance management practices remains 
largely ignored. Furthermore, even research that has considered the impact of managers on 
employees’ performance in performance management systems has mostly been in the form of 
theoretical papers (e.g., Den Hartog et al., 2004), which lack the support of empirical 
evidence. 
 
Without an in-depth understanding of the contextual mechanisms that mediate, and to some 
extent determine the actual impact of performance management practices on employees, it 
can be challenging for organisations implementing performance management systems to 
understand how employees collectively learn new behaviours, reinforce existing ones, refrain 
from performing other ones and perhaps, what influences the pace at which certain 
behaviours are adopted and diffused in organisations. Consequently, this research seeks to 
shed light on these issues by addressing the two following research questions and their 
associated aims:  
 
1) What are the unintended outcomes that arise from performance management 
systems? This has the associated aim to create a typology of the unintended outcomes 
that arise from performance management systems;  
 
2) How are unintended behavioural outcomes learned and diffused in their social 
context? This has the associated aim to explore, through the lens of social leaning 
theory, how the unintended behavioural outcomes displayed by employees in response 
to performance management systems are learned, diffused, adopted or avoided by 
other employees.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter used social learning theory to explain how certain behaviours are learned and 
practised in organisations. Since the aim of this chapter is the demonstrate how social 
learning theory can explain the occurrence of the unintended outcomes of performance 
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management systems, attention has been given to explaining how some of the behaviours that 
detract from the utility of performance management systems can take place in organisations.  
Given the definitional issues pertaining to the notion of context, the chapter started by 
presenting some of these issues, highlighting some commonalities in the definition of context, 
and explaining how social context is used in this thesis. The chapter then discussed the way 
context has been analysed in previous performance management research together with the 
limitations of previous approaches to studying performance management systems. In order to 
explain how context influences employees’ behaviour at work, the chapter then introduced 
and defined Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory. Following this, the major principles of 
social learning theory were used to explain various behaviours in organisations, and highlight 
the way these behaviours affect the functioning of performance management practices. In 
light of the arguments presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the research questions for this 
research were presented. The next chapter explains the methodology that is used to answer 
these research questions, and justifies the appropriateness of this methodology to the thesis. 
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Chapter	5:	Methodology	
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology employed in the thesis. By methodology, I mean the 
general way the research topic is explored, including the method and the particular techniques 
used (Langdridge, 2007). This chapter begins by justifying the selection of a qualitative 
methodology, followed by explaining the paradigm of the research. The chapter then 
describes the evolution of the higher education sector in the United Kingdom and 
demonstrates the appropriateness of the United Kingdom higher education for answering the 
research questions of the thesis. Following this, the primary data, which was gathered from 
13 universities rated in the top quartile of the Research Excellence Framework (REF) 2014 in 
the United Kingdom together with the sampling strategy used in this research are discussed. 
The chapter then moves to explaining the way the data were analysed, demonstrating how 
quality in this research is assessed, and highlighting the ethical considerations that were taken 
during the course of the research.  
 
5.1 The justification of a qualitative methodology 
There are numerous factors that have informed the selection of a qualitative methodology, 
some of which are discussed in this section. Discussions start with the more general factors, 
explaining how existing performance management literature does not provide enough 
information on the topic of this thesis to be able to undertake a quantitative study, followed 
by specific factors that demonstrate the suitability of a qualitative methodology to answer the 
research questions of the thesis.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter (in section 4.5), research into the unintended outcomes 
of performance management systems is limited and inadequately explored, with no empirical 
study (to my knowledge) that has applied social learning theory to understanding the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems. This limited available 
information renders a qualitative methodology a better approach for this research. In areas 
that are poorly conceptualised, a qualitative methodology can be more appropriate than a 
quantitative one because the former can help induce new theories and generate new insights 
about the phenomenon under investigation whereas the latter is usually used to deduce 
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hypotheses from existing theories. Creswell (2012) stated that in cases where literature does 
not provide sufficient information on the phenomenon being studied, and there is a need to 
conduct an exploratory study and learn from participants, a qualitative methodology is more 
appropriate. 
 
Another reason for doing qualitative research is that performance management systems are 
complex (Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011), requiring in-depth 
investigation of the various contexts in which they take place. For this reason, a qualitative 
approach was taken as it is likely to reveal novel aspects of the context of performance 
management systems as opposed to a quantitative approach that restricts itself to a narrow 
appreciation of the context by focusing on a small number of variables. The attempts of 
survey designers to restrict the number of variables and research questions can limit the 
ability of surveys to closely examine social phenomena (Yin, 2009). In order to fully 
understand how employees perform in performance management systems, an exploratory 
study that unearths the various factors that affect individuals’ behaviour is therefore essential.  
 
For example, a qualitative study can help identify the various unintended effects that 
performance management systems have on employees, and then explore why and how 
performance management systems give rise to these unintended effects. This information can 
help to reach the first aim of the thesis (i.e., to create a typology of the unintended outcomes 
that arise from performance management systems, which prevent performance management 
systems from reaching their intended outcomes), which can be achieved by eliciting 
responses from participants about their perceptions and personal experiences of performance 
management systems. Furthermore, a qualitative study can help to gain detailed information 
on respondents and the context in which they operate. Accessing such information is critical 
to reach the second aim of the thesis (i.e., to explore, through the lens of social leaning 
theory, how the behaviours displayed by employees in response to performance management 
systems but not intended by the systems are learned, diffused, adopted or avoided by other 
employees). Without this information, it will be challenging to assess the role and utility of 
social learning theory in explaining the behaviour of individuals in performance management 
systems. The importance of understanding the social context of performance management 
systems is also emphasised by numerous qualitative researchers who argued that it is not 
possible to understand social behaviour without understanding the specific context in which 
individuals function (Bryman and Bell, 2015).  
  92 
Before discussing the methods that are used to collect and analyse data in this thesis, the next 
section explains the philosophical paradigm that underpins this research. This is because the 
philosophical orientation of researchers has a significant influence on the selected research 
methods (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
5.2 Research paradigm  
A research paradigm is “a framework that guides how research should be conducted, based 
on people’s philosophies and their assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge” 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009: 55). The way in which research paradigms influence the direction 
of research is often explained in terms of ontology and epistemology (Wahyuni, 2012).  
 
Ontology “is a branch of philosophy dealing with the essence of phenomena and the nature of 
their existence” (Duberley et al., 2012: 17). Epistemology addresses the question of what 
forms legitimate knowledge (Wahyuni, 2012). Therefore, epistemology and ontology are 
connected because epistemology concerns the way in which we can gather knowledge of a 
particular phenonomenon (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Epistemology can be realist or relativist 
in that a realist epistemological position suggests that an objective reality can be known by 
using appropriate tools; in contrast, a relativist position argues that knowledge is 
“perspectival” and having one reality is not possible (ibid.). 
 
This thesis adopts the relativist perspective on the grounds that “performance” is a multi-
dimensional construct (Armstrong and Baron et al., 1998; Keasey et al., 2000) that cannot be 
adequately assessed and understood only through the use of quantitative measures. In 
addition to this, the understanding of performance management systems is closely dependent 
on individuals’ local contexts, sensemaking, and point in history. Hence, the unintended 
outcomes of performance management systems together with the way individuals understand 
them will also vary alongside these dimensions. Researchers’ focus on evaluating employees’ 
performance through quantitative measures has been widely criticised not only in 
performance management literature, but also in performance measurement literature wherein 
the inadequacies of such an approach in terms of measuring employees’ performance has 
been debated at length (this point is detailed in Chapter 2 in section 2.9.2). Furthermore, as 
shown in Chapter 2 in section 2.3, a single definite definition of performance management 
does not exist. Hence, this research does not support the view that there is one objective 
reality about employees’ performance, or performance management systems. Instead, this 
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research explores existing interpretations of the terms performance and performance 
management within the academic sector, with the aim of introducing new meanings derived 
from the perspectives and experiences of participating individuals.  
 
Another reason this thesis adopts the relativist position is that considering that the research 
question of the thesis is to identify the unintended outcomes of performance management 
systems and understand how they occur, it seems plausible that the best way to explore this 
topic is by asking individuals who are subject to these systems, and analyse the implications 
that performance management practices have on their behaviour and subsequent 
performance. This is important because people who are involved in performance management 
systems normally have different experiences of the systems, and I therefore need to engage 
with respondents to be able to gain a good understanding of their personal interpretations. 
 
Accordingly, this thesis adopts the interpretivist paradigm, informed by a phenomenological 
epistemology. Interpretivism is a paradigm that “focuses on capturing the essence of the 
phenomena and extracting data that provide rich, detailed explanations” (Collis and Hussey, 
2009: 65). In this respect, interpretive researchers seek to develop social science concepts by 
inductively collecting information from social actors (Gephart, 2004). Interpretivists argue 
that research which reveals the research participants’ perspectives on a particular 
phenomenon generates good knowledge (Wahyuni, 2012).  
 
It is this particular way of viewing the world from the perspective of social actors that is of 
central interest to phenomenologists (Bryman and Bell, 2015) and to this research project. 
Phenomenologists object to the objectivity/subjectivity argument of positivists, who believe 
that there is a distinction between the world as it is, and the way we perceive it; 
phenomenologists criticise this point on the basis that an object only becomes a ‘reality’ when 
we perceive it, arguing that objects should not be considered independently from our 
perceptions (Langdridge, 2007). Phenomenologists believe that social scientists need to 
access individuals’ thinking, and that researchers’ interpretation of individuals’ actions and 
their social environment should be based on the meanings participants attribute to their 
actions and their social environment (Bryman and Bell, 2015).  
 
Having justified the selection of a qualitative methodology together with my ontological and 
epistemological position, the chapter now turns to explaining the reasons for the selection of 
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the higher education sector in the United Kingdom as the research context for this thesis, 
stipulating the tools, processes and strategies that are used to collect and analyse data. 
Methods for data collection and analysis are discussed in turn in the following sections.  
 
5.3 Research context: Performance management systems in the higher education sector 
in the United Kingdom 
Before 1980, United Kingdom universities received a fixed amount of government funding 
per student and government funding for research was distributed relatively equally among 
universities (Prichard and Willmott, 1997). During the 1980s, the British government 
introduced and implemented various techniques to evaluate the performance of public sector 
organisations (Johnes, 1996).  
 
This initiative involved major restructuring of the higher education sector and was designed 
to ensure that organisations receiving public funding became more accountable to those who 
gave the funding (Johnes, 1996). At first, significant reductions in university funding were 
made selectively based on the A-level grades of students, with universities receiving more 
funding for students with higher grades (Prichard and Willmott, 1997). Since then, the 
number of students attending university has consistently increased (Prichard and Willmott, 
1997), for example, in the 1960s, university student numbers increased by 5%, but in the 
1980s, numbers increased by 15% (Elton, 2000). However, governments have not provided 
consistent levels of funding to cover the cost to universities of increasing student numbers 
(Prichard and Willmott, 1997). In terms of research, government funding has increasingly 
been allocated on the basis of performance metrics as opposed to academic staff numbers 
employed (ibid.). As most university expenses are fixed and cannot easily be reduced, 
altering the amount of government funding to universities can have a major impact on their 
ability to cover costs (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015).  
 
Another notable structural change to the funding of United Kingdom universities involved the 
substitution of the University Grants Committee with the University Funding Council, which 
was later relabelled as the Higher Education Funding Council1 (Scotland has a different 
 
1 Currently replaced with UK Research and Innovation and the Office for Students: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/higher-education-funding-council-for-england 	
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agency) (Power, 1997). The University Grants Committee was generally regarded as a buffer 
between the state and universities, and most of its members included senior academics who 
provided the government with advice about educational policies and the adequate amount of 
resources required to enforce these policies (Willmott, 1995). On the other hand, the Higher 
Education Funding Council is considered to be an organisation operating on behalf of central 
government, which from the middle of the 1980s implemented assessment processes to 
monitor the distribution of increasingly reduced funds (Power, 1997).  
 
5.3.1 From self-regulation to external control through performance assessment exercises 
The most recent evaluation exercise conducted by the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England was the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in 2014 and was done on behalf of 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for all funding councils in the United 
Kingdom (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015). The Higher Education Funding Council for 
England facilitated the administration and implementation of assessments in line with 
guidelines from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, which acted in 
accordance with the requirements of HM Treasury, the ultimate controller of government 
expenditure (ibid.). The REF 2014 followed a series of other formal evaluation exercises 
organised in 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001 and 2008, the outcomes of which influenced the 
reputation of universities and determined the funding they received from the government 
(Pidd and Broadbent, 2015). The assessments evaluate the performance of individual units in 
universities in various nationally determined research subjects, rewarding top performance 
with very large amounts of funding (Chandler et al., 2002). The outcomes of the assessment 
exercises also gained considerable publicity, including the construction of league tables for 
institutions by the press (Cooper and Otley, 1998). This in turn affected the number of 
students applying for certain universities and also influenced the quality of students who 
applied to these universities (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015).  
 
Considering that the higher education sector in the United Kingdom is largely funded by the 
government (although the funding that comes from other non-governmental institutions has 
significantly increased since the 1980s), higher education sector institutions have found 
themselves increasingly competing for funding with each other and with organisations from 
other sectors (Johnes, 1996). The competition for government funding became particularly 
intense after 1992, when polytechnics and a number of colleges became part of the university 
sector and also qualified to receive research funding, which meant that some departments in 
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pre-1992 universities lost some of their finding (Elton, 2000). The dependency of higher 
education institutions on government funding has forced universities to conform to 
government requirements for efficiency and cost effectiveness (Power, 1997). Parker and Jary 
(1995) explained that although universities had implemented various performance 
management practices and made much effort to improve their overall performance and satisfy 
the government, universities’ efforts were never considered to be sufficient by the 
government. They argued that as universities achieved higher performance levels, this 
confirmed to the government the claim that higher education institutions had been ineffective 
in the first place, thereby increasing government efforts to reduce funding and place more 
students into universities (ibid.).    
 
As a consequence, universities’ freedom to make their own decisions were dramatically 
curtailed as universities were continuously expected to provide reports detailing the outcomes 
of their efforts to the government (Elton, 1988, Power, 1997). By making the higher 
education sector accountable to the government, the government shifted power from 
universities to itself (Elton, 1988). These initiatives altered the measurement systems of 
universities, moving from self-evaluative processes to standardisation of output 
measurements, with new assessments and performance indicators being designed to facilitate 
good research and teaching (Power, 1997).  
 
5.3.2 University performance management systems in the United Kingdom  
Universities are currently operating in environments where accountability to external 
stakeholders is increasingly emphasised (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015), and they are 
subject to a number of external forces that affect the way they internally operate (Ylijoki, 
2005). The previous section explains how universities in the United Kingdom have 
experienced important national changes, and how the government plays a key role in the 
functioning of universities. In this thesis, the national changes refer to the external structures 
and policies that place constraints on universities in the United Kingdom (Parker and Jary, 
1995). Examples of such constraints include the significant increase in student numbers, 
changes to the criteria for university funding, the restructuring of research funding exercises 
(Parker and Jary, 1995), and the evolving periodic research and teaching evaluation exercises 
used to gauge the performance of universities (Pidd and Broadbent, 2015). Although 
universities are able to choose how to distribute government funding within different 
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departments, the government specifies the amount to be dedicated to different subject groups, 
(tel Borg and Scapens, 2012). 
 
To obtain desirable resources from the government, universities have strategically altered the 
way they manage the performance of their academics (Power, 1997). Agyemang and 
Broadbent (2015) argued that universities have internally operationalised external 
governmental control mechanisms by using different performance management systems and 
performance measures to assess academics’ work. They explained that as universities 
attempted to resist the externally enforced control mechanisms such as the REF, they created 
internal control systems that are more rigid and more restrictive than the external 
governmental measures universities initially intended to resist. For example, universities use 
of journal lists to resist the REF has become part of the internal performance management 
universities use to determine what good research publication is and is not (ibid.). As journal 
lists such as the Association of Business Schools and the Financial Times have become 
influential in recruitment and promotion decisions, and in selecting academics to participate 
in the national assessment exercises, journal lists have started to determine the nature, 
composition and structure of academic work (Mingers and Willmott, 2012).  
 
In addition to the government, universities are influenced by other forces. For example, 
universities are expected to comply with international standards, adhere to national 
performance assessments, and simultaneously distinguish themselves from competitors 
domestically and globally (Kallio et al., 2015). As a result, universities have become 
increasingly apprehensive about their rankings and the way the rankings affect their 
reputation and income generation (Power, 1997). Local and international classifications 
together with university league tables are determined by universities’ research and teaching 
performance (tel Borg and Scapens, 2012). Academics’ research performance is typically 
assessed based on the number of papers published in top journals, while in teaching, students’ 
experiences are considered important indicators of quality (ibid.). Academics, as a 
consequence, find themselves increasingly faced with ambitious targets, urged by their 
universities to publish in top rated journals, win external finding and support their universities 
to enhance their ratings in league tables (Tourish and Craig, 2018).  
 
An important point to note is that while universities in the United Kingdom are more or less 
subject to the same external forces, there are differences in the way individual universities 
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and departments implement performance management systems. For instance, performance 
management systems vary depending on the agendas of heads of schools, departments, deans, 
directors of research, etc. However, while there are differences in the performance 
management systems used across departments/schools and universities, there is some degree 
of commonality across departments/schools in terms of their performance expectations. This 
is because, as well as being subject to the same national/sectorial influences, 
departments/schools likely have some guiding principles and policies on performance 
management systems which are shared across the entire university. University performance 
targets cascade down to departments and then to individual academics who are in turn 
expected to perform in line with the vision of their heads of schools. 
 
The various changes experienced by universities have led to a noticeable change in the 
context in which academics’ research, teaching and administration takes place across United 
Kingdom universities (Parker and Jary, 1995). Willmott (1995) explained that while in 
practice the formal job content for academics has not changed significantly, the method of its 
delivery and the daily experiences of academics have altered, and at times quite remarkably. 
Academics are no longer free to establish their own priorities as they are now expected to 
work towards the priorities of their employing institution (Harley et al., 2004). Performance 
management systems have been redesigned to reflect notions of accountability, and increased 
use of performance indicators and private sector management techniques (Agyemang and 
Broadbent, 2015). Scholars have termed changes to academics’ work as new public 
management (Sun and Van Ryzin, 2014), a point that is discussed in more detail below. 
 
5.3.3 New public management in United Kingdom universities  
New public management is defined as the spillover of private sector practices such as 
accountability, auditing, monitoring and employee surveillance into public services (Clarke et 
al., 2012). New public management seeks to make public services more efficient and 
responsive to customers by making public servants’ work more visible and controllable 
(McGivern and Ferlie, 2007). It promotes ideas such as controlling expenditure, creating 
quasi-markets, decentralising management authority and increasing accountability to 
consumers through the introduction of performance measures (Power, 1997). It is also 
concerned with raised efficiency and work intensification, where accountability is used to 
increase management processes and power (Chandler et al., 2002). Even in cases where new 
public management is carried out with a friendly attitude towards the individuals being 
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managed, the introduction of new public management likely entails higher workloads for 
academics and increased external management control (ibid.). Parker and Jary (1995: 
324/325) describe the change in the internal environment of universities saying: “the 
language of line managers, customers and products begin to displace the academic language 
of deans, students and courses, and in some cases (markets for example) introduces ideas that 
were not previously used at all”.  
 
The use of new public management principles in public services has spurred diverse reactions 
from bureaucrats, ranging from the belief that it is the inevitable solution to fix an old and 
flawed public sector management system to the belief that new public management creates an 
irreversible destruction of the ethos of public services that took over a century to develop 
(Hood, 1991).  
 
However, despite the varied responses to new public management principles, governments in 
the United Kingdom have progressively implemented such principles in public services 
(Hood, 2006; Radnor, 2008) including universities, to the extent that some academics call 
governments’ movement to externally regulate universities the ‘McDonaldisation’ of 
universities (Parker and Jary, 1995). Notions like modernisation, specialisation, 
professionalisation and rationalisation have become common terms used to describe the 
operation of United Kingdom universities (Willmott, 1995). Bevan and Hood (2006) and 
other scholars viewed the use of performance indicators by the government as a form of 
indirect control, and Neave (1988) described the rise of governments’ interventions as the rise 
of an “evaluative state”. Agyemang and Broadbent (2015) argued that such a change in the 
management of universities has created a “transactional relationship” between the 
government and universities, whereby the government uses a command and control approach, 
dictating to universities the output to be achieved if funding is to be given. Likewise, Geuna 
(2001) described such dynamics as a “contractual-oriented approach”, whereby the 
government creates financial incentives to monitor the behaviour of universities, explaining 
that in the contractual-oriented approach, universities are expected to support goals that 
contribute to national economic growth and in order to improve the efficiency of universities, 
the government creates a competition between universities over resource allocation.  
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Having noted the different factors that influence the way academics’ performance is 
managed, the next section articulates the rationale for selecting United Kingdom universities 
as a case study for this thesis. 
 
5.3.4 The rationale for examining the unintended outcomes of performance 
management systems in United Kingdom universities 
The notion of assessing academics’ performance is not new. Universities have always had 
measures for assessing academics’ work, but this assessment used to be done in more 
traditional peer-review forms and a more collegial fashion (Sousa et al., 2010). As noted in 
the previous section, the advent of new public management has changed the landscape of 
academia in that universities are now experiencing an abrupt move towards more corporate 
models of management (Kallio et al., 2015). Issues such as productivity and efficiency have 
become of paramount importance to universities, putting the performance of both universities 
and academics in the spotlight. As universities find themselves in a constant race to retain or 
improve their position in league tables, academics’ performance has simultaneously come 
under scrutiny.  
 
The introduction of performance management systems has generated much resistance from 
academics, who have repeatedly expressed their discontent with the systems (Prichard and 
Willmott, 1997). However, despite academics’ resistance, a growing body of studies has 
shown that performance management systems have had a significant impact on academics' 
performance (Chandler et al., 2002; tel Borg and Scapens, 2012; Tourish and Craig, 2018). 
Parker and Jary (1995) criticised academics’ responses to performance management systems 
saying: “the new academic, like the New Higher Education, begins to become more 
instrumental and rationalised. No longer should teaching, administration and research be seen 
as complementary and inseparable activities. No longer is a fascination with the discipline a 
satisfactory legitimation for a scholarly life. The new academic becomes an organisation 
person, someone dedicated to a career with certain progressions and rewards, and someone 
who knows their (and others’) quality ratings.”  
 
Academics’ instrumental attitude to performance management systems has been echoed by 
different researchers. For example, Chandler et al. (2002) argued that the research assessment 
exercises motivate certain academics to be more competitive rather than collaborative, and 
capitalise on performance management systems to personally benefit their career. Agyemang 
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and Broadbent (2015) explained that performance management systems encourage academics 
to achieve desirable performance output (e.g., paper publications), but perhaps not desirable 
outcomes (e.g., contributory publications). For example, academics may obtain a high 
number of paper citations and produce large quantities of publications, but these publications 
may be of a poor standard or even fraudulent as opposed to being truly original pieces of 
work that are perhaps not instantly recognisable as such (Biagioli et al., 2019). 
 
Other researchers have even gone a step further noting the relationship between performance 
management systems and dysfunctional work behaviours. According to Tourish and Craig 
(2018), there is a conflict between ethical research practices and performance management 
systems as the systems exhort academics to publish more and more papers in top rated 
journals and establish a high academic profile, placing less emphasis on ethical 
considerations. Evidence of academic misbehaviour is also evident in the sharp increase in 
the number of papers retracted in the last decades for reasons of academic fraud and 
misconduct (Biagioli et al., 2019; Tourish and Craig, 2018).  
 
In addition to obvious prohibited types of misconduct such as fabrication of data and 
plagiarism, in recent years, there has been a propagation of what is termed in the literature as 
gaming behaviours (Biagioli et al., 2019). Some of these behaviours can be unequivocally 
categorised as misconduct whereas others are ambiguous, and it is unclear whether they 
should be classified as misconduct (some of the ways in which academics game performance 
management systems are discussed in the next section) (ibid.). Tourish and Craig (2018) 
stated that the reason for the increased occurrence of academics gaming is that the research 
environment for academics provides them with the tools, opportunity and motivation to 
engage in inappropriate work behaviours. When academics engage in cost/benefit 
considerations, the benefits of engaging in gaming behaviours to achieve greater outcomes 
far outweigh the costs (ibid.). Indeed, not engaging in gaming behaviours can put one at a 
competitive disadvantage to those who do and are able to perform well in performance 
management metrics (Biagioli et al., 2019). 
 
In sum, United Kingdom universities have been selected in this thesis for the following 
reasons. As highlighted above, United Kingdom universities have experienced important 
changes where the spirit of collegiality has been substituted with managerialism (Willmott, 
1995). The sector has seen increasing attempts to performance manage academics over 
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approximately the last 20 years since the introduction of the REF (termed as research 
assessment exercises in previous years), with the intensity of performance management 
systems growing over time, manifested in the advent of other national assessment exercises 
(e.g., the National Student Survey, the Teaching Excellence Framework, and soon the 
Knowledge Exchange Framework). Alongside these changes, there are growing concerns 
about academic gaming and misconduct (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2012; Tsui, 2013; Tourish 
and Craig, 2018; Biagioli et al., 2019).  
 
As existing research has related academics’ misbehaviour to performance management 
systems, this thesis seeks to ascertain the influence of performance management systems on 
academics. In other words, this research aims to identify whether performance management 
systems help to improve academics’ performance in the manner performance management 
scholars claim, or whether they have other unintended effects. Addressing this question is 
important because there is mounting evidence suggesting that some of the purported benefits 
of implementing performance management systems in organisations do not seem to be 
occurring in higher education institutions. In fact, current evidence has shown that academia 
has been severely damaged by the implementation of performance management systems as 
these systems challenge some of the most important tenets of academic work including 
academics’ freedom, autonomy of inquiry (Parker and Jary, 1995; Kallio et al., 2015), and 
intrinsic motivation to be in the service of scholarship. More importantly, existing evidence 
suggests that attempts to manage academics’ performance can render scholarship both 
irrelevant (Tsui, 2013) and potentially injurious to our society (Elton, 1988). Academics’ 
misbehaviour can also have serious implications for the academic community. As more 
efforts are currently made by researchers to expose the inappropriate behaviours of 
academics, these exposures could damage public trust (Biagioli et al., 2019). On the other 
hand, remaining silent about academic misconduct could lead to major scandals that might 
attract the attention of the media and damage public trust, hence, it is important to have 
debates in the academic community as to how misconduct can be prevented from occurring 
(ibid.). 
 
In this thesis, I do not claim that inappropriate work behaviours among academics is a 
completely new research topic. However, in light of the literature, I believe that it has become 
more pervasive and important as a consequence of performance management systems and 
very little is known about how these systems can generate unintended outcomes and 
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encourage academics to display inappropriate work behaviours (Kallio et al., 2015; Biagioli 
et al., 2019).  
 
The next section presents various ways in which academics game performance management 
systems. The varied responses of academics to performance management systems show that 
while it has been possible for the government to more closely monitor the performance of 
universities (Elton, 1988), it has been much more challenging for the government to control 
the way academics perform their work, or control the way they behave in response to the 
performance management practices introduced. This is because academics’ work is primarily 
autonomous and it is very difficult to monitor what they do in detail (Tourish and Craig, 
2018). As is shown below, the nature of academic work provides ample scope for academics 
to circumvent the various control mechanisms and performance management practices 
imposed. These kinds of reactions have led different researchers to argue that reforms to 
public services often lead to outcomes that are quite different from the ones expected to result 
from performance management systems interventions (Espeland and Sauder, 2007).  
 
5.3.5 Problematic reactions to performance management systems in academia 
It is widely recognised that tenure, career advancement and research funding are strongly 
contingent on academics’ ability to continuously publish in highly ranked journals (Alvesson 
and Sandberg, 2011; Kepes and McDaniel, 2013). Faced with much pressure to publish in 
quality journals (Mingers and Willmott, 2013), academics have counteracted this pressure by 
shifting their focus from the content of their publications to how many top rated papers they 
publish (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2012), and engaging in a number of questionable 
behaviours (Bedeian et al., 2010). Examples of these behaviours include writing more 
inconsequential articles, intentionally publishing research in small parts, and publishing the 
same work in various forms (Elton, 1988). Similar behaviours were also reported by Bedeian 
et al. (2010), who found that a large number of their respondents were aware of various 
dubious behaviours taking place in their department such as plagiarism, acceptance or 
assignment of undeserved authorship credit, falsification and fabrication of data, and 
selective reporting.   
 
Tsui (2013) added that the reward structure of academic journals can unintentionally 
encourage the creation of inappropriate research practices. For example, the likelihood of 
studies with statistically significant results being published in comparison to studies that do 
  104 
not have such results can give rise to a number of problematic behaviours (Kepes and 
McDaniel, 2013). To achieve favourable statistical results, researchers can stop collecting 
data when the desired p-value is reached, increase their sample size, change the 
measurements used, abandon previously collected data and gather new data, ignore outliers or 
other information that detracts from the significance of their findings, and subsequently 
present their findings in a well-organised fashion with no mention of the changes and 
decisions made in reaching those results (ibid.).  
 
Another issue that arises from the focus on publication refers to what Mingers and Willmott 
(2013) term “homogeneity of scholarship”. Mingers and Willmott (2013) argued that by only 
prioritising research that is published in top journals, the research agenda, topics and methods 
privileged by those journals are valued, however, research that is published in other journals 
is simultaneously undermined in spite of its significance or contribution. Considering that 
most top journals are in North America, especially in the United States, scholars throughout 
the world attempt to adjust their research strategies to respond to the research models 
favoured by North American editors and reviewers (Tsui, 2013). This attempt to emulate 
North American models can, however, have deleterious effects on the advancement of 
scholarship as it limits innovation and prevents the heterogeneity of research (Mingers and 
Willmott, 2013).  
 
Having said that, it should be noted that although the behaviours described above are 
generally deemed inappropriate, the unprecedented pressure on academics to publish in 
highly ranked journals (Bedeian et al., 2010) may play a part in explaining the existence of 
these behaviours. If it is the case that only articles published in top journals are valued, 
principled academics may behave in ways they would not do otherwise (Tsui, 2013). For 
example, researchers’ attempts to emulate existing research, or adapt their research strategies 
to American models is simply a rational reaction to a performance measurement scheme that 
Tsui (2013: 378) describes as a “bean-counting” research regime, or to what Van Dalen and 
Henkens (2012) call a “publish or perish” culture. 
 
This, of course, does not justify the highly questionable practices that have plagued the higher 
education sector. In Tsui’s (2013) view, schools that narrowly encourage publications with the 
primary purpose of enhancing their own rankings in league tables, and make promotion and 
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employment decisions for employees accordingly are akin to firms accumulating wealth to 
serve only the interests of their shareholders.  
 
Other potential adverse effects of performance management practices on academia, although 
not often mentioned, relate to other activities that academic work entails. For example, in 
addition to research output, academics are expected to teach, supervise and do administrative 
work. Important questions arise as to how these essential tasks are accounted for, or whether 
they are indeed sufficiently considered. Van Dalen and Henkens (2012) explained that the use 
of publication indices as an indication of academic productivity can lead to both intended and 
unintended outcomes. The intended outcome is that the productivity of individual academics 
together with their institution's overall academic output increases. The unintended outcome is 
that other duties traditionally associated with academic institutions become of lesser 
importance to academics. 
 
Some scholars attribute academics’ behaviour to the rewards structure of universities arguing 
the rewards academics receive for their work does not indicate that the various tasks 
academics do are given equal value by universities (especially in prestigious universities 
where the focus is placed on research output) (Kerr, 1975). Kerr (1975) criticises the way 
academics are rewarded, arguing that rewarding academics based on research while hoping 
they will do equally well at teaching, or assuming that good research goes hand-in-hand with 
good teaching is highly questionable because when academics allocate their time, they often 
have to choose between allocating it to research related activities or to teaching related 
activities. In the United Kingdom, Willmott (1995) explained that academics’ inattention to 
non-publication activities was fuelled by the reforms implemented by the government, stating 
that eroding academics’ pay and restricting their work freedom led to ongoing resentment and 
while this did not translate into organised action against university reforms, it led to 
academics’ withdrawal from duties that were not formally assessed.   
 
5.4 An individual based approach to exploring the unintended outcomes of performance 
management in academia 
As shown, the various forms of performance management systems currently practised have 
many attendant problems and inevitably give rise to various forms of unintended outcomes. 
This research seeks to identify and explore these unintended outcomes through the use of an 
interview based approach. The interview based approach was selected because this research 
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addresses a sensitive topic and focusing on one department or university might not have 
generated rich data because despite my assurance of anonymity about sharing personal 
information, some academics might have been apprehensive about the possibility of a report 
of my findings being sent to their dean if the report was known to be based on their particular 
department. In order to make interviewees feel comfortable, interviewing a sample of 
academics working at different business schools/schools of management across universities 
in the United Kingdom was deemed more appropriate.  
 
Performance management practices are currently widely used in universities in the United 
Kingdom (Mingers and Willmott, 2013; Kallio et al., 2015). The United Kingdom is one of 
the first countries in Europe that has aggressively enforced performance management 
processes at universities (Kallio et al., 2015), and still does so at the present time. As a result, 
universities in the United Kingdom are particularly relevant for research into performance 
management systems in the higher education sector. This study uses United Kingdom 
universities as an illustrative example of how unintended outcomes can ensue from 
performance management systems within public sector organisations.  
 
Having highlighted the relevance of an interview-based approach and illustrated the reasons 
for selecting universities in the United Kingdom as a source of data collection, the chapter 
now further explains why semi-structured interviews were adopted and the way they were 
used to collect data. 
 
5.5 Primary data collection 
5.5.1 Semi-structured interviews 
An interview is a process of gathering data where participants are asked questions by 
interviewers in order to understand how they think and feel (Collis and Hussey, 2009). As a 
large part of human life is not visible to others, interviews are useful tools to gain detailed 
accounts of people’s experiences (Wilson, 2010), and understand the subjective meanings 
they attach to various social phenomena (Braun and Clarke, 2013). In order to explore a 
social context as perceived by its participants, interpretivist researchers seek to interact and 
engage with their participants in conversations (Wahyuni, 2012). In so doing, interviewers are 
able to elicit rich information from interviewees, helping them to understand the research 
topic they wish to explore (Braun and Clarke, 2013). 
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In this thesis, interviews were used for various reasons. As this research focuses on the 
subjective experiences of participants in performance management systems, an in-depth 
understanding of participants’ respective experiences with these systems is important. 
Furthermore, considering that this thesis seeks to explore how academics in different 
universities perceive and react to performance management practices, interviews were 
particularly useful in accomplishing this aim. Interviews provided me with a unique 
opportunity to have informative talks with participants, and also explore the various 
meanings academics from different universities attached to a number of performance 
management practices. The role of interviews in capturing the meanings of social phenomena 
is noted by King (2004: 21), who stated that “the qualitative interview is ideally suited to 
examining topics in which different levels of meanings need to be explored”. 
 
Another reason for the selection of interviews lay in the sensitivity of my research topic. 
Given that my research looks at the unintended outcomes of performance management 
systems and the role that the social context plays in facilitating the occurrence of unintended 
outcomes at work, some interviewees may not have been readily willing to discuss this topic 
with me. It is precisely this challenge that made interviews a particularly suitable method for 
this thesis. In this research, the use of semi-structured interviews played a pivotal role in 
accessing important information from participants. Face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
facilitated the establishment of a rapport with interviewees, which helped me to create a 
friendly environment that encouraged interviewees to share more information with me. The 
importance of establishing rapport is emphasised by multiple scholars. For example, Harding 
(2013: 34) asserts that “the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the 
respondent is […] crucial to the success of an interview”. 
 
For this reason, qualitative researchers value the importance of maintaining a good 
relationship with their participants as they “believe that there can be no such thing as a 
‘relationship-free’ interview. Indeed the relationship is part of the research process, not a 
distraction from it” (King, 2004: 11). In this research, while trying to build rapport with 
participants, I was also wary of disclosing any information that might reveal my views on the 
research topic, and attempted to retain a neutral position. To make interviewees feel more at 
ease, I also tried to explicitly show an interest in participants’ responses through my body 
language and the questions posed (the questioning techniques used are presented below in the 
interview guide section). 
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The following sections present the sampling strategy, a summary of participants’ 
characteristics, and the interview guide used in this study. As I explain below, data collection 
involved an on-going process of defining and re-defining the parameters of my research, 
which is also reflected in the number of amendments made to the interview guide.        
 
5.6 Sampling strategy 
As this research looks at the unintended effects of performance management systems in the 
higher education sector, the main condition for participation was that individuals were 
currently working at the selected business school/schools of management in the United 
Kingdom. 13 research-intense universities were selected based on the results of the REF in 
2014. Within each university, three to seven academics were interviewed depending on the 
size of the business schools/schools of management and on academics’ willingness to 
participate in the study. In total, 65 academics were interviewed with a response rate of 15% 
(65 out of 431), lasting between 45 minutes and 2 hours 30 minutes. Of the 65 interviews, 62 
were face-to-face and three were via Skype (as it was not possible to arrange a face-to-face 
meeting). A balanced spread across gender and seniority was attempted to avoid research 
bias. However, given that academics working in the sampled universities were mostly in 
lectureship and professorship positions, the sample of academics interviewed for this study 
reflects this composition (see Table 5.1 for background information about participants). The 
contact details of academics working at the selected schools were found on the universities’ 
websites. Academics were sent participation invitations via email. Interviews with academics 
started in May 2016 and ended in February 2017. 
 
Given that this research aims to gain different views from academics working in various 
university business schools/schools of management in the United Kingdom, purposive 
sampling was considered appropriate to accomplish this aim. Purposive sampling enables 
researchers to strategically sample cases and participants so that their research questions are 
adequately answered (Saunders et al., 2009). However, as purposive sampling is a non-
probability sampling approach, it does not enable researchers to make generalisations about 
the wider population (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Since generalisation was not the goal of this 
thesis, this is not considered an issue here. Rather, the main goal of this research was to reach 
individuals who could provide the richest analysis of the research topic. On a few occasions, 
participants were recruited using snowball sampling. Snowball sampling involves recruiting 
participants connected to people who have previously participated (Braun and Clarke, 2013). 
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During the interviews, some of the academics I interviewed either recommended names of 
other academics I could contact or directly asked some academics to participate in the study 
on my behalf. Snowball sampling was very helpful to recruit additional interviewees, 
particularly at the early stages of data collection process where it was not easy to find 
participants. In total, 11 out of 65 academics interviewed were recruited through snowball 
sampling. 
 
An important point to note though is that while I selected academics who could participate in 
the study, those included in the final sample comprised those who responded to my request 
and agreed to participate. Academics might have participated in this research for a range of 
reasons. For example, some of the interviewees participated because they were interested in 
my research topic, others wanted to help me with data collection, and others felt it was an 
opportunity for them to express their views on the topic. On the other hand, some of those 
who did not agree to participate perhaps did so for reasons that were related to the research 
topic of this thesis. As my research looks at the unintended outcomes of performance 
management systems, those who engaged in behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems were probably the ones that were less motivated to participate. For 
instance, those who engaged in what was termed in Chapter 2 as effort substitution might 
have been more concerned with achieving certain performance goals as opposed to engaging 
in activities like volunteering to be interviewed. Furthermore, some of the academics who 
engaged in gaming were perhaps also less motivated to participate as they probably wanted to 
avoid talking about the topic or about their own actions. Hence, while much effort was made 
to ensure that an inclusive sample was achieved, the fact that academics could choose to 
participate or not might have influenced the type of data collected in this study. 
 
The next section presents an overview of the characteristics of academics who took part in 
the research. 
 
5.7 A summary of participants’ characteristics 
Table 5.1: Overview of the characteristics of interviewees 
ID Gender Position Contract  Mode of 
employment 
1 Female Reader Permanent contract  Full-time 
2 Female Senior lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
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3 Female Senior lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
4 Female Senior lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
5 Female Senior lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
6 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
7 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
8 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
9 Male Lecturer On probation Full-time 
10 Male Lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
11 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
12 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
13 Female Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
14 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
15 Female Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
16 Male Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
17 Male Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
18 Male Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
19 Female Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
20 Female Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
21 Male Lecturer On probation Full-time 
22 Male Lecturer On probation Full-time 
23 Female Lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
24 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
25 Female Senior lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
26 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
27 Female Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
28 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
29 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
30 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
31 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
32 Female Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
33 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
34 Female Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
35 Male Professor Permanent contract Part-time 
36 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
37 Female Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
38 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
39 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
40 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
41 Male Lecturer On probation Full-time 
42 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
43 Female Lecturer On probation Full-time 
44 Male Lecturer On probation Full-time 
45 Male Lecturer On probation Full-time 
46 Male Professor Permanent contract Part-time 
47 Female Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
48 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
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49 Female Lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
50 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
51 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
52 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
53 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
54 Female Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
55 Male Professor Permanent contract Full-time 
56 Male Senior lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
57 Female Lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
58 Male Senior lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
59 Female Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
60 Male Senior lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
61 Male Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
62 Male Lecturer Permanent contract Full-time 
63 Male Reader Permanent contract Full-time 
64 Male Lecturer On probation Full-time 
65 Male Lecturer On probation Full-time 
  
While recruiting the right participants was essential, asking the right questions was equally 
important to the success of the interviews. In order to ensure that the right questions were 
asked, I prepared an interview guide and followed various interviewing techniques. 
 
5.8 The interview guide 
Before conducting interviews, I designed and tested an interview guide. I tested my interview 
guide using various sources including five academics currently working in United Kingdom 
universities, and these interviews were included in the final sample. This process contributed 
to piloting and refining my interview guide and further honing my interviewing skills. Pilot 
studies are deemed valuable as they can help the researcher to identify problematic questions 
and unclear responses (Creswell, 2012). 
 
A good interview guide can have many benefits (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Interview guides 
can do a lot more than just help interviewers remember the questions to be asked and provide 
some structure for interviews (Rapley, 2004). They can help interviewers to establish trust 
and rapport with their respondents, and facilitate the process of conducting interviews (Braun 
and Clarke, 2013). It is important for researchers to give sufficient attention to the questions 
they ask because as stated by King (2004), the way interviewees are asked questions can 
strongly influence the quality of the responses interviewers receive. 
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Given the importance of having good interview guides, I carefully designed an interview 
guide for academics currently employed in the selected universities. However, despite much 
effort to design an informative interview guide, as the guide included sensitive questions, 
some academics were not very receptive to some questions. As a result, over the course of the 
interviews, some questions were rephrased, removed, or added, sometimes alongside 
accompanying changes to the structure of the interview guide. In total, major alterations to 
the interview guide happened five times, two of which were in the piloting phase, and three 
were afterwards. In the interviews, I generally avoided asking participants leading, direct or 
broad questions. I avoided leading questions so as not to affect the trajectory of interviewees’ 
responses, direct questions because my research addresses sensitive issues and I did not want 
to make interviewees feel uncomfortable, and broad questions so that interviewees did not 
drift on to topics that are of little relevance to my research.  
 
The interviews started and ended with questions asking academics about their thoughts on 
performance management systems. The middle of the interviews often focused on the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems and how academics learned 
different behaviours in response to performance management systems. When discussing the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems, academics were asked to report 
either on their personal experience with the systems or to report on the experience of their 
colleagues in their existing department. In other words, academics either discussed the way 
they personally responded to the systems or reported the way they saw others responding to 
the systems in the department where they worked. Given the sensitivity of my research 
questions, this questioning technique was used in order to avoid making participants feel 
uncomfortable and to also encourage interviewees to answer my questions openly. 
 
In the interview guide, I prepared possible probing questions to stimulate further discussions 
that would elucidate respondents’ previous responses. This was important because 
understanding meanings and making sense of them is a difficult process, and it is therefore 
important for interviewers to ask follow-up questions to gain a good understanding of the 
topic in question (Alvesson and Ashcraft, 2012). In my research, the aim of asking probing 
questions was to gain new insights from my interviews and encourage interviewees to 
elaborate on ideas that had some relevance to my research topic. However, although I 
prepared possible probing questions prior to my interviews, the nature of the questions was 
highly dependent on interviewees’ responses. Transcription and data analysis was done soon 
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after each interview in order to ensure that emerging themes were identified and considered 
before the next interviews took place. This practice helped me to investigate emerging themes 
in subsequent interviews. When I amended the interview guide, I considered new probing 
questions accordingly.  
 
Having said that, given that this research was exploratory in nature, the goal of the interview 
guide was merely to facilitate the interview process, where openness to respondents’ answers 
and deviation from the guide was indeed desired (Alvesson and Ashcraft, 2012). This was 
because I needed to explore individuals’ narratives, and I wanted my interview guide to 
facilitate this process, not hinder it. In other words, the interview guide was used to help me 
ensure that the important topic areas were covered, but I needed to engage with interviewees 
and ask follow-up questions in order to both understand their views and elicit responses that 
would help answer my research questions. The final interview guide used, the information 
sheet sent to participants and the consent and data processing statement given to academics 
prior to interviews are presented in Appendices I, II, and III. 
 
The next section explains how the interviews were analysed following data collection. 
 
5.9 Data analysis  
In this research, qualitative data analysis took place as soon as the first few interviews were 
conducted and transcribed. The aim was to ensure that emerging themes and problematic 
areas in the research (both those that I anticipated and those I did not) were identified at an 
early stage of the research process (Ziebland and McPherson, 2006). This is important 
because the overlap of data collection and analysis helps researchers to thoroughly explore 
their data, and allows them to capitalise on the flexibility of data collection methods afforded 
in qualitative research (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this research, as explained in the interview 
section above, the simultaneity of data collection and analysis allowed me to make 
adjustments to my interview guides and probe new emergent themes in greater depth. 
 
Data collection occurred in three stages. Firstly, the focus was on exploring how academics 
responded to performance management systems and on identifying the resultant unintended 
outcomes. Secondly, the focus was on analysing how these systems gave rise to the 
unintended outcomes identified. Thirdly, the focus was on examining the role that social 
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context played in influencing academics’ propensity to engage in behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems, based on social learning theory principles. 
 
During the analysis process, I followed a number of steps to ensure that the collected data 
were adequately analysed. This was in response to numerous scholars, such as Attride-
Stirling (2001: 386), who stated that “if qualitative research is to yield meaningful and useful 
results, it is imperative that the material under scrutiny is analysed in a methodical manner”. 
Accordingly, in this research, I attempted to analyse interviews in a systematic fashion with 
the ultimate aim of obtaining a rich analysis that captures the complexities of the data by 
encompassing both the common themes and divergent themes that are relevant to my 
research questions. In the next section, I detail the steps I followed during my data analysis 
process.  
 
Thematic Analysis  
In this research, data were primarily analysed using software known as Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis, which is designed to help researchers analyse their data (Creswell, 
2012). However, although I used Nvivo to code my transcripts, I sometimes coded my 
interviews manually. The combination of Nvivo and manual coding helped me to improve my 
codes and themes as I analysed my interviews using both my laptop and printed transcripts at 
different times and in different places. Throughout the process of data analysis, thematic 
analysis was used.  
 
Thematic analysis is “a form of pattern recognition within the data, where emerging themes 
become the categories for analysis” (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 4). In this sense, 
thematic analysis offers flexible and valuable techniques for researchers, helping them 
generate rich, thorough and complex analysis of their data, however, since thematic analysis 
is a flexible method, researchers are required to describe the analysis approach they pursue 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this research, the data analysis process broadly involved three 
processes: reducing and breaking down the data, exploring the data, and integrating the data 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001). In particular, Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six data analysis steps were 
adopted. These steps are presented below. 
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Thematic analysis phases 
Phase one: familiarising yourself with the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Once interviews are 
transcribed, I checked them another time by listening again to the interview recordings and 
making adjustments until accurate transcriptions were reached. All interviews were recorded 
and transcribed verbatim. I then added (in the headings of each transcript) information about 
participants. I did not include interviewees’ personal information, but simply numbered each 
interview and added interviewees’ gender, position, types of contract, and mode of 
employment. I included this information because it helped my analysis and enabled me to 
keep track of my interview transcripts and to file them in a way that made them easy to 
retrieve. As I was reading and annotating interviews, I had a notebook, as suggested by 
(Ziebland and McPherson, 2006), in which I wrote my initial thoughts about potential 
codes/themes that could be useful for my data analysis. All these activities played a 
significant part in helping me to familiarise myself with the data before the actual start of the 
coding process. 
 
Phase two: generating initial codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this phase, codes were 
inductively generated from the transcripts. However, although this process was inductive, the 
coding process was also informed by my research questions. In essence, I coded for 
arguments that have some relevance to my research questions. Some scholars term this 
coding strategy ‘theory driven’ because researchers code their data with certain research 
questions in mind (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Having said that, while my coding was to some 
extent informed by my research questions, I was quite flexible in my coding approach and I 
coded a lot of information at first. This was because there were times when I was not sure 
about the significance of some information and did not want to restrict my analysis to my 
presumptions about what might be relevant or irrelevant to my research. Hence, when I was 
in doubt, I coded the information and made a decision about these codes as my coding 
progressed. Throughout this phase, my codes were primarily descriptive in nature in the sense 
that my themes merely described the information I wanted to code, and no extensive analysis 
was conducted. However, I attempted to develop a broad picture of how the codes converged 
with or diverged from each other.   
 
Phase three: searching for themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this phase, as proposed by 
Braun and Clarke (2006), I assembled codes into potential themes and collected pertinent 
quotes for each theme from the transcripts. I moved away from the descriptive coding done in 
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the previous phase to more interpretative coding, which was facilitated by the process of 
collating codes that had some relationship to each other in order to come up with themes. By 
relationships, I do not only mean codes that have similarities to each other, but also codes that 
contradict each other. I also included peculiar cases because I wanted my codes and themes to 
appropriately represent my initial texts. This process was challenging because I had to come 
up with themes that were, as described by Attride-Stirling (2001: 394), “discrete enough to 
avoid redundancy, and global enough to be meaningful”. In order to achieve this while I was 
designing my themes, I had to merge certain codes, identify new codes and rename some 
existing ones. The aim was to remove unnecessary duplications and have codes that 
supported the generation of informative themes.  
  
Phase four: reviewing themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this phase, I reviewed my themes 
and checked them against the extracted codes and also against my interview transcripts. 
Whenever issues were identified, I revised my codes and themes.  
 
Phase five: defining and naming themes (Braun and Clarke, 2013). This process involved 
constantly analysing and refining themes and also reviewing the general story that the 
analysis conveyed (Braun and Clarke. 2006). When the refinement process was completed, I 
then defined each theme that I included in my codebook. In this phase, the selection of codes 
and themes was finalised, and I started to closely analyse all my codes and themes in order to 
gain an appropriate understanding of the stories behind my themes. 
 
Phase 6: producing the report (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This was the last phase in my 
thematic analysis, and was the most challenging one because I had to write my report in a 
way that did not simply represent my findings, but was also intelligible, defensible and 
convincing to readers. I discussed each theme with its related codes in turn, supporting each 
theme with interview extracts in order to demonstrate the appropriateness of the theme. I also 
discussed the relationships between themes. When all the themes were explained, I then 
related each theme to my research questions and also to the literature. The intention was to 
show how my themes answer my research questions, and also explain the way in which my 
themes are currently positioned and interpreted in the existing literature by other researchers.  
 
The last point to mention regarding the six step thematic analysis is that although the steps 
are presented here as a linear process, in practice, it was an iterative process in which I 
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constantly moved between the stages as I saw fit. For example, while the process of coding 
featured more in phases two, three and four, in fact, I was coding in every phase.  
 
In this thesis, Braun and Clarke’s method was used because it offers a detailed approach that 
facilitated my data analysis process. There are other researchers who suggest a slightly 
different approach to analysing thematic analysis than that of Braun and Clarke (2006). 
However, although various researchers suggest different data analysis approaches, the 
thematic principles are the same and the goal is the same, which is to generate rich analysis 
from qualitative data, and that is the goal of this thesis too. 
 
5.10 Quality in qualitative research  
So far, I have discussed my methodology, explaining how various processes took place. The 
question that arises from this is how the quality of this research methodology was assessed. In 
order to assess the quality of qualitative research, scholars have set a number of criteria by 
which quality in qualitative studies can be evaluated. Considering that there are numerous 
criteria that can be used to assess qualitative research, and in line with Symon and Cassell 
(2012) suggestion, I have identified the criteria that were more appropriate given the context 
and topic of my research. These criteria are credibility, transferability, and confirmability 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Before proceeding to explain these criteria individually, I would 
like to highlight that although I set these three criteria for evaluation purposes, in practice, 
quality was considered at every stage of this research, starting from the selection of my 
research topic to the writing up phases. 
 
The first criterion was credibility. Credibility refers to “the trustworthiness, verisimilitude, 
and plausibility of the research findings” (Tracy, 2010: 842). In other words, credibility looks 
at the internal validity of the research and whether the study findings are coherent (Buston et 
al., 1998). In this research, I have included measures to enhance the credibility of the study, 
which involved member checking, and negative case analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
 
Member checking is defined as researchers checking with their research participants whether 
they accurately interpreted data (Symon and Cassell, 2012). In this research member 
checking was used in different ways. During each interview, I made conscious and frequent 
attempts to rephrase and repeat interviewees’ responses to ensure that I accurately understood 
their views. This process encouraged interviewees to both expand their answers and elucidate 
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any unclear response that could be potentially misinterpreted. During data collection and 
analysis, I also regularly discussed emerging themes with my supervisors and other 
academics who although did not take part in the sample, showed an interest in my work. The 
large majority of these academics worked in other institutions not selected for this study. 
Once all the data were collected and analysed, a summary report was sent to academics who 
participated in this study, a group of those contacted emailed me back commenting on the 
report and expressing their agreement with the findings of the research.    
 
With respect to negative case analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), I tried to ensure that the 
various views expressed by interviewees (including the views that fit with the rest of the data 
and those that deviate from the common themes) were included in my research analysis. In 
this sense, while the final themes presented in this research mainly reflected the frequent 
responses found in the data, the analysis also included themes that were less frequent, but 
were viewed as important in answering the research questions of the thesis. When new 
emerging themes were found in the data, they were further explored in subsequent interviews 
for greater detail.  
 
Transferability was another important quality criterion that was used for this research. Even 
though qualitative research does not provide statistics that justify the generalisability of the 
findings, this does not mean that qualitative research does not provide valuable information 
that can be transferred to other contexts (Tracy, 2010). To enable the transferability of 
qualitative research findings, Linclon and Guba (1985) suggested that researchers give a thick 
description of the context of their research and provide the information that is needed for 
other individuals who wish to make a transfer of the research findings to consider. Tracy 
(2010) added that a thick description could help researchers to improve their research 
credibility as they provide detailed contextual information that explains their research 
conclusions. In this thesis, the goal of providing a thick description is twofold. The first is to 
provide enough details about the research context that can help readers to understand how the 
findings could be applied in other contexts. The second is to enhance the credibility of the 
research. To do this, I supported each theme and its associated codes with sufficient 
information that explained the contextual dimensions of the themes as well as how the 
derived themes were reached. 
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The other quality criterion used in this thesis was confirmability. Confirmability included 
providing an account of the way data were collected and the processes used by researchers to 
reach their research findings (Symon and Cassell, 2012). To enhance the credibility of this 
research, this chapter provided detailed accounts of both data collection and analysis 
processes. Confirmability also involves making sure that while researchers appreciate that 
absolute objectivity is not possible, they can also demonstrate that they have not overtly 
allowed their personal and theoretical preferences to bias their research and the findings they 
generate (Bryman and Bell, 2015). This was done through intra-coder reliability and self-
reflexivity. 
 
Intra-coder reliability was used to ensure that the codes are consistent over time (Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). In this research, I used intra-coder reliability tests by leaving each transcribed 
and coded interview for a period ranging from about a week to two weeks, and coded the 
interviews again. The first coding round of interviews took a considerable amount of time, 
but the second round was relatively fast to do as I became much more familiar with the text. 
The aim of intra-coder reliability was to check the consistency of my codes by comparing the 
new codes to the codes previously generated. When inconsistencies are found, I either 
selected one of the codes identified, or removed both codes and tried to create a new one that 
best described the coded extract. 
   
The other measure used to improve the confirmability of this research was self-reflexivity. 
Considering that a number of factors, such as researchers’ background, knowledge, and 
preconceptions can influence the way researchers approach their studies (Walsham, 2006), 
being self- reflexive is considered to be good qualitative research practice that can be used to 
counteract researchers’ subjectivity (Tracy, 2010). The next section presents an account of 
how self-reflexivity was implemented in this study and how my participation in the research 
could have influenced the orientation of the project.   
 
Reflexivity  
Reflexivity refers to how researchers and their respondents communicate with and relate to 
one another during a study (Stokes, 2011). Reflexivity is about recognising that the 
involvement of a researcher in a research project influences both the research process and the 
information gathered (King, 2004). Reflexivity is very important in qualitative interpretive 
research because, unlike quantitative research that dissociate researchers from their data, 
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qualitative researchers recognise the role that researchers play in generating data and embrace 
it (Stokes, 2011).  
 
However, given researchers’ involvement in qualitative studies, it is important that 
researchers are self-reflexive and understand how their involvement can affect the outcomes 
of their research (Tietze, 2012). Being self-reflexive involves being honest and authentic 
about oneself, one’s research and the public (Tracy, 2010).  
 
In this research, self-reflexivity took place in different ways. Throughout the processes of 
data collection and analysis, and in line with King’s (2012) suggestions, I kept a research 
diary in which I regularly recorded the experiences I faced, my own reflections, and the 
decisions I made. The diary helped me to identify and note my own subjectivities, and also 
try to address them before the next interview took place. Furthermore, particularly at the early 
stages of data collection, I listened very carefully to the interview recordings and, as 
recommended by King (2012), focused on self-assessing my interviewing skills and overall 
performance. 
 
As a young female PhD student, I experienced a range of experiences with interviewees that 
inevitably influenced the trajectory of this research. Interviewing academics, particularly 
male ones, was challenging at times because a group of them felt some sense of superiority. 
They treated me more as a student than an interviewer and did not give me much opportunity 
to talk, explore their answers or ask follow up questions. Being in this situation made me feel 
uncomfortable and certainly affected my ability to conduct the interviews. When faced with 
these kinds of situations, I tried to reflect on the experience and learn how to better handle 
such experiences in future interviews.  
 
On the other hand, my status as a PhD student worked to my advantage with other 
interviewees. Being a student who came from a different institution encouraged another 
group of academics to participate as they were driven by the motivation to help and 
contribute to my research. They possibly also viewed me as a PhD student who did not pose 
threats to their career. These academics showed an interest in my work and I felt they were 
quite open in their answers. Unlike the above mentioned group of academics, these 
academics were very engaging and made a lot more efforts to answer my questions.  
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Furthermore, being a female student helped me to recruit a good number of female academics 
to participate in my study and also generate a lot of data from them. Of the 65 interviewees 
conducted, 29 were female. Considering that most sampled universities included considerably 
more men than women is their staff profile, my sample at first was largely dominated by men, 
and it was more challenging to recruit female academics. In universities that had a relatively 
good number of women employed, I sent an equal amount of emails to men and women 
academics working in those universities. However, even in these universities (except in one), 
I received a greater number of men willing to participate than women. After realising this, 
when emailing female academics inviting them to participate, I also explained the challenges 
I faced in having a gender balanced sample. Following this, more female academics 
contacted me back expressing their willingness to participate in the study. During the 
interviews, I was able to get a lot of data from female participants because being of the same 
gender enabled some academics to relate to me and many of them shared personal 
information that, perhaps, would have been more challenging for an opposite sex interviewer 
to access.   
 
As a student seeking to work in academia in the future, I was able to identify with academics’ 
experiences. This enabled me to engage with participants’ responses quite well. However, 
given that my research topic looked at the experiences of academics in universities, I 
sometimes felt that I became deeply immersed in the topic both for personal and professional 
reasons. While the aim of the interviews was of course to answer the research questions of 
the thesis, my interest was also driven by my motivation to work in academia following 
graduation. An important point to note though is that my selection of the thesis research 
questions was purely the result of the literature review and completely unrelated to my desire 
to work in academia. Until I was almost half way through my data collection, I was not sure 
whether I wanted to pursue an academic career. Furthermore, my PhD research topic was an 
extension of my master’s thesis that looked at the role of performance management systems 
in a British university. As a result, it is important for me to recognise my own subjectivities, 
which I did throughout the research process as I took deliberate steps to manage them. As 
King (2012) suggested, I wrote down my presumptions at the beginning and at every stage of 
data collection. I tried to prevent my presumptions from influencing my research by firstly 
being aware of them and secondly reflecting and addressing them. Having said that, it is 
important to note that, despite these attempts, it is impossible to state that such initiatives 
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eliminated any kind of subjectivity I might have had, but they surely significantly reduced 
them. 
 
During data collection and analysis, I had to stop collecting data for about two months. The 
reason for this was that I started collecting data in May 2016 and I was unable to recruit 
participants from early July until early September due to academics being unavailable to 
conduct the interviews. Although pausing conducting the interviews happened out of 
necessity, it gave me a great opportunity to reflect on the research process. Exiting data is a 
very important step in reflexivity (Delamont, 2004) as it allowed me to distance myself from 
the fieldwork and more critically assess both the data collected and the way I gathered this 
data. During that time, I revised my topic guide, assessed the demographics of participants in 
the sample, reviewed my position as an interviewer, and assessed the way I interacted with 
interviewees. I also consulted my supervisors for feedback.   
 
5.11 Ethical considerations 
In recent years, research ethics has become an important topic in social sciences (Langdridge, 
2007), and researchers are increasingly expected to attend to the implications of their research 
on others (Holt, 2012). The overall aim of research ethics is to ensure that neither the 
researcher, nor the participants are exposed to any harm prior to, in the course of and after the 
research is done (Stokes, 2011). In this research, numerous measures were taken in order to 
ensure that the research was ethically sound and conformed to Royal Holloway Research 
Ethics guidelines. In what follows, I discuss the measures that were taken to ensure that 
appropriate ethical standards were maintained during the research. I have organised my 
discussions around two types of ethics, which Tracy (2010) describes as procedural ethics and 
existing ethics. 
 
Procedural ethics proposes that individuals who participate in a study have the right to be 
informed about the nature and possible outcomes of the research in which they take part, and 
should also understand that their participation is voluntary (Tracy, 2010). Therefore, I ensured 
that my participants were fully aware of my research topic, what participation involved, and 
also how the data would be handled. When emailing individuals to invite them to participate, 
I described my research project and also attached a project information sheet that further 
explained my project. Before the interviews, I also gave academics two consent and data 
processing statement sheets to read and sign; they kept a copy and gave me the other. I took 
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this approach because, as suggested by Stokes (2011), I wanted to have informed consent 
prior to data collection.  
 
In addition to informed consent, procedural ethics emphasises the importance of protecting 
participants by ensuring that their personal data is secured (Tracy 2010). Therefore, I made 
sure that the anonymity and confidentiality of all my interviewees and their universities was 
maintained. According to Harding (2013), anonymity involves reporting findings in a way 
that those reading the report will not be able to identify those who express the viewpoints 
included in the report. I achieved this by deleting any personal information that could make 
certain participants identifiable, including the names of my participants and the universities 
where they were working. The only information disclosed was the gender of interviewees, 
position, type of contract, and mode of employment. This information was revealed because 
it was important for my analysis, and did not compromise the anonymity of my participants.  
 
While anonymity focuses on protecting the identities of participants, maintaining 
confidentiality suggests that an agreement should be reached between the researcher and 
participants with regard to the way in which the data will be utilised and who will be able to 
access it (Harding, 2013). For this reason, I reminded interviewees about how the data would 
be handled prior to the interviews. The purpose of doing this was to clarify any potential 
misunderstandings, and to give interviewees an opportunity to ask questions. It also gave me 
a chance to reassure participants that the data would be treated with the strictest confidence, 
that the transcriptions would be kept on my password-protected laptop, and that the audio 
recordings would be kept in my locked cabinet, where no one could access the data. 
 
With regard to the second type of ethics: existing ethics, the focus is placed on maintaining 
ethical practices after data are collected and shared (Tracy, 2010). Throughout my data 
collection and analysis phases, I made every attempt to ensure that I behaved ethically and 
responsibly towards my participants, and continued to do so after the data were collected. 
Before the interviews took place, I agreed with participants to send them a summary of my 
findings in May 2017, and then did so, as agreed. While writing the summary, I tried to report 
my findings as clearly and honestly as possible in order to avoid any misunderstandings on 
the part of participants. After the reports were sent, I also offered to answer any questions the 
participants might have had with regard to my report, and did so on request. 
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5.12 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown the appropriateness of a qualitative methodology for addressing 
the aims of this research. As stated above, the strength of qualitative research is its ability to 
explore and explain various social phenomena; however, depth of analysis can only be 
achieved if there is a methodological rigour across all research stages from research design to 
fieldwork to data analysis (Attride-Stirling, 2001). Given the benefits that can be gained from 
having a carefully designed qualitative methodology, I attempted to rigorously analyse every 
step discussed in this chapter. The chapter started by explaining why a qualitative 
methodology and an interpretative paradigm were adopted. The chapter then discussed the 
reasons for the selection of the higher education sector in the United Kingdom, and for 
employing an individual based approach as a way of recruiting participants. This was 
followed by an explanation of how the primary data was collected together with a description 
of the sampling strategy employed and a summary of participants’ characteristics. The value 
of utilising thematic analysis, the steps that were taken to analyse the data, and the way 
quality in my research was assessed were then discussed. Finally, the chapter presented the 
ethical measures that were taken to ensure that the research was in line with the ethical 
principles of good qualitative research, followed by a conclusion. 
 
In the next two chapters, the findings of this research are presented. 
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Chapter	6:		A	typology	of	the	unintended	outcomes	of	performance	management	systems	in	the	higher	education	sector	in	the	United	Kingdom	
 
6.0 Introduction 
This research has two aims. The first is to create a typology of the unintended outcomes that 
arise from performance management systems and which prevent performance management 
systems from reaching their intended outcomes. The unintended outcomes discussed here are 
unintended from the perspective of the employer (the designer of the systems). The second 
aim is to explore, through the lens of social leaning theory, how the behaviours displayed by 
employees in response to performance management systems but not intended by the systems 
are learned, diffused, adopted or avoided by other employees. In this chapter, the focus is on 
addressing the first aim of the research, and in the subsequent chapter, the focus is on 
addressing the second aim. The analysis is based on the data collected from 65 interviews 
conducted with academics working in 13 research intense universities in the United 
Kingdom. Using illustrative quotes from the interviews, the unintended outcomes, and the 
contextual factors that gave rise to them are presented.   
 
The chapter begins with a brief descriptive analysis of the prominent performance 
management practices used by the 13 universities based on participants’ accounts. Providing 
such contextual information is important because the way academics perceived their 
performance management systems played a large part in influencing the way they responded 
to the systems. The chapter starts with the performance management practices related to 
research and teaching as they were commonly reported by academics to be the areas that 
significantly affected their work. Following this, given the prevalence of annual reviews in 
universities, the effects of these on academics are highlighted. The chapter then provides a 
detailed analysis of the unintended behavioural outcomes displayed by academics, and the 
unintended psychological outcomes experienced as a result of the performance management 
systems implemented by the universities. Next, the relationships between the resultant 
psychological and unintended behavioural outcomes are explained, and finally, a conclusion 
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is provided. 
 
6.1 Managing academics’ performance in business schools/schools of management 
All the 13 universities selected implemented some form of performance management system, 
using a wide range of performance management techniques to assess their employees’ 
performance. In some universities there were discussions about increasing the performance 
management systems utilised in the belief that doing so would enable the universities to 
better manage academics’ performance. The extent to which performance management 
systems were implemented differed from one university to another, depending on the ranking 
and goals of the university, and the aspirations of the deans and heads of business 
schools/schools of management. Despite these differences, there were many similarities in 
the way the universities managed the performance of their academics (the main similarities 
and differences in the way performance management systems were implemented in the 
sample universities are highlighted throughout this section). These similarities might be due 
to my sampling strategy because research-intense universities were purposely selected, and 
such universities generally compete with each other based on similar performance 
management indicators, more or less managing their academics’ performance in similar ways. 
As a result, the unintended outcomes discussed in this chapter that were found to ensue from 
performance management systems occurred in all the sample universities.      
 
This section specifies the performance management practices that academics reported to be 
important, and were repeatedly associated with the unintended outcomes identified in 
sections 6.3 and 6.4. The way these practices were used by the sample universities and the 
reasons they led to unintended outcomes are highlighted. However, detailed analyses of these 
unintended outcomes, and their relationship to performance management systems are 
provided in sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. According to participants, the performance management 
practices related to research, teaching and annual reviews had the most influence on their 
performance, and these practices are discussed below respectively.  
 
6.1.1 Managing academics’ publication output 
In all the sample universities, academics’ publication output was considered to be an 
important performance measurement that significantly determined their career trajectory 
within the university. Measurements to assess academics’ research were designed by 
individual departments/schools to ensure that academics who were on a standard research and 
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teaching contract produced research papers that were considered of a high enough standard to 
be entered in the REF expected in around 2021. This approach to assessing academics’ 
performance meant that the internal performance management systems of universities were 
largely determined by the requirements of the REF. For example, in the 2014 REF exercise, 
academics were required to submit their best four papers to be evaluated by an external REF 
panel2. Although not certain what the next REF requirements will be, at the time of the 
interviews, academics reported that their universities used this measure as a means of 
assessing their current performance. Hence, all sample academics were expected to have four 
papers published in highly ranked journals within the REF cycle. This meant that academics, 
to varying degrees, had to strategise their behaviour in order to meet the publication goals set 
by their employing university.  
 
However, there was a difference in the extent to which universities intervened in the choice of 
journals in which academics could publish. For example, while all the sample universities 
exhorted academics to have their papers published in journals rated within the four star rating 
categories in the Association of Business Schools (ABS) list (expressed as 4 and 4* in the 
ABS journal list, with 4* journals being of higher standing than 4 rated journals)3, and 
rewarded them accordingly, the extent to which academics were able to publish in journals 
not classified within the four star categories differed across the 13 universities. This did not 
mean that academics could not publish in other journals, but having papers in one, two, and 
three rated journals without also having papers in four rated journals for the REF would very 
likely be perceived as low performance on the part of university management.  
 
Having said that, ten out of the 13 universities accepted papers published in three star rated 
journals, but it was considered the minimum performance standard they expected their 
academics to accomplish. In the other three universities, academics were given a list that 
 
 
2 This has changed in the REF 2021 from 1 to 5 publications per academic with a departmental average of 2.5 
per academic employed on a contract that stipulates research responsibilities. 
http://www.kfs.edu.eg/com/pdf/20820152253917.pdf 
 
3 The REF 2014 uses the terminology of 1 star to 4 stars to rate articles whereas the ABS list uses a rating 
system of 1 to 4 star journal rating, but also has 4* rating signifying a higher rating. 
https://results.ref.ac.uk/(S(utbrsgz1vjtevjprg1zztwkh))/Results/ByUoa/19 	
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stipulated the journals in which they were required to publish. In these three universities, only 
4* rated journals in the ABS list were valued by the university. A MaleProf25 said: “We're not 
allowed to publish in the whole gamut of information system journals that we think are the 
best. We publish only in those information system journals that the management people think 
are good. So it's a more complex kind of thing, and here you enter the politics of the fields. 
The politics of the disciplines.”  
 
Overall, all the sample universities strongly urged their academics to aim for four star 
journals. Having four publications of the calibre set by the universities was extremely 
important for both academics and universities to the point that academics started to label 
themselves as being “REF-able”, meaning REF returnable or “Non REF-able”, meaning non 
REF returnable. A MaleRead10 stated: “We're talking about REF REF REF. It's become a 
fruit or vegetable that you take all the time. If you really care about your job you feel that you 
need to do what's required and have to contribute to the institution.”  
 
Hence, academics, fully aware of the importance of publishing, placed a great emphasis on 
their publication output, and strove to meet their universities’ publication goals. However, as 
the pressure in universities mounted on academics to meet their institutions’ publication 
goals, academics reported increasingly witnessing or engaging in behaviours which were 
categorised by the literature and academics as inappropriate and contrary to the expected 
outcomes of performance management systems (discussed in section 6.3), as well as 
experiencing a range of unintended psychological outcomes (discussed in section 6.4).  
 
6.1.2 Managing teaching and other activities 
The way teaching was assessed differed between universities. Certain universities used a 
combination of peer reviews and student module assessments whereas others limited their 
assessment to student evaluations. In the peer review process, academics were assessed by 
another academic in their university, who attended one of their classes and gave the teacher 
formal feedback based on their observations. In the student module assessments, academics’ 
teaching was measured based on the feedback given by students. Academics normally 
reported their teaching scores to their appraisers in their annual performance review, 
documenting their grades on the review form. They also used their students’ scores when they 
intended to apply for a promotion.  
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Irrespective of the assessment methods used by universities, all academics stated that their 
teaching performance was primarily assessed based on their students’ feedback scores 
benchmarked against a threshold set by their university. As a head of group FemaleProf14 
said: “We try to also implement a peer assessment where we basically go and sit in each 
others’ lectures and fill in a peer assessment. But I think the student evaluations at the 
moment are definitely looked at more.” Likewise, a FemaleRead8 explained: “Our 
performance is evaluated in terms of what students say about us in that. And that's what 
seems to matter.” Given that students’ ratings were the main teaching measurement tool, the 
unintended outcomes related to teaching that are discussed in section 6.3 are connected to the 
performance management practice of measuring academics’ teaching performance based on 
students’ assessment scores. 
 
The value universities placed on teaching varied across universities, but on balance, teaching 
took a secondary place in all the sampled universities in that the focus was very much placed 
on research relative to teaching. However, during the interviews, there was a strong sentiment 
among academics that there was a gradual increase in the importance of teaching in their 
university. This was primarily due to the government initiative to make academics more 
accountable for their teaching to students through the introduction of national student 
assessment measures. Consequently, although teaching was not considered as important as 
research, all sample universities aimed to have satisfied students, and to score highly in the 
National Student Survey (which was the key government measurement tool in effect at the 
time of the interviews) and other surveys.  
 
In this chapter, the focus is on research and teaching because they were the dominant topics 
discussed during the interviews. Other topics mentioned included grants, citizenship, 
leadership, administration and impact. However, these were only mentioned by a small 
number of academics affected by them. This was because the extent to which academics were 
involved in these activities depended on their level of seniority, role within their department 
and willingness to do them. Of these activities, citizenship was said to be understood least 
well while grant applications, leadership and impact seemed to be goals that some academics 
thought about and aspired to achieve, but were not concerned about to the same extent as 
research and teaching. Furthermore, as the focus of this chapter is on exploring the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems, these activities were not found to 
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be related to any relevant unintended outcomes in the data.  
 
6.1.3 Managing performance annual reviews  
In all the sample universities (except in one where academics submitted their forms without 
having a meeting and in another where the performance reviews were in abeyance4), 
academics were expected to have a formal annual review with a professor who discussed and 
rated their performance. In one university, the frequency of performance reviews was 
expected to increase to twice a year in the new academic year, which was about three months 
after data was collected for this research. In another university, academics had an additional 
one-to-one meeting every year on top of the annual reviews with the director of research. In 
this meeting, unlike the annual performance reviews, where the appraiser considered various 
areas of academics’ performance, the focus was on research outputs, and academics had to 
demonstrate that they were on track to meet their departments’ publication expectations.  
 
Academics who were on probation had a different performance management system. The 
way universities reviewed their probationary staff differed significantly from one university 
to another, depending on the probation period of the university, which ranged from one year 
to seven years, and on the personal preference of the management team within the 
department. For instance, in some universities, probationary academics had two face-to-face 
performance meetings spaced at six month intervals each year whereas in others, probationers 
only had a single one-to-one meeting each year. 
 
Although universities called the annual review a developmental review, 61% of the 
participants who had their annual reviews and discussed this topic did not find the reviews 
particularly developmental. A MaleSeniorLect6 explained: “It feels like a chore that I have to 
do and it doesn’t seem to have any strong connection to what I’m doing or in how I think 
about my work. So usually my approach tends to try to find a way to not have anyone be 
annoyed with me rather than anything else.” This approach to performance reviews meant 
that academics did not necessarily present an accurate account of their performance, but 
 
4 In this university, there was an action against the annual reviews. At the point of the interview, the annual 
reviews were to be resumed, but the interviews took place just before participants had their reviews. Information 
on the reasons behind the suspension of the annual reviews is not disclosed here in order to retain the anonymity 
of the university. 
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managed it in a way that helped them to safely pass their performance reviews, at times 
engaging in the behaviours not intended by performance management systems discussed in 
section 6.3. For these academics, the annual reviews were viewed as an inevitable meeting to 
which they were subjected every year. Except for one professor who refused to complete the 
review forms and asked his assistant to complete them on his behalf, the others realised that 
there was no way out of the reviews and tried to cope. There were two academics in two 
different institutions who managed to evade having their annual reviews. However, this was 
because they were not called upon by the management or human resource department to have 
their reviews, and they remained silent about it.   
 
The remaining 39% of the participants who considered the annual reviews to be helpful for 
their development primarily thought so because of the refection process that the reviews 
entailed. These academics said that because they were usually immersed in their work, and at 
times lost sight of their progress, the annual reviews enabled them to reflect on their work 
and know where they stood in relation to their performance goals and long-term career goals. 
A FemaleSeniorLect5 explained: “It helps you to at least reflect on what you've done and 
think about what you're going to do for the next year and to then maybe get advice from a 
more senior person as to what they think.” However, while 39% of academics linked the 
reflection process to their personal development, saying that the reviews encouraged them to 
reflect on their performance, which in turn contributed to their development, the other 61% 
did not report having experienced improved performance from the reflective process involved 
in performance reviews.  
 
On occasions, academics used the annual reviews to clarify the performance goals they were 
supposed to reach in order to, for example, pass probation or get promoted, and get some 
useful advice on their work from their appraisers. The advice given was generally along the 
lines of how to get a promotion, managing workload, improving teaching scores, selecting 
conferences and journals, managing work tasks, and sometimes even advice on how to 
complete the annual review and promotion forms. However, sometimes the information 
shared between appraisers and appraisees was also on how to enable appraisees to evade 
performance management systems, conveniently meet their performance goals, and present 
their performance on the forms in a way that met their universities’ performance management 
requirements. The ways this was done are illustrated in section 6.3. 
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6.2 Unintended behavioural and psychological outcomes of performance management 
systems 
Having described academics’ general stance on performance management systems, 
highlighting the most salient performance areas discussed in the interviews, the chapter now 
turns to addressing the first research question, which considers the unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems. The chapter begins by discussing the unintended 
behavioural outcomes, presented under the rubrics of gaming, instrumental effort allocation 
and myopia. Following this, the unintended psychological outcomes are presented under the 
rubrics of cognitive dissonance, feelings of inadequacy, resigned compliance and self-
inflicted pressure (see Figure 6.1 for a visual illustration). Subsequently, the interactions 
between the unintended behavioural and psychological outcomes are explained.  
 
First, however, it is important to note that the depicted unintended outcomes in Figure 6.1 
represent wider negative views of performance management systems among academics. The 
findings of this thesis do not suggest that performance management systems cannot lead to 
positive intended outcomes, but the positive intended outcomes are not the focus of this 
thesis, and there are already a large number of papers focusing on the intended positive 
outcomes. Furthermore, although this thesis presents several negative unintended outcomes, 
this does not mean that performance management systems cannot have positive unintended 
outcomes. Another point to mention is that while the unintended outcomes discussed below 
might look negative on the surface, they can also have positive consequences for the 
individual and/or their employing organisation. When performance is considered in terms of 
metrics, the performance outcomes could be interpreted as positive, but the emergent 
unintended outcomes could be damaging for the profession, a point o which I will return in 
the discussion chapter.    
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Figure 6.1: Unintended behavioural and psychological outcomes of performance management 
systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Unintended behavioural outcomes of performance management systems 
Performance management systems had major influences on academics’ behaviour, and 
despite limitations, did have some positive effects on their performance. For example, 
performance management systems prompted academics to work harder by dedicating more 
hours of their work to developing some of their skills, and searching for ways to become 
more efficient in completing their tasks. As a MaleLect4 stated: “My goal is to have a good 
publication record on my CV, therefore I need to do things more effectively and efficiently. So 
if there is a strategy that I can use to enhance my effectiveness, then I’ll definitely try it.”  
 
However, while performance management practices encouraged academics to proactively 
work to develop themselves, it also encouraged them to devise new strategies that did not 
necessary involve exerting more effort or improving their skills, but did involve the search 
for more expedient means of meeting performance management standards. The result of this 
search was that a host of creative behaviours were developed. Typically, the literature 
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considers these kinds of behaviours as unintended outcomes, meaning negative unintended 
behavioural outcomes of performance management systems, although the words negative and 
behavioural are usually implied rather than explicitly stated (e.g., Bevan and Hood, 2006; 
Berry et al., 2009; Smith, 1995). The vague use of the term unintended outcomes may be 
because performance management systems have traditionally been related to positive 
intended outcomes. As evidence disconfirming this association has gradually emerged (e.g., 
Hood, 2006; Tsui, 2013), perhaps researchers have started to use the concept of unintended 
outcomes to problematise the suitability of performance management systems in achieving 
their acclaimed positively perceived outcomes. However, because the amount of research into 
the unintended outcomes of performance management is significantly smaller than that of 
intended outcomes, the broad way the term is used is probably simply an expression of the 
little information that is available in the literature on this topic.  
 
The following sections detail the notable ways in which the unintended behavioural outcomes 
manifested in the sample universities, presented in the following order: gaming, instrumental 
effort allocation and myopia. The second order themes are defined in Tables 6.2, 6.4 and 6.6 
and later explained in more detail along with the first order codes. Discussions of the 
unintended behavioural outcomes broadly follow a common format. They begin by 
explaining why the behaviours can be regarded as an unintended outcome of performance 
management systems and then illustrate how the behaviours arose from performance 
management systems, often referring to goals, measurements and rewards. This is also 
complemented by an analysis of the way academics displayed the behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems identified in the sampled universities. The next section 
presents the first unintended outcome of gaming, but before presenting the specific gaming 
behaviours found in the data, a description of the way gaming was used by the academics 
interviewed is presented and then followed by a summary of certain common features that 
run across all the gaming behaviours discussed.  
 
6.3.1 Gaming: undesirable but sometimes necessary 
In almost every interview, academics used the phrase “this is a game”, or “you need to play 
the game”, or “you need to know the rules of game” or other similar expressions. Although 
playing by the rules of a game in its literal meaning does not necessarily carry negative 
connotations as it simply means that, as in every game, there are rules by which individuals 
abide, in the interviews, game playing was not used by academics in a neutral sense. As in the 
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literature (Smith, 1995), gaming was used by academics in a negative sense in the way that 
academics carefully strategised their actions in order to meet certain performance goals. As a 
head of group MaleProf11 said: “There is the game, there are the rules of the game. We don't 
like it, but that doesn't take away the reality of that game. You're in that game. I'm afraid 
you're one of the players, a very important actor.” A FemaleSeniorlect3 , who felt the need to 
play the academic game, reported how other academics’ unwillingness to do so disadvantaged 
their career progression. She said: “In other places, not here, I know great colleagues who 
are really just really great academics, intellectuals who you can have such great 
conversations with about just anything and they are really, really good. But they don’t play 
the publication game, they don’t want to play what they would call the nasty game. They'll be 
stuck wherever they are. And that’s a pity I think.” 
 
Not all academics reported engaging in gaming, but almost every academic said that they had 
observed or heard of gaming practices in their departments and/or in other departments where 
they were previously employed. The way academics described gaming resembled the way the 
term is conceptualised in the literature in that when an individual engages in gaming, they 
deviate from an ‘appropriate form of conduct’ (Smith, 1995). However, when academics 
talked about gaming, particularly with reference to research, they described it as a 
commonplace practice, and as an almost inevitable response to performance management 
systems. A MaleProf15 explained: “Everybody does gaming. The only people who don’t do it 
don’t have academic jobs any more. I think some level of gaming if you want to be even half 
successful, you are going to have to do it.” However, because establishing what is deemed 
appropriate or inappropriate conduct is open to interpretation in academia, some of the 
behaviours that were described by some academics as gaming were not viewed as such by 
others. In fact, as is shown below, they were carried out with no qualms by certain academics. 
Having said that, there were popular practices that academics overwhelmingly regarded as 
inappropriate gaming behaviours, and it is these behaviours that are discussed in this section. 
 
Gaming across all academic activities and different levels 
While both the literature (e.g., Hood, 2006) and academics viewed gaming as any attempt by 
an individual to skillfully change their behaviour to gain a competitive advantage, academics 
thought that gaming took place at different levels. A MaleProf4 said: “When you say you play 
the game of publications, you play it at several layers or levels.” In the sample universities, 
gaming was broadly played at two levels: individual and group gaming. In individual gaming, 
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academics engaged in gaming on their own whereas in group gaming, there were two or more 
people involved. Discussions in the literature on gaming in universities centres around the 
publication of papers (e.g., Keasey et al., 2000), however, it was revealed in the interviews 
that while publishing was an activity in which gaming was rife, gaming also took place in 
teaching and performance reviews. 
 
As academics published both single authored and collaborative papers, many of the gaming 
activities described were played individually or collectively, but there were other types of 
gaming that necessarily involved the participation of two or more people, so could only be 
played collectively. In teaching, gaming was mainly played at an individual level, whereas in 
the performance reviews, gaming was played at both individual and collective levels. Table 
6.1 shows the individual and collective gaming activities academics reported having 
repeatedly engaged in or seen. These are discussed below in detail under the broad themes of 
gratuitous proliferation, cooking the cooks, hoarding performance, collusive alliances, 
pandering to customers, and playing safe. To illustrate the way these themes are used in this 
thesis, each of the themes is explained separately along with excerpts from interviews in 
Table 6.2.  
 
Out of the 65 semi-structured interviews, 32 mentioned the theme collusive alliances, 40 
mentioned pandering to customers, 26 participants mentioned gratuitous proliferation, 14 
mentioned cooking the books, 21 mentioned hoarding performance and 45 mentioned playing 
safe. However, an important point to note is that these frequencies provide a conservative 
estimate of the occurrence of the themes and they might in fact be an underestimate of the 
frequencies of the unintended outcomes. When interviewees mentioned an unintended 
outcome, I tried to explore the theme with them in some depth and as I only had a limited 
amount of time, exploring one theme meant that there was less time for interviewees to cover 
other themes. Furthermore, as the interviews included open-ended questions, participants 
chose the unintended outcomes they wished to discuss. However, this does not mean that the 
other unintended outcomes not mentioned by them were not evident in their life or not 
occurring, but just that they were not raised during the hour interview with them. Moreover, 
as academics who engaged in gaming had various strategies to achieve their desired outcome, 
there is the issue of equifinality. Equifinality is defined as when an outcome can be reached 
through various pathways (Gresov and Drazin, 1997). Hence, equifinality might have led to 
an underestimate of the frequencies of the themes discussed in this thesis. Having said this, 
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these points were not considered an issue in this thesis as the goal was not to provide to a 
quantitative representation of the unintended outcomes of performance management systems, 
but to understand how academics respond to the systems implemented in their department. 
 
Table 6.1: Gaming and its first-order codes and second-order themes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           Gaming 
First-order codes 
Second-order themes 
 Individual 
gaming 
Group 
gaming 
Salami Slicing 
Recycling data 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
Gratuitous 
Proliferation 
-s   
Gratuitous proliferation 
Falsifying data 
Fabricating data  
√ 
√ 
√ 
√                 
Cooking the books 
Setting goals 
already/almost met in 
the performance review 
Banking papers 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
Hoarding performance 
Spurious Collaboration 
Appraisers conspiring 
with appraisees 
 √ 
√ 
Collusive alliances 
Entertaining students 
Dumbing down module 
content 
Inflating students’ 
grades 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
 
 
Pandering to customers 
 
Fitting research to 
journals 
 
Setting broad goals in 
the performance review 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 
 
Playing safe 
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Table 6.2: Definitions of second order themes 
 
Second-
order 
themes 
Definition Illustrative quotes 
Gratuitous 
proliferation 
Dividing output 
into sub-units 
where the 
justification for 
doing so is 
tenuous. 
 
 
“You try to make the most out of a single field study 
by presenting it in five different ways, in five 
different journals rather than presenting it perhaps 
in a slightly longer form as a kind of well-developed 
multi-faceted study.” (A MaleSeniorLect8) 
 
“I've been involved in cases where people have auto-
plagiarised and published many articles in journals 
with basically the same data, the same text or 
whatever.” (A MaleProf8) 
 
Cooking the 
books 
Falsifying and 
fabricating data.  
“I've even found people who have a tendency or a 
temptation to manipulate the data in ways that 
confirm or disconfirm hypotheses and premises to 
almost become more publishable.” (A MaleLect13 
lecturer). 
 
“There are different publication games, there is 
faking data which is just completely wrong.” (A 
FemaleProf18) 
 
Hoarding 
performance 
Withholding 
information 
about 
achievements 
and only 
revealing it when 
it is 
advantageous for 
the individual to 
do so. 
“You become very suspicious to reveal what you 
actually want to do, what actually your objectives 
are. This in a sense is a tactic to subvert the power 
relation. You have a powerful centre who tries to 
control you and what you can do is avoid revealing 
things and this probably is unintended.” (A 
FemaleSeniorlect1) 
 
“People selectively choosing when to publish things, 
so talking about the last REF deadline, people 
deliberately held things back, so they had two or 
three papers, and they say I’m not going to submit 
them because probably I’m just okay for the REF, so 
I'll wait.” (A MaleProf15) 
 
Collusive 
alliances 
An implicit or 
explicit secretive 
arrangement 
between two or 
more individuals 
to reach 
“I know the importance of the REF, but I keep telling 
people think of what is good for your career, not 
what's good for the REF.” (A FemaleProf18/ A 
group leader) 
 
“You simply add other people to your research. And 
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performance 
goals through 
performance 
manoeuvring.  
if you do it in reciprocation you can inflate your 
number of publications… I’ve heard stories of it” (A 
MaleSenioLect6) 
 
Pandering to 
customers 
Forsaking one’s 
values to satisfy 
others in a 
position of 
power. 
“She (a colleague) sent them (students) customised 
cards before the performance appraisal (student 
feedback forms) and she did it online. I was, like, 
why? In the beginning I thought it's cute, but when I 
found it's because of the performance appraisal I 
was, like, yes, that's disgusting, honestly.” (A 
Femalelect14) 
 
“You make it (your course) simple, you please 
instead of teaching, you enter the business of 
entertainment not of teaching.” (A MaleProf11) 
 
Playing safe Avoiding risky, 
but potentially 
beneficial 
decisions in an 
attempt to ensure 
the achievement 
of performance 
goals.  
“Instead of being very critical, sometimes people 
write in a way to fit the journals, which I find 
unethical in a way and especially if you're a person 
who has just started, you are not in a position to say 
that doesn’t make sense, no, I don’t want to change 
that argument. You just accept what the reviewers 
want you to write for the paper.” (A Femalelect14) 
 
“I’ve always kept it (identifying goals in an annual 
review) relatively vague to be honest and they’ve not 
picked me up on that. So I’ve said things like I’m 
going to focus on publishing three and four star 
papers and then I would mention some journals that 
I would be targeting.” (A Femalelect10) 
 
 
Gratuitous proliferation 
Proponents of performance management systems argue that the systems can motivate 
employees to increase their effort, hence, increasing their performance output (Pulakos, 
2009). From the interviews, it was found that academics were overly concerned about finding 
efficient, not necessarily positive, ways to increase their publication output, but were 
relatively less interested in increasing their effort or improving their performance.  
 
Given that performance management systems did not particularly motivate academics to 
improve their performance, but motivated many to look for ways to inflate their output with 
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minimal effort, their behavior is described as an unintended outcome of performance 
management systems, and is termed gratuitous proliferation in this thesis.  
 
Academics were also less willing to learn new skills or develop their existing ones. When 
they lacked a specific skill, they simply collaborated with others who had the skill they 
missed so performance management systems did not encourage many academics to exert 
more effort or develop their skills, which probably explains why, as mentioned above, the 
majority of academics did not find performance management systems to be developmental. 
As a FemaleRead6 explained: “I don't come from a very quantitative background, so four 
years ago I did a summer school in econometrics because I wanted to learn. I think that's 
wrong. That's the wrong thing to do because it develops my expertise as a researcher but it's 
not rewarded, it's a route that is not rewarded. The most efficient thing to do is to team up 
with someone who is in econometrics and do things together rather than learn it yourself. So 
I think this is the most efficient way to go about it, about this pressure and to meet the 
requirements.” 
 
The way academics conducted their work was analogous to an assembly line where 
employees produced outputs in large quantities by performing very specific repetitive tasks, 
but in universities it was a more modern form of assembly line. Like assembly lines, 
academics' focus was on meeting their performance goals and producing output (i.e., papers) 
in large quantities in the shortest periods possible, but the difference was that academics tried 
to achieve outputs with the minimum amount of effort while simultaneously attempting to 
claim maximum rewards when the value of the output produced was itself in question. The 
way academics maximised their publication return was often done by salami slicing and 
recycling data.  
 
Salami slicing was described by participants as deliberately dividing research into distinct 
papers where the justification for having that many papers was tenuous. A MaleProf15 
described his experience saying: “I think there's gaming on a more strategic level. You might 
say okay I have a study, how many papers can I get out from it? Salami slicing stuff.” 
Another MaleProf16 who thought that such a practice was popular provided further 
rationalisations of how salami slicing occurs. He said: “They are kind of companion pieces. 
That's how I would think about it. They've got a data set or whatever they have done, a series 
of interviews, and then rather than saying ‘Okay, can I somehow distil this into one piece that 
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really presents what I consider to be the most interesting findings?’, they'll say, ‘Well, 
actually no, there's this angle here, and then there's another angle here, and there's another 
angle here’, and so on, so they can get four or five or three things out of one and certainly, 
you see that going on. Whether that's salami slicing, I suppose it's a version of it.” Another 
FemaleRead6 participant who aimed to publish different papers from one data set but got a 
rejection from the journal to which she submitted. At the time of the interview, she was in the 
process of rewriting that paper, and she was also apprehensive about not being able to publish 
the paper because not doing so meant falling short of her performance goals in her upcoming 
annual review. She said: “I diluted the research into two, three papers rather than one paper, 
you have to do that… it's damaging in this way in the sense that it's encouraging us to dilute 
the content of our work. You could have one very good paper. No, go for three mediocre 
papers.”  
 
Publishing various papers from one data set was not always considered to be salami slicing 
by participants because sometimes academics had legitimate reasons for producing different 
outputs. This was because academics reported that journals tend to encourage academics to 
have very specific research questions, and they therefore had to narrow the focus of their 
papers. Other times, academics simply had a lot of data that could not all be disseminated via 
one paper. This was illustrated by a FemaleRead7 who said: “I had a paper rejected and one 
of the comments was that there's too much in this paper because I'm like I have done all of 
this research, I'm writing it… I’ve got to do it (salami slicing) also because otherwise it gets 
rejected because there's too much. An article needs to be very focused.” 
 
Recycling data is similar to but different from salami slicing. While in both activities the goal 
of academics was to get the highest number of papers from a data set, when academics 
recycled their data, their focus was on employing the same data used for other publications to 
generate additional publications. In other words, recycling data involved re-using and 
repackaging existing data in a different way. A MaleSeniorLect6 stated: “What I see is mostly 
reusing the same piece or reusing the same study too many times for it to be interesting”. 
Similarly, a FemaleProf12 explained: “There are different publication games… there is using 
data more than once, squeezing it up, reusing it, which I think is wrong because it makes it 
look as there are two different papers, two different sets of data supporting this.”  
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Generally, when academics recycled their data, they sent their recycled data to different 
journals so that their chances of getting published and doing well in performance 
management systems were increased. A FemaleProf18 expressed her concern about this 
practice saying: “I see more or less the same argument or set of issues being published in 
different journals around about the same time and I always feel uncomfortable about that.”  
  
Another way in which data recycling took place was when researchers used the same data to 
produce different papers, but instead of just presenting the same data in a different format, 
they added a small contribution to the paper. Academics still viewed this activity as recycling 
because they considered the contribution to be trivial and not worthy of publication, or at 
least not worthy of having a separate paper for the contribution to be indicated. A 
FemaleProf5 described how this occurs: “You end up saying how can we say this in a new 
way to get into that journal rather than to really say something new, so you're making a tiny 
tiny contribution to theory that few other people in that world are going to read and no one is 
ever going to use.” Another MaleProf21 illustrated this point, emphasising the popularity of 
recycling data. He stated: “It may be basically reporting the same study in a slightly different 
way in another journal. These are things that don’t ultimately add much to the pursuit of 
knowledge or science, but simply for someone to get more publications in better journals, 
there's a lot, a lot of that around.” Such practices are considered inappropriate in the 
literature, and certain authors categorised them as a form of research misconduct in which 
academics should not engage (Bedeian et al., 2010).  
 
There was a very small number of academics who viewed the practices of salami-slicing and 
recycling data to be unproblematic as long as researchers are able to produce good research 
papers. As a MaleProf2 said: “When you have a data set and you use the data set for multiple 
analyses and each analysis leads to a new publication, now you could argue each publication 
should be based on a completely fresh data set. I disagree. I think when you spend years 
collecting data there are many things to be learned from this because you have different 
theories and different ways of analysing. So in a way you could accuse that scholar of playing 
a game of efficiency and saving some time, but ultimately, if they manage to make a 
contribution that convinces with each piece that is a solid piece of research, it probably is.” 
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Cooking the books 
Performance management systems are generally considered to be essential tools that align 
employees’ performance with the vision and goals of the firm, enabling organisations to reap 
important benefits from such alignment (Aguinis and Pierce, 2008). When performance 
management systems do not support organisations to achieve the outcomes they desire, they 
can be described as ineffective, as has been traditionally the case in the literature. However, 
when performance management systems unintentionally encourage employees to engage in 
illegitimate behaviours (Denisi and Smith, 2014), they probably warrant more attention.  
 
In the interviews, interviewees reported being aware of academics fabricating, 
misrepresenting or falsifying their research findings by distorting data in ways that increased 
the potential of that data to get published in top journals. These behaviours are called here 
cooking the books. Fabricating data is defined as “making up data or results and recording 
and reporting them”, whereas falsifying data is defined as “manipulating research materials, 
equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research is not 
accurately represented in the research record” (Bedeian et al., 2010: 716/717). 
 
Both participants and the literature considered faking and misrepresenting data to be at the 
extreme end of the inappropriate research practices spectrum. However, while participants 
categorised these practices as gaming, the literature described them as “the gravest form of 
research misconduct” (Bedeian et al., 2010: 716). Academics understood the dangers 
associated with falsifying data, especially with regard to data fabrication, and reported having 
seen colleagues having their contract terminated with their university after fabricating data. A 
FemaleProf14 stated: “I know there are people who actually fake data and do all kinds of 
questionable stuff... I can't name all the names any more, but there have been a few high 
profile cases.” However, despite many participants saying that such activities often take 
place, not many academic reported having seen colleagues being caught falsifying or 
fabricating data and losing their jobs as a result. This is perhaps due to research 
methodological flexibility and academics’ dexterity in manipulating data (Kepes and 
Mcdaniel, 2013).  
 
A MaleProf4 gave examples of how researchers can manipulate their data. He stated: “Other 
game playing is more at a micro level around publication, like HARking, and dropping 
participants or increasing participants in certain kind of studies.” HARking refers to the 
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practice of academics changing their hypotheses after data are analysed (Kepes and 
Mcdaniel, 2013). A Femalelect18 described the ease with which her research data could be 
manipulated, and criticised the performance management goals implemented by her 
university for motivating academics to manipulate their data. She said: “When I analyse data, 
it would be very, very easy for some cases to go missing and you have totally different 
findings. So while I then put the data on the side and say, oh I can’t publish my findings, if 
you would delete a few cases, something totally different would come out. I don’t think that 
would be ethical but I think the REF would encourage that because the REF obviously they 
want you to publish a lot so you might instead of not using that data, you might.”  
 
Consequently, academics have become sceptical about published data. A MaleProf20 
explained how performance management measurements encouraged academics to become in 
his words “selfish” and publish papers that did not truly represent their data. He stated: 
“Whether deliberate or not, things are being published which are not necessarily as close to 
the truth as they should be…one thing is people maybe trying to make a story when there isn’t 
one in a paper; and I'm not talking about deliberate faking or anything like that. I'm talking 
about maybe just reporting the results that are favourable to the story rather than the others, 
which is something that I think is quite common. It is not good science and I've seen it in my 
department of course. I'm also an associate editor at a journal and it can be spotted 
sometimes but not always when people submit articles.” 
 
Fabricating and falsifying data was discussed in relation to research. Only one academic 
MaleRead9 reported having experienced data fabrication in relation to teaching by a 
colleague who lost his job as result. He said: “I know one individual who in effect has been 
sacked because he…was caught falsifying students’ evaluations.” 
 
Hoarding performance 
Generally, performance management systems are defined as “a continuous process of 
identifying, measuring, and developing the performance of individuals and teams and 
aligning performance with the strategic goals of the organisation” (Aguinis, 2014: 2). Based 
on this definition, it can be inferred that performance management systems allow 
organisations to collect performance information about their employees, in turn allowing 
organisations to better manage employees’ performance. However, this definition is based on 
the premise that the performance information collected through performance management 
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systems offers an accurate representation of employees’ performance, which was not always 
true in the sample universities. As academics broadly knew how their university assessed 
their performance, they used performance management systems to their advantage by 
providing inaccurate information about their performance, hence, preventing performance 
management systems from achieving their intended outcomes. This practice is described here 
as hoarding performance. 
 
For non-probationary staff, performance was assessed every year through performance 
reviews, and every six years through the REF. For both assessments, academics worked to 
meet the criteria by which they were measured. However, when academics exceeded those 
criteria by, for example, having more publication outputs than was specified by performance 
management systems, they sometimes did not disclose that information so that they had 
enough output to present in their next assessment. A FemaleSeniorLect1 explained: “I'm very 
strategic and I'm not ambitious. I write objectives that I'm almost sure I have almost 
completed. So the appraisal is in September, I put things that I know quite well that I will 
have completed by December. Just in case there are delays, I know that I will still have nine 
months to complete.” Another MaleSeniorLect6 who followed a similar approach described 
the way he handled the reviews: “In that review, what I’m trying to do is to describe things 
which I’m planning to do or which I’m already close to finishing hopefully in a way that they 
would look at least moderately challenging goals. As I said, I’m not treating it seriously as a 
process of development. I’m trying to find a way for it to look reasonable on paper and not to 
raise any eyebrows. So that’s my approach. So I’m not trying to do anything challenging 
through that.” 
 
Another way in which academics managed their performance was by strategically planning 
when to submit their papers to journals. A FemaleSeniorLect3 showed her publication timing 
strategy: “You need to have four good outputs. So you have to be strategic when you submit. 
There's a cut-off time, there's a beginning and ending. Now we're in the middle, so it's good 
that what you submit now is REFable.” When the goal of having the four papers was reached, 
academics banked their papers, typically by delaying the process of publishing the surplus 
papers. A MaleProf22 explained: “You need to make sure there's stuff in the pipeline that is 
going to actually appear before the REF. And some people bank papers. If they've got a lot of 
papers from the previous REF, they'll keep some in reserve to make sure that they've got some 
for the next REF.” Delaying submission time until the next REF can negatively affect the 
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available knowledge in the literature as it can prevent the supposedly new, urgent and timely 
knowledge from being accessible to others. 
 
The practice of withholding performance information has been highlighted in much literature 
on dysfunctional behaviours at work. Various labels have been used to describe this practice 
calling it, for example, unethical behaviour (e.g., Thau et al., 2015; Li-Ping Tang et al., 2008), 
destructive deviance (Warren, 2003), or a form of organisational misconduct (Andreoli and 
Lefkowitz, 2009). While diverse labels exist, researchers have not identified much difference 
in meaning between them. Withholding performance is generally used to describe instances 
when employees deliberately do not share performance information with their co-workers. 
The withheld performance information of course differs from one context to another, but the 
fundamental principle is the same in that the information employees conceal benefits the 
employee while disadvantaging the employer5 (Warren, 2003). Hence, withholding 
information has been negatively viewed in the literature, and employees are encouraged to 
stray away from such a practice. 
 
Generally, academics concealed their goals because they could not predict if their papers 
would be positively received by journals, and whether they would have enough output to 
show for their next assessment. A MaleLect17 explained: “There's a lot of stress because you 
do feel that you do need to have publications. And a lot of that is dependent on your work, but 
it's not just on you, because you never know what reviewers you'll find, you'll never know 
when it's going to be published, or whether you have to submit it to a different journal.” 
Hence, to guard themselves against unsuccessful publication attempts, academics took 
advantage of the information asymmetry that exists between them and managers. This was 
because management were usually unaware of the progress of academics’ work. When a 
MaleProf22 head of group was asked whether he knew about the performance of the other 
academics to whom he was assigned to do performance reviews, he responded with: “At the 
margins. You find out a little bit about what people are doing that you didn’t know about. But 
to be honest, I’m not sitting here now and thinking, oh, you know, as a result of having done 
 
5 It is possible that withholding information could be damaging to the employee as well if, for example, the 
employee is caught. 
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the performance reviews, I now feel a lot more informed in terms of what the group’s up to 
and what people are up to.” 
 
The information asymmetry between management and employees in public services has been 
an important issue in the criticism of performance management systems in public services 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Jackson, 2011; Sun and Van Ryzin, 2014) because, as happened in the 
sample universities, employees could capitalise on this information gap to play the system to 
their advantage. In this sample, the way academics capitalised on this information asymmetry 
was by concealing their performance and setting easily achievable goals (a point further 
explained below in this section), and only disclosing it when it was advantageous for them to 
do so.  
 
Collusive alliances 
Performance management systems typically look at the individual input of employees in that 
the focus is very much on identifying ways to increase individuals’ motivation and 
performance (Denisi, 2011). However, as most organisations nowadays require or encourage 
employees to work in teams to perform work related tasks, performance management systems 
have also been used to assess team performance (Fletcher, 2001). Nevertheless, even in cases 
where performance management systems are used for the latter purpose, individual 
performance has remained at the heart of performance management systems in the sense that 
the assessment of team performance is usually accompanied by an assessment of individuals’ 
performance and individuals’ contribution to their team (Aguinis and Pierce, 2008). Hence, 
when employees disproportionately contribute to a given task, the credit received or lack 
thereof is supposed to be commensurate with their input. On the other hand, when employees 
do not sufficiently contribute but still claim the credit, or make arrangements with each other 
to reap rewards based on each other’s work, the behaviour could be viewed as an unintended 
outcome of performance management systems, and is termed in this thesis as collusive 
alliances.  
 
In the interviews, all academics stated that they worked in collaboration with other academics 
for their publications, and they were generally in favour of collaboration. One reason given 
was that academics found publishing to be a challenging task, and working with each other 
helped to surmount publication difficulties. A MaleProf15 explained: “I think it is very 
difficult (the REF goal). For me, the only way I can do something like that is because I work 
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with other people, and I have done historically.” Another popular reason for collaboration 
was that academics perceived collaboration to be an efficient way of producing papers. A 
MaleProf20 stated: “I've never especially worried about that (publication output) because I 
have to confess I've been very lucky. I've managed to develop really good research 
collaborations with quite a few different people, but in particular with three or four co-
authors who are very prolific writers.” This quote could also be read as someone admitting to 
freeriding but in a manner that does not suggest the socially undesirable nature of freeriding. 
 
As a result, collaboration helped academics to achieve their performance goals. However, 
these goals were also achieved through illegitimate collaborative means. On numerous 
occasions, it was found that collaboration quickly turned into collusion where the main goal 
of publication became supporting co-authors to boost their publication record. This collusion 
took the form of spurious collaboration.  
 
Academics described spurious collaboration as instances where academics either did not 
make any contribution to papers in which they were named as co-authors, or when they 
contributed very little to the papers, so co-authoring the paper was viewed as an unearned 
credit. A MaleProf9 expressed his anger at this practice saying: “Quite a lot of people seem to 
be moving towards more collaborative publications, which is good when they're genuinely 
collaborative publications because it's a team effort but sometimes you wonder whether the 
collaborative authorship isn’t a little artificial. People plotting, thinking, we work in three 
different universities, therefore our articles can be counted in three different REF 
submissions.” Another MaleProf25 described how his colleague managed to get her name on 
a paper where she made no contribution other than taking it to print: “There are people that 
are professors - I'm telling you this because I know - that have carried the paper for printing 
and put it in; in a team of five people that have published ten articles and he or she is the fifth 
author and basically was carrying the paper for printing, and that's a professor, and I know a 
few of them.” Academics engaged in collusive alliances because performance management 
systems demanded that academics needed to have a given number of papers, for example, to 
progress or receive further rewards in their university. Therefore, academics started to make 
arrangements with each other to increase their publication numbers, and meet the goals stated 
by their university.  
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During the interviews, it was found that collaboration also took place between appraisers and 
appraisees during the performance reviews, but was conducted in a manner distinct from the 
way collaboration between the two parties is prescribed in the literature. In theory, although 
rarely the case in practice (Longenecker et al., 1987), collaboration in performance reviews 
involves a manager objectively assessing what in management terms might be called a 
subordinate, and rewarding the subordinate accordingly (Murphy and Cleverland, 1995). In 
the sample universities, collaboration was not always used to achieve these aims. It also 
involved appraisers collaborating with appraisees to find easy routes that allowed appraisees 
to receive extra credit with little or no performance improvement. Consequently, these kinds 
of collaboration are considered unintended outcomes of performance management systems, 
and also described as collusive alliances in this thesis. 
 
In the sample universities, academics normally had a formal annual review with a professor, 
acting as a manager (Sousa et al., 2010), who rated their performance. In some instances, the 
appraisers collaborated with appraisees to help them develop their performance, although as 
mentioned above in section 6.1.3, 61% of participants did not find the review meeting 
developmental.  
 
The collusive behaviours described in this section do not reflect instances when appraisers 
and appraisees jointly worked to enhance appraisees’ performance, but when the two parties 
conspired against performance management systems. The collusive behaviour mostly took 
place because most appraisers interviewed reported that they did not believe in performance 
management systems, yet had to conduct reviews they fundamentally opposed. While these 
appraisers did not explicitly express their reservations about the systems to their appraisees, 
they secretly colluded with them. For example, the appraisers showed appraisees tactics to 
favourably present their work on the review form or shared tips on how to meet their goals 
through expedient means. A MaleProf22 appraiser who had to review the performance of an 
academic who missed the teaching goal set by the university admitted teaching the appraisee 
improper teaching practices by saying: “Don’t worry about the content of your lectures, just 
make the classes more entertaining for students.” Prioritising entertainment value over 
academic content is of course questionable on many grounds, and this was recognised by the 
appraiser. However, the appraiser still suggested it as a ‘quick fix’ solution.   
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Pandering to customers 
Organisations are constantly urged to be socially responsible to their various stakeholders 
(Weaver et al., 1999). Behaving in a socially responsible manner varies depending on the 
industry in which organisations operate, but irrespective of the industry, organisations should 
not intentionality offer sub-optimal products or services to consumers when claiming not to 
do so (Carroll, 1991). Given that being socially responsible has become a goal that most 
organisations, at least on paper, strive to reach and given that performance management 
systems are supposed to assist organisations in achieving their goals, performance 
management systems should therefore encourage employees to be more socially responsible.  
 
Based on the interviews, it was found that performance management systems sometimes 
motivated academics to do the reverse by purposely behaving in ways they knew were not in 
the best interests of students. In essence, academics engaged in strategies they personally had 
many doubts about, and which they thought were against the long-term interests of students. 
These behaviours are described here as pandering to customers and are considered to be 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems because they go against the 
overall mission of universities to provide good quality teaching to students. 
 
Academics realised that in order to reach the teaching scores set by their university, they had 
to adapt their teaching to students. They also realised that getting high teaching scores only 
marginally depended on their teaching quality as scores heavily depended on the extent to 
which they were able to make students happy. Hence, for many academics, pleasing students 
became a central teaching concern. While detailing their reasons for concern is not the focus 
of this thesis, listing some of them is important because they help to explain the behaviours 
discussed in this section.  
 
According to academics, students were often satisfied or unsatisfied for reasons that were 
unrelated to academics’ teaching as there were various confounding factors that influenced 
the scores they received. A MaleProf22 expressed his objection to teaching scores saying: 
“The danger with that kind of assessment is it becomes a popularity contest, that you approve 
of your lecturer for reasons that have virtually nothing to do with his or her ability as a 
lecturer - whether they're entertaining or not, or how they look or whatever. It then becomes 
more about that. Students are not necessarily the best people to judge the quality of the 
teaching that's being provided because they don't know the field, they don't have that kind of 
  
 
151 
specialism and background that would enable them to judge whether or not the material 
they're receiving is up-to-date or factually correct or at a sufficiently high level.” Similarly, a 
FemaleRead1 explained: “I don’t think it's (student evaluation) very good at all. It's widely 
known that there are real inequalities put into that. Firstly is women, secondly is people 
whose English is their second language. Research has proven that women do worse and so do 
non-native speakers, so it's very disadvantageous. And the thing is, students don't like things 
that are difficult, and so if you can teach something easy, entertaining, you get high marks as 
a lecturer, but you produce poorer quality graduates.”  
  
Despite all the problems academics had with this kind of assessment, they knew that their 
teaching was primarily measured based on students’ feedback, and they were increasingly 
apprehensive about their scores. Academics often likened universities to businesses, 
describing students as customers, a view that has also become widespread in the literature 
(Sousa et al., 2010). A FemaleLect8 stated: “The kind of whole rationale of imparting 
learning is no longer the case. This is a business, it’s being run like a business and we have 
customers, i.e., students who are paying a lot of money.” 
 
Academics thought that British universities now view students as customers because of the 
huge increase in students’ fees. This view had been internalised by some academics as they 
also started to see students as customers. Others challenged this perception. A MaleLect6 
made an analogy between universities and gyms saying: “It annoys me a bit when academic 
staff, especially in business schools, call students consumers. I think it’s not a helpful way at 
all of viewing students. My friend had a nice analogy about - what was it? Something to do 
with gyms. Essentially the idea is that just because you bought a gym membership pass you 
still need to actually do the exercise to sort of get fit. And again, just because students are 
enrolled onto a course at the university, they still need to actually do the reading, do the work 
to exercise their minds and things to get where they need to go.” Despite their discontent, 
academics had to come to terms with this new mode of teaching and get scores that met their 
university teaching goals. 
 
Consequently, academics were faced with the twin pressures of producing good quality 
graduates while ensuring that students were satisfied with the teaching (or service) provided. 
As the pressure to satisfy students increased in universities, academics used strategies such as 
oversimplifying module content, entertaining students and inflating students’ grades. A 
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FemaleSeniorLect3 described some of these strategies: “I know that those who play the 
teaching game, for instance, would kind of give high marks, or would basically tell what’s 
going to be in the exam. And people do these things. So with high marks, you can't give 
everybody a distinction, obviously, but you can move the average up you know. So people do 
that and people definitely reveal exam questions. It doesn’t go against the practice here - you 
can do it. I mean like some professors would take chocolates to their last lecture.” Another 
MaleLect13 explained why and how academics apply these gaming strategies: “If your 
career depends on the scores that you receive from students, again an understandable 
behaviour is I need to do something to ensure that they evaluate my course positively and that 
may force people to lower the standards of the evaluation. For instance, set an exam that is 
easier so that students get higher marks and therefore they are more satisfied and therefore 
they value the course and teaching better. The other one is very much aligned with this and to 
try to please the students in some way. Maybe if there's a topic that's difficult and hard, you 
avoid that and instead you bring things that are more memorable or amusing, so you move 
away from education to this thing called entertainment.” 
 
Playing safe 
As stated by numerous academics, performance management systems enable organisations to 
ensure that employees produce their best outcomes (Armstrong and Baron, 1998). 
Performance management systems help organisations to cascade their goals to individual 
employees, and in so doing employees understand how they can best contribute to 
organisational performance (Aguinis, 2014). However, in order for this relationship to occur, 
a certain level of motivation and commitment to organisational goals on the part of 
employees is essential (Denisi and Smith, 2014). When employees partly support or strongly 
oppose performance management systems, it is hard to imagine how performance 
management systems can maximise employees’ performance in the ways envisaged by 
organisations.  
 
In fact, in the interviews, many academics stated that performance management systems 
negatively affected their performance. This was because performance management systems 
articulated the performance outcomes expected from academics, creating more transparency 
in management decisions such as workload allocation, promotion, and financial bonuses. 
Hence, academics were aware of both the opportunities and threats associated with achieving 
or not achieving performance goals. To avoid unpleasant consequences, academics became 
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risk averse, and only engaged in courses of action that increased the likelihood of reaching 
their universities’ demanded outcomes. These behaviours are described here as playing safe, 
and considered to be unintended outcomes because many academics interviewed said that 
performance management systems neither supported them to do good quality research nor 
encouraged them to set challenging or developmental goals that helped them to improve their 
work. A MaleProf16 described how publication measures influenced academics’ work 
saying: “We're heading into doing low risk research and low risk scholarship and it just ends 
up as rather homogeneous, formulaic, and trivial.”  
 
Many academics thought that performance management systems constrained their ability to 
do research in the way they perceived as appropriate because they had to ensure that their 
papers were designed in a way that would most likely get them published in highly ranked 
journals. For example, a FemaleSeniorLect4 explained: “The problem with the publication 
game is that you always write papers and topics in a way that would suit any of the three and 
four star journals in the ABS list. So you don't write a paper on a topic that doesn’t suit any 
of the ABS graded journals.” Another MaleProf17 explained how, in his view, academics do 
research in the wrong order: “We observe gaming. I think the REF has changed the way that 
research is done, so again research now is governed by rankings of journals in the sense that 
rather than write a paper and then look for a journal, you look for a journal and write a 
paper, so it is the other way around, and that is part of that gaming process.”   
 
Hence, academics felt that the performance management requirement of publishing in certain 
outlets steered their research in directions they did not necessarily want to go. A 
FemaleRead7 explained: “For a long time in my area there was only one journal that was a 
three star, and all the others were one star or two stars. There was none as a four star, so I 
ended up publishing outside my specific area in more general marketing or management 
journals because those were the ones that would give me the three stars, so you sort of, you 
are a specialist in a field and you try to publish outside your field because those are the ones 
that are recognised and not others in this field. And I think it's bad”.  
 
Overall, the high rejection rate in top journals together with the fierce competition academics 
felt they had to endure to get published in these journals encouraged academics to become 
risk averse in how they conducted their research, and much more willing to conform to the 
wishes of other authorities in their field. Therefore, many academics interviewed had become 
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more and more focused on finding ways to reduce the likelihood of getting their papers 
rejected by journals, which was largely because a lack of publications meant that they would 
likely become embroiled in an uncomfortable discussion about their performance, possibly 
endangering their employment contract with their university, which was eagerly awaiting 
their papers.  
 
Academics also did not take risks in performance reviews. They carefully phrased the goals 
they put on their review forms, keeping them broad. Having broad goals was mainly done by 
not writing the specific goals they wanted to achieve. Instead they wrote about the steps they 
took to achieve their goals, and these steps were framed as goals. For example, if an 
academic aimed to publish a paper (the goal), the written goal would be to submit a paper for 
publication (the step to the goal). A FemaleProf7 group leader illustrated this point: “You 
keep them open (goals), and then that’s where you start taking it as a useless game. You start 
living a very weird double life (personal information about the participant removed). 
Somebody comes with something stupid like you set up goals and then we all know that it is 
stupid, but we don't say that it's stupid and we pretend that we do it, so in all these evaluation 
systems what you do is say I'll submit for publication two papers next year, and you leave it 
open.” This group leader knew that her appraisees purposely kept their goals broad on their 
review forms, but turned a blind eye to it, and even supported them in doing it.  
 
Academics had broad goals because, in addition to being unable to control the outcomes 
(some of the reasons for this are highlighted below in section 6.4 under the subheading of 
feelings of inadequacy), they did not trust performance management systems. A 
FemaleSeniorLect1 argued: “The other problem is the objective; you write the objective and 
the following year the people that are there are on top of you. So the person who chairs the 
appraisal and the head of school have to tick boxes and say, she's met the objectives. But this 
information is not confidential to the department, it goes to human resources. So if you 
haven't met the objective, it's stored somewhere in the human resources office.” Hence, 
academics avoided writing challenging goals because if they missed them, this information 
would be documented, which they believed could be used against them should their 
institution wish to do so. This behaviour was, in essence, a defence mechanism used by 
academics against the system. As a FemaleProf12 stated: “I try to be as non-specific as 
possible so that I'm not creating any hostages to fortune if I don't achieve them”. 
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Having broad goals also meant that the goals of performance reviews were so broad that they 
became relatively easy to achieve, an outcome that goes against the tenets of goal setting 
theory, which exhorts employees to have specific difficult goals at work (Locke and Latham, 
2006). In the sample universities, performance management systems had the unintended 
outcome of encouraging employees to stray from the guidelines of goal setting theory. 
Another FemaleLect10 explained why performance management systems encouraged her to 
set easy goals: “I put the ones (the goals) I know I'm going to achieve and then if they tell me 
- the thing is, my reviewer can tell me if they are not challenging enough and then I can move 
them up. But it seems to me, if you are really going to go for the performance angle of things, 
and the performance review part, it's better to do the minimum so I can then exceed them. 
The thing is if you have the goal and you're not exceeding the expectations, then you have to 
set the goal lower, so that you can actually exceed them. I find that such a stupid marking 
criterion. Exceeding expectations!” 
 
The behaviour displayed by academics has some parallels with what Bevan and Hood (2006) 
called the ratchet effect (which was defined in Chapter 3, section 3.2.1) to describe how 
employees in the Soviet Union gamed performance management systems. As stated by Bevan 
and Hood (2006), in the Soviet Union, performance management systems typically involved 
a review of past performance with a vision of future performance, so employees often reacted 
to this by purposely reducing their performance in fear of having more challenging goals the 
next year (as their next years’ goals were based on their current year’s performance). In the 
sample universities, as performance management systems also involved a review of past and 
future performance, employees reacted to this in a similar way to employees in the Soviet 
Union. However, unlike the Soviet Union, where employees purposely reduced their 
performance in fear of having more challenging goals the next year (Bevan and Hood, 2006), 
all participants in the sample, except for one, did not report having lowered their performance 
following the achievement of their goals, but played safe by setting themselves easy goals so 
that their performance would not be poorly rated if their goals were unachieved. 
 
As mentioned in section 6.2, the unintended behavioural outcomes found in the interviews 
were gaming, instrumental effort allocation and myopia. Having discussed gaming, the 
chapter now turns to discussing instrumental effort allocation followed by myopia.  
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6.3.2 Instrumental effort allocation 
At the outset of this chapter, it was noted that academics’ work consisted of various activities, 
notably, research, teaching and administration. Of these activities, it was also stated that for 
both universities and academics, research was the performance area that was of highest 
importance to most academics, and to which they devoted much of their effort. When 
employees focus on some performance areas as opposed to other important ones, Kelman and 
Friedman (2009) described such behaviour as effort substitution. However, in the sample 
universities, academics did not substitute their efforts because, unless they had very special 
circumstances like being on sabbatical or buying themselves out by winning research grants 
that took away their teaching responsibilities, they still had to perform in all performance 
areas. Hence, academics did not substitute their efforts, but instrumentally allocated their 
efforts by prioritising research over all other activities. Accordingly, this thesis uses 
instrumental effort allocation instead of effort substitution to describe such behaviour.  
 
Before illustrating the way instrumental effort allocation occurred in the sample universities, 
it is important to note that all the sampled academics graded research performance above 
other performance domains because in their view, the performance management systems in 
their universities prioritised research. In terms of teaching, although not the top priority, it 
was described as being given varying levels of importance by different universities in the 
sample.  
 
In seven institutions, academics’ teaching performance was one of the areas considered in 
promotion and probation decisions although this was not always true. A FemaleLect10 
academic who worked in one of the seven universities that openly celebrated their dedication 
to teaching excellence described being promoted even when she fell dismally short of the 
teaching standards set by the university, but did well in research. She stated: “In my first year, 
when I was teaching, I did really well in my student evaluations. I got (the grade received has 
been removed for confidentiality reasons - this was a high grade) and then last year I got (the 
grade received has been removed for confidentiality reasons - this was a low grade) and I got 
really worried because this was just before I was submitting my application to be promoted. I 
thought oh no this is really disappointing, I don't understand. How can my performance and 
ratings go down? I improved the course from last time. What are the students thinking? And 
then I just thought oh if that's the case and they put so much emphasis on teaching, how am I 
ever going to get a promotion? And then I did get a promotion. I was like oh okay.”  
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In the other six institutions, academics reported that their teaching performance had little 
influence on their career prospects as research performance was the main determiner. A 
FemaleSeniorLect4 stated: “All schools say that all of these activities are important and that 
you should put a lot of weight and emphasis, but at the end of the day the only thing that 
matters is your research track record; my personal opinion. The others are very rarely deal 
breakers for promotion.” Hence, regardless of the extent to which the sample universities 
voiced their commitment to teaching, almost all academics were confident that in reality 
teaching did not play an important role in how their performance was assessed and rewarded.  
 
In the next section, instrumental effort allocation is discussed under the rubrics of neglecting 
performance domains and balancing sufficiency against interest (see Table 6.3). Table 6.4 
provides a definition of the way neglecting performance domains and balancing sufficiency 
against interest are used in this thesis, supported by excepts from the interviews for 
illustration. 
 
Table 6.3: Instrumental effort allocation and its first-order codes and second-order themes 
Instrumental Effort Allocation	
First-order codes	 Second-order themes	
Insufficient teaching preparation 
Inadequate attention to students	 Neglecting performance domain	
Keeping corporate citizenship 
behaviours to the minimum 
Ticking the box for teaching and 
administration	 Balancing sufficiency against interest	
 
Table 6.4: Definitions of second order themes 
Second-
order 
themes 
Definition Illustrative quotes 
Neglecting 
performan
ce domains 
Focusing on 
performance 
domains that bring 
most personal 
benefits to the 
“My impression in terms of what the university is 
looking for is publications, they want publications, 
so I think that can affect negatively the teaching 
element, and how much involvement or how much 
work you give to teaching and providing a positive 
  158 
individual to the 
neglect of other 
performance 
domains that bring 
lesser benefits 
 
student experience. But sadly, you will not, or it 
seems to me that you will not get promoted, like 
you can have excellent scores in feedback from 
students and you can deliver the best lectures in 
the world, but that will not get you up the 
academic ladder. So what matters is the 
publication element. So I think once you 
understand that, then you can focus on the things 
that matter (research), which is what I'm trying to 
do.” (A MaleLect16) 
 
“The problem is we have to deliver 100% in 
research, 100% in teaching, and then hopefully 
also 100% in good citizenship. Something has to 
give.” (A FemaleRead7) 
 
Balancing 
sufficiency 
against 
interest 
Striving for average 
performance in 
domains that do not 
bring much personal 
gain for the 
individual 
“You're always trading something off against 
something else. So it might be teaching 
preparation perhaps is not done to the level that 
you would like to do, maybe the lectures haven't 
been updated as much as they should have been, 
for example, or the reading list might have not 
been updated as much as it should have been. But 
it's sufficient. So it often feels like what you're 
doing is sufficient, but not what you would like to 
be doing, not at the level you'd like to be hitting.” 
(A MaleProf22) 
 
“The main trade-off everyone will mention I think 
is the time you spend on teaching versus the time 
you spend on research and versus the time you 
spend on anything else. Again, I think we are given 
a lot of autonomy here in how we manage that. I 
think I could spend more time doing teaching if I 
thought that I was going to get more credit for it - 
preparing interesting case studies, preparing 
workshops, simulations, seminars. I really can’t 
allow myself much time to that so that I focus on 
publication because you think well how can I write 
something that can get in to a good journal? I 
think about half of the staff probably see teaching 
as a bit of an inconvenience sometimes when they 
are desperate to go back to their research.” (A 
MaleLect19) 
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Neglecting performance domains 
Performance management systems are known in the literature for being tools used by 
organisations to signal to employees what their organisational priorities are (Den Hartog et 
al., 2004). In the sample universities, given the way universities managed academics’ 
performance, academics understood that it was their research output that mattered most to 
their university, adapting their behaviour accordingly. Therefore, considering that 
performance management systems communicated to academics that research was of the 
greatest value to their universities, it would be against the system if academics focused more 
on areas other than research, or gave equal weight to all performance domains. When 
academics focus more on research and less on other activities like teaching, this behaviour 
can be regarded as an intended and a rather predictable outcome of performance management 
systems.  
 
Nevertheless, academics’ behaviour is still classified as unintended here because at the time 
of the interviews, all the sample universities expressed, for example, on their websites and 
media channels, their dedication to both teaching and research. Given that performance 
management systems did not transmit the same message to academics, it can therefore be 
understood that either universities did not value teaching to the degree they claimed, or that 
their performance management systems were communicating wrong messages to academics, 
and leading to unintended outcomes. While both explanations are plausible, this thesis uses 
the explicit messages stated by the sample universities on their websites, and in their official 
lines that teaching was very important to them to categorise academics neglecting teaching as 
an unintended outcome of performance management systems.  
 
Some academics reported that their colleagues neglected their teaching responsibilities in 
different ways. Based on the interviews, the common ways this neglect took place were by 
insufficient teaching preparation and inadequate attention to students.  
 
Insufficient teaching preparation refers to academics putting insufficient effort into their 
teaching. A FemaleLect8 illustrated how after understanding the way performance 
management systems worked in her university, she no longer strove to design lecturers that 
best suited students’ courses. She said: “I was so naïve and optimistic when I joined here that, 
you know, oh I need to make new lectures, this topic is really exciting, there’s new research 
coming out into that. None of that anymore; because I was asked to basically do maternity 
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cover this year, this semester basically and I just chose lectures that I’ve done another time 
basically. I pretty much had lectures made, you know. Previously, no, I would’ve made new 
topics. I would’ve chosen topics that really fit into the criteria of the course. No, this time 
round I made the criteria of the course fit my lectures, previously made lectures.”  
 
On the other hand, inadequate attention to students refers to occasions where, in addition to 
insufficient teaching preparation, the day-to-day care given to students was compromised.  
For instance, a FemaleLect18 explained: “I can think of some examples where people have 
focused on research because they know that ultimately it’s the publications that will get 
rewarded and maybe they’re probably also more interested in doing the research. They've 
focused much more on research at the expense of teaching or at the expense of other teaching 
related responsibilities. Like for example we have a system of personal tutors where we as 
academics meet with either undergrads or post-grad students several times a year. You just 
give some personal support and some academic support so those things sort of fall a little bit 
by the wayside. Maybe emails aren’t being answered, maybe meetings not being arranged, 
maybe not enough support given for supervision, those kinds of things. And you do see that. 
So people being very much focused, and they’re not wrong to think that. They think about 
what's the most important thing really.” As can be seen in this quote, the academics used the 
argument of focusing on important things (i.e., research) as a justification for neglecting 
students.  
 
Balancing sufficiency against interest 
While there have been innumerable (although unsuccessful) attempts by academics to 
overhaul performance management systems (Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011) in ways that 
motivate employees and enable them to improve their performance, it is essential to 
remember that the major goal of performance management systems is to improve the overall 
performance of organisations (Denisi and Smith, 2014). When performance management 
systems encourage employees to focus on how to manage their tasks in ways that bring them 
most personal gains, displaying the “what’s in it for me” attitude with little or no 
consideration for organisational performance, the systems can be regarded as unsuccessful 
(Aguinis and Pierce, 2008: 142) and not achieving their intended outcomes. 
 
In the sample universities, there was another group who did not neglect areas of their 
performance, but also did not strive to excel in performance areas that fell outside their 
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research. In other words, academics aimed to tick the box in areas like corporate citizenship 
behaviours, teaching and administration while simultaneously ensuring that these activities 
did not interfere with their personal interests. For example, a MaleLect21 said: “What I find 
most people doing, myself included, is do your teaching and your admin well enough and 
focus on your research because no one is going to get promoted on being the teacher of the 
year. I mean, if you're the course director of the year you're going to get a mug. That's 
basically what happens. I mean, being brutally honest, working in a university like this, 
people focus on getting their publication out - that's what makes the difference between being 
recognised as an expert in your field or not, that's what makes the difference between getting 
promoted and getting a pay rise or not. That's just it. All the rest of it - your contribution to 
your department, being a good citizen - are things that you have to do. Because obviously we 
all understand that the money comes from tuition fees and your salary comes from that, and 
you need to do a good job, but that's it. Just do a good enough job, because running the extra 
mile might not get you that far not even with students.” 
 
6.3.3 Myopia 
In Chapter 3 section 3.2.3, myopia was conceptualised as the focus on short-term goals at the 
expense of longer-term ones (Smith, 1990). Myopia was generally described in the literature 
as employees engaging in calculative thinking where, due to time pressure, they weigh the 
related costs and benefits of achieving short-term results versus longer-term ones. However, 
in the sampled academics, while certain academics followed this line of thinking when they 
manifested myopic behaviours, others, through their extensive focus on short-term goals, 
simply failed to see the long-term ones. Furthermore, as in the literature (Keasey et al., 2000), 
there were instances where myopia resulted from time constraints, and other instances when 
myopia did not really result from time pressure, but more from academics’ focus on short-
term results, for example, in order to score highly in performance reviews, get promoted, or 
receive financial or non-financial rewards. As a result, this section distinguishes between time 
related myopia and non-time related myopia (see Table 6.5).    
 
Both time related and non-time related myopia are considered unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems here because while achieving short-term goals is 
important, attaining the long-term goals of organisations is also important for organisational 
survival and growth (Neely et al., 1995). Furthermore, it is hard to find firms nowadays that 
completely lack long-term goals, and performance management systems particularly exist 
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because they claim to assist organisations in achieving their long-term goals (Aguinis, 2014). 
Hence, when performance management systems encourage employees to compromise the 
long-term goals of their institution, as was evident in the interviews, performance 
management systems can be said to have failed to attain their intended outcomes.   
 
Table 6.5: Myopia and its first-order codes and second-order themes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Definitions of second-order themes 
Second-
order 
themes 
Definition Illustrative quotes 
Time-
related 
myopia 
Because of time 
pressure, the scope of 
work is limited to 
what can be achieved 
within the deadline, 
which has negative 
implications in the 
long-term. Individuals 
may or may not be 
aware of the long-term 
implications of their 
actions. 
“Sometimes a paper may not be ready for 
submission, but you may feel the pressure 
to submit it because of these targets - so I 
felt that before - submitting earlier than I 
should have really because of the pressure 
that you feel.” (A MaleLect19) 
 
“I think there are always trade-offs 
between the immediate things that need to 
be done and those in longer term, and 
often the longer-term ones get traded off 
for the short term, having to get 
particular things to meet particular 
deadlines and things like that, but longer- 
term ones tend to go out of the window.” 
(AMaleProf8) 
 
Myopia 
First-order codes Second-order themes 
Publishing unfinished 
manuscripts in journals  
Engaging in unproductive 
collaborations 
Time-related myopia 
Reducing the depth and breadth 
of research 
Abandoning important research 
ideas 
Non-time related myopia/ Time-related 
myopia 
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Non-time 
related 
myopia 
By prioritising the 
requirements of 
performance 
management systems, 
the scope of work is 
limited in ways that 
have long-term 
negative implications. 
Individuals may or 
may not be aware of 
the long-term 
implications of their 
actions. 
“One of the problems is that the short 
termism has manifested itself in actually 
academics who don’t have the depth of 
scholarship or breadth of scholarship. So 
there’s overspecialisation, and so they 
know more about less. They don’t know 
the history of their own discipline and 
they don’t have a concept of their own 
discipline. That impoverishes everybody.” 
(A FemaleLect18) 
 
“Sometimes the objectives are so tight, so 
mandatory, like you do need to publish in 
a three or four star, but what if I have a 
great idea that would only go for a two 
star. You know, then a lot of good ideas 
might be lost on the way. Maybe it's not 
such a groundbreaking idea to go to a 
four star, but it would definitely contribute 
to our knowledge and it goes to a two star. 
And that's good. But that doesn't really 
count so much for our progression here, 
so a lot of people are more 
strategic.”(AMaleLect13) 
 
 
Time related myopia 
In the sample universities, academics had a number of deadlines to meet. The two commonly 
discussed ones were the REF and annual reviews. For academics, both the REF and annual 
reviews assessed academics’ performance from a short-term perspective. A 
FemaleSeniorLect1 explained: “Everything is measured in one year, four years. The REF is 
every six years, the appraisal is every year, so everything is really short-term and this is not 
good for academia when things need a long time to develop.” Academics thought that doing 
quality research was time consuming and performance management systems do not account 
for the time the publication process can take. A FemaleSeniorLect2 described the length of 
time publication in her discipline takes to finalise: “I think five years is way too short. I 
mean, in economics, for example, we’ve got articles knocking around, it can take you three, 
four years, sometimes ten years to publish one in economics. I mean, they’re so slow, so 
unbelievably slow. So I think that we need a bit more time in it.” 
 
As academics knew that there was a limited time available for outputs to be produced, they 
directed their attention to meeting those deadlines. However, for most, it was difficult to 
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produce good quality research in short time frames. A FemaleLect18 explained: “There’s so 
much pressure, and it’s impossible to do quality work in that sort of time frame. You know, it 
takes time. I was reading something a while ago about changes in the former Soviet Union, 
and it was an ontological study of change. That fieldwork took ten years. Now, you know, two 
REF cycles have gone. You know, that sort of research, that longitudinal, that in depth 
research - you can’t do it. Unless you’ve got a quick and dirty response to what’s coming 
out.” 
 
With the awareness that performance management systems did not take into consideration the 
challenges associated with research, publication and time, academics focused on adjusting 
their work to the time they had. Academics felt they were working against the clock, and 
worked to ensure that they had enough output to present in time for their upcoming deadlines. 
However, in so doing, their publications were subsequently given insufficient time and effort.  
 
In the interviews, it was found that time constraints encouraged many academics to submit 
their papers to journals before the papers were completed. A MaleLect19 explained how, 
because of his annual reviews, he submitted his unfinished papers to journals. He said: “We 
all have to publish so maybe some people would submit something before they even feel that 
the project is completed.” When asked if he had personally submitted an incomplete paper, 
he replied with: “Yes, I have done and I have argued with co-authors about it as well. In a 
couple of cases, they said it’s not ready, and I have said it may not be ready, but I can’t wait 
any longer... because it comes back to performance pressure. I guess at one level I was 
thinking I really need a publication, but you know it’s hard and you're probably going to get 
rejected from a difficult journal. I think the other thing, it comes to our performance review. 
It’s just to show that you have finished something, you have submitted it, does show partial 
performance. It’s a bit of a con because if you say that something is under review, you could 
submit any rubbish, they don’t know that, but there is a positive assumption that if you have 
something under review at a good journal, you have managed to finish it and send it to the 
journal.” 
 
Likewise, because of the REF, a MaleProf22 confessed to having published papers he was not 
satisfied with. He said: “There have been occasions when I have rushed a paper for the REF 
when otherwise, I would have taken my time and it would have been a better paper. So there 
have been occasions when I think work has gone off, it was an okay standard and it was 
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published, but it wasn't quite what I had in mind. So what the REF does, I think, because it 
puts you under pressure all the time to be producing outputs, it reduces the amount of 
thinking time, and the amount of time that's required for deep scholarship.” 
 
Another MaleProf21 and former head of department explained how performance 
management systems have changed the way academics do research. According to him, junior 
researchers were unable to construct strong and coherent research projects because 
performance management systems forced them to think in publication terms rather than 
research terms. He said: “Research is hopelessly derivative. Because I'm in a privileged 
position, my research is based on projects. When most other people talk to me about their 
paper, the paper is the project. It's not: I did the project, I got the results, I wrote it up as a 
paper. It's the paper that's the project. Why? Because there isn't time to do a project… Now 
you can't do that. Most young academics couldn't ever attempt that because it takes too long. 
You'll get sacked by that time. You failed before you finished your project. That's the dilemma. 
It's the time dimension. It's the deadline and the publication lag. Your publication lags are 
chronically long.” 
 
A lack of time also encouraged academics to search for quick collaborations in order to get 
faster publications. However, because academics did not give their collaborations and 
projects related to those collaborations sufficient thought, their efforts did not always lead to 
fruitful outcomes. For example, a FemaleLect12 explained how resorting to collaborators in 
order to increase the number of her projects for her annual review hampered her performance. 
She said: “When I realised that I was falling short of my research, I started looking for faster 
projects, faster ways to get projects done and I looked, for example, for co-authors to share 
the load with. It didn’t go very well. Actually now looking back I feel it was a waste of time, 
these co-authorships, they slowed me down. I used them as a short-term solution to have 
more research projects looking good at the performance evaluation. There's a section on 
research projects, and there weren't enough for me, and they told me there aren't enough 
projects here. The short-term focus – okay let’s increase the number of projects, let’s increase 
collaborations. The number is increased but I wasn’t taking the next step of growing and 
developing them.” 
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Non-time related myopia  
Because performance management systems regularly appraised academics’ short-term 
outputs, some academics also started to appraise their performance on a short-term basis. 
Time constraints were not the main driver for these academics’ behaviour because 
irrespective of time, they had a tendency to think in the short term about their performance. 
For them, getting publication outputs in top journals was a mark of good performance, and it 
became almost the only research goal they strove to attain, losing sight of or interest in any 
long-term research goals they could also aim to reach. Their focus was on getting published 
in top journals rather than ensuring that they conducted good quality research. These 
academics were largely uncritical of performance management systems, and as their 
performance was repetitively measured and rewarded in performance management terms, to a 
great degree, they internalised performance management measures, viewing them as the 
appropriate way of managing academics’ performance and aligning their performance with 
those measures. The social context and the day-to-day interactions between academics also 
played a large part in reinforcing and solidifying their views on research (the way the social 
context influenced academics is detailed in the next chapter).  
 
In the sample universities, performance management systems significantly shifted academics' 
focus from developing research to producing publications. This shift in focus is labeled by 
sociologists as goal displacement (Merton, 1968) (for a definition of goal displacement, see 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.2), where the means of achieving a goal becomes in itself the goal for 
employees. A FemaleSeniorLect5 expressed her concern about academics’ focus on 
publication as opposed to doing good research, saying: “I think there are quite a few people 
who worry. The focus is too much on publishing and too little on research. In some sense, 
they put the cart before the horse in various ways.” Another MaleLect21 explained why 
myopia occurs in universities. He stated: “I may know that X is the right thing to do, but I 
may choose to do Y because the immediate rewards or the attractiveness of an alternative 
option is higher. That’s what gaming is about, gaming is about making choices based on 
convenience, not significance; based on personal interests, not the interests of the 
organisation, based on immediate results rather than long-term benefit.” Tsui (2013) 
condemned such behaviours, and criticised academics for being motivated to pile up 
publications as opposed to addressing crucial research questions.  
 
In the sample, when academics became exclusively focused on meeting their publication 
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goals, it often meant that the breadth and depth of their research also narrowed. As mentioned 
in the previous sections, some research questions and methodologies do not lend themselves 
to quick publication, and many academics reported having limited the scope of their research 
and/or having abandoned research ideas they believed were important, but would take a long 
time to get published in top journals. A MaleLect13 explained: “If you have a good idea that 
has little chance of being published, the chances of you abandoning that good idea are very 
high because this is the paradox: you can have an academic working on a complex, 
unsolvable problem for many years and because the problem is significant, there is very little 
chance of resolving the issue in ways that can be published. Therefore, the publication game 
forces people to think in terms of publishable problems, so problems that are theorised in a 
way that is consistent with a particular tradition, and using methods that are seen as popular 
in particular journals and by particular groups of scholars. Excessive focus on the output has 
the potential to compromise the quality of input - like the famous saying: you can find 
yourself hitting the target but missing the point.” 
 
In the sample, there was another group of academics who acknowledged that their short-term 
focus on publication was not conducive to good research, and also had a negative impact on 
their contribution to their field, but nonetheless prioritised short-term goals. This was 
illustrated by a MaleRead9 who after working as an academic for 15 years thought that he 
lacked papers he considered contributory or high quality. He said: “I would love to think 
expansively about this intellectual contribution that I'm going to make to the academy and the 
field and think about this big theoretical book that I am going to write. A lot of the time I'm 
thinking about it, but I've got to do my REF return. I've done longitudinal research, collected 
data over a three-year period. I have published at each of the stages of those years material 
from the data I have collected to get publications coming rather than wait for three, four 
years and work on a really really big, good interesting publication that could be a book or 
maybe I could try and work out the best possible paper to craft from that with the theoretical 
contribution. Now that would be lovely to be able to do that, but you can't because you have 
to get your REF return. Therefore, I don't have the big quality pieces of work that I would be 
able to spend three or four years thinking about that would be a big impactful piece of work, 
a good quality piece of work.” In this case, having a short-term attitude enabled the academic 
to reach his short-term goal, but also disadvantaged him in the long run in terms of having 
research outputs he felt were important.  
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6.4 Unintended psychological outcomes of performance management systems 
The chapter has so far presented a typology of the unintended behavioural outcomes of 
performance management systems that emerged from the interview data, but as was apparent 
in some of the quotes listed above, academics' narratives were also imbued with a range of 
emotions or psychological states that they also experienced as a result of performance 
management systems. The goal of the previous section was to identify the unintended 
behavioural outcomes of performance management systems, hence, the quotes presented in 
the earlier section were selected based on their adequacy for explaining the unintended 
behavioural outcomes and not the psychological ones. However, because unintended 
psychological outcomes permeated the interviews and played a large part in influencing the 
occurrence of the unintended behavioural outcomes, this section turns to identifying these 
unintended psychological outcomes, explaining their relationship to performance 
management systems, and why they led to the behavioural unintended outcomes identified in 
this section. These unintended psychological outcomes are explained under the headings of 
cognitive dissonance, feelings of inadequacy, resigned compliance, and self-inflicted 
pressure.  
 
However, before explaining each of these unintended psychological outcomes, academics’ 
psychological reactions to performance management systems are presented. This is because 
the extent to which academics were receptive to performance management systems 
influenced how they affectively responded to performance management systems, and helps to 
explain why the unintended psychological outcomes subsequently occurred.  
 
6.4.1 Psychological reactions to performance management systems: mixed but mostly 
negative  
As shown above, universities used a range of performance management techniques to 
manage academics’ performance. In the sample, 11 out of 65 academics (two lecturers, one 
senior lecturer and eight professors) were supportive of the way their performance was 
managed while the remainder were dissatisfied with the performance management tools used 
to assess their work. The extent to which academics positively viewed performance 
management systems was predicated on the way academics defined their job role, and on the 
extent to which their definition was congruent with the way performance management 
systems assessed their work.  
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For example, with regard to research, academics who believed that the quality of a piece of 
research should be assessed based on the journal in which it was published supported 
performance management systems. They did not think that the implementation of these 
systems posed any additional challenges, or significantly changed the way they normally 
worked. On the contrary, they endorsed these systems because they reinforced their existing 
views about research, and how it should be conducted and rewarded, as explained by a 
FemaleProf18: “They (top journals) would be the ones I would want to be publishing in 
anyway. They were always my aspirational publications well before the REF, well before 
performance management.”  
 
On the other hand, those who were dissatisfied with journal rankings as a means of assessing 
research were highly critical of such an approach. They saw a big disconnect between journal 
rankings and good research, and struggled to positively engage with performance 
management systems as a result. A MaleLect7 expressed his dissatisfaction with performance 
management systems saying: “There's an awful lot of superficiality in research, the same 
stuff. Even papers that are so-called, three or four stars and the rest of it, a lot of them are 
incomprehensible because they’re too narrow, too focused on something that is meaningless. 
Although it’s a controversial point. You know, research is not just about research. It needs to 
have some relevance to the human condition, and I think that's been lost.”  
 
Discussions on the adequacy of performance management systems were not only limited to 
research as academics also very much wrestled with the performance management systems 
related to teaching. Overall, four out of 65 interviewees did not express any major concerns 
about the teaching measures used by their employing university, and were instead supportive 
of them. One of these four academics, who was a MaleProfessor13,  argued: “If you don’t ask 
your customers to evaluate how good you are, who are you going to ask? So, I don’t think 
there's an alternative, so I think teaching scores are a really important part. You have to have 
them.” The remaining 61 academics were to varying degrees perturbed by them. Despite the 
differences in views, all academics welcomed having their teaching measured and receiving 
feedback from students. The area of dispute was, however, on the way their teaching was 
assessed, and on the extent to which it was perceived as appropriate or inappropriate.  
 
As can be seen, performance management systems were viewed differently by different 
academics, but in general, there was an overwhelmingly negative attitude to them. 
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Performance management systems were not only negatively viewed by those whose 
performance fell below the performance standards set by their department, but also by those 
who met or exceeded the expected goals. For example, there were numerous academics who 
had historically done very well in students’ evaluations, had successfully published in highly 
ranked journals and were expected to be entered in the next REF, but who were against 
performance management systems. For them, being able to follow their intellectual curiosity, 
publish in journals they regarded suitable for their topic, and teach students in the way they 
perceived appropriate without being embroiled in performance meetings was of high 
importance. 
 
Of the small percentage of academics who were in favour of the performance management 
systems, most were either academics who saw that the existence of performance management 
systems would enable them to get promoted faster than they would do in their absence, or 
senior academics who had, primarily through extrinsic rewards, greatly benefited from the 
system. This was illustrated by a FemaleProf5 who stated “For me it works out well, but I am 
probably unusual because many people moan about the REF whereas I’ve been a real 
beneficiary of it, I've had a lot of pay rise.” Similarly, a MaleProf13 who endorsed the 
teaching performance management practice reported that he received a teaching prize 
because of his high teaching scores, which probably explains his positive stance on the 
systems.  
 
Cognitive dissonance 
As stated in section 6.3, in order to meet performance management goals, academics 
sometimes engaged in behaviours they regarded as inappropriate. While engaging in those 
behaviours generally brought academics personal gains, doing so also generated a great sense 
of psychological discomfort for them. This was because academics felt that the behaviours 
they exhibited as a consequence of performance management systems were contradictory to 
the appropriate behaviours they thought academics should display.  
 
In the interviews, academics repeatedly questioned what it meant to be an academic, their job 
roles, and the role of academia and universities more broadly. Deliberating on these questions 
typically generated conflicting thoughts in the minds of academics. For example, after 
admitting to having engaged in gaming to meet performance management goals, a 
MaleProf15 explained how his behaviour did not match his beliefs. He said: “Sometimes the 
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way I think about it: what is the university for? What’s the point of a university? What is it 
supposed to do? And I think about that instead of universities being as businesses. Then you 
come up with a completely different set of activities, not completely different but quite 
different that each academic would be doing. What’s the whole endeavour for? Not what 
matters to this university, this department, to this school, to my CV, which is the way it's sort 
of become.” Being faced with performance management systems made certain academics 
even question their identity as academics. For example, a MaleLect7 said: “On the point 
about being involved in setting a goal, you don't. That's completely out of your hands. You 
just get told that you’ve got to do these four star publications regardless of whether you want 
to. It is basically a very black and white system. You're either a high achiever and you're 
getting these four stars and you're a valued researcher or you don’t and therefore you're not a 
researcher, so what are you?” 
 
Considering that performance management systems are supposed to help employees to align 
their goals with organisational goals (Schleicher et al., 2018), the resulting psychological 
conflict that arose from the discrepancy between what academics thought they should be 
doing and their understanding of what their performance management systems were directing 
them to do are considered unintended outcomes of the systems in this thesis. This state of 
psychological conflict is described by social psychologists as cognitive dissonance, a concept 
adopted here to refer to the incompatible cognitions that academics experienced as a reaction 
to performance management systems. Cognitive dissonance is “a state of tension that occurs 
whenever an individual simultaneously holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, 
opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent” (Aronson, 2011:180).  
 
Examples of cognitively dissonant thoughts about both teaching and research were abundant 
in the interviews. For instance, there was a renowned MaleProf25 who worked at one of the 
most prestigious schools of management in the United Kingdom who struggled to explain his 
actions in the interviews and described his behaviour as “a self-fulfilling prophecy”. This 
professor strongly opposed the performance management systems used in his university, 
especially the journal list employed to measure academics’ work, but at the same time, he 
used the journal list to decide where he published his papers. He reported being in a cycle 
where his actions contributed to the occurrence of the outcomes he disliked, which he 
described as self-fulfilling prophecy. He said: “They (journal lists) risk impoverishing 
science, and social sciences in particular at its extreme. They're totalitarian, they're not bad 
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on all counts, but they're bad for most counts…There is a learning mechanism here - but I 
don't know whether it's a learning mechanism - which is called a self-fulfilling prophecy. It’s 
a term created by the American sociologist Robert Merton. So they (his university) are setting 
these journals, so to me, these journals, I adopt them and play to them in order to respond to 
that. And this feeds back on to you and reinforces these journals, which are then sent back to 
me, and I reinforce them with my routines and my behaviour. It's a complex process.” As can 
be seen from this quote, the dissonant cognitions for this academic were: 1) ‘I do not agree 
with the journal list used in my university as the list is damaging research’, and 2) ‘I adopt 
and use the journal list set by my university to publish my work’. 
 
Another example of the cognitively dissonant thoughts experienced by academics was 
indicated by a MaleProf4 with respect to his teaching performance. In the interview, this 
professor reported that he simplified his lecture content, and also tried to please students in 
order to get good evaluation ratings from students. He said: “In terms of teaching I believe 
you shouldn’t tell people only this is Maslow, this is Herzberg, here is a model, we're going to 
do the test. This is a terrible way of teaching, but I feel I can't do anything about that here.” 
The dissonant cognitions for this academic were: 1) ‘I should give students more challenging 
material to learn’, and 2) ‘I dumb down the content of my lectures to please students’.   
 
Feelings of Inadequacy 
One of the most important arguments that proponents of performance management systems 
make against those who detract from the systems is that performance management systems 
enable employees to receive feedback on their performance, which is essential for employees’ 
development (Denisi, 2011). Furthermore, because performance management systems 
involve ongoing interactions between managers and employees with the aim of improving 
employees’ performance, performance management systems are supposed to increase 
employees’ motivation, level of engagement and job satisfaction (Aguinis et al., 2012). 
However, like previous studies (Denisi and Kluger, 2000), this research found that 
performance management systems had negative affective consequences on employees. By 
being repeatedly faced with negative feedback and by not believing in the credibility of 
performance management systems, the systems demotivated academics and impaired their 
sense of self-efficacy, leading to the unintended outcome labelled here as feelings of 
inadequacy. Feelings of inadequacy refers to the sentiment academics had about not being 
good enough or suitable for their job role, and this feeling occurred in the sample universities 
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because academics felt that the goals of performance management systems were difficult, 
unrealistic and did not represent their performance.  
 
Getting the publication outputs was viewed by all interviewees (except one) as a difficult 
activity. Given the high rejection rates in journals, especially in top tier ones, where 
academics had to publish because of their performance management systems, academics’ 
confidence in their ability to do their work had gradually faded. However, apart from finding 
performance management goals inherently difficult, there were other reasons that contributed 
to feelings of inadequacy discussed here.  
 
The first was that academics did not believe in performance management systems because 
they viewed them as arbitrary tools invented by policy makers. Hence, even when, for 
example, academics got their work published in top journals, they did not feel a strong sense 
of achievement because they did not think that having papers in top journals signified good 
performance. A MaleProf6 who was at the time of the interview a head of group explained: “I 
don't feel necessarily comfortable being in a system where there are these arbitrary systems 
in place which are rating research, which I don't necessarily believe in.”  
 
Another reason academics did not believe in performance management systems, and did not 
attribute their performance outcomes to their own efforts was because they thought that for 
both teaching and research, the outcome was beyond their control. While acknowledging that 
effort does not always translate into successful performance outcomes, academics felt that 
they were measured on factors that were beyond their control. For example, in teaching, they 
reported that the outcome very much depended on factors such as the topic of the module 
taught, conditions of teaching rooms, and the quality, number and motivation of students in 
their cohort. A FemaleLect18 explained how academics had limited power in influencing the 
scores saying: “One of the problems with this rating malarkey is that it’s so narrow. It’s about 
the room. What can I do about the estate? It’s about students’ engagement. It’s about their 
previous educational experience. It’s the fact that they’re over-surveyed.”  
 
Hence, when academics had high teaching scores, they partly ascribed those scores to 
favourable external factors, or to their ability to satisfy students rather than to the quality of 
their teaching, which made it more difficult for academics to relate positive performance 
outcomes to their own efforts. For example, a FemaleProf24, who was the course leader of a 
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module that was positively rated by students described her puzzling experience regarding the 
scores she received, saying: “We just experienced a change of 25% in satisfaction in our MSc 
programme, so the university has said well, that’s good practice, so write us a report of what 
you’re doing right. And I want to say, sorry, we’re not doing anything differently from the 
previous year, you know. We’re doing the same. I mean, we’re the same people trying to do 
things as usual...I’m not going to write a report, because I am under no illusion that this 
really reflects anything, any changes in our practices, and I don’t think those numbers 
represent anything.” For these reasons, academics did not derive much satisfaction from 
achieving performance management goals, and because they did not think that doing well in 
performance management terms meant good performance, meeting performance management 
goals did not help them to boost their confidence. Similarly, in research, academics did not 
think that the attainment of their performance outcomes was exclusively related to their input 
as there were numerous factors at play such as how popular a research topic was, the agenda 
of the journals, and the personal preferences of reviewers and editors.  
 
Another reason for feelings of inadequacy among academics was that they thought their 
performance management goals were unrealistic because they had to perform well in many 
areas if they were to be regarded as good performers. However, academics reported being 
unable to meet all their performance gaols, which in turn evoked a sense of being inadequate 
for the job. A FemaleLect18 explained how she felt incapable of meeting all the demands of 
her work saying: “I think I am under pressure for sure because there are so many different 
areas that we need to perform in and that we need to perform in well... It feels like you have 
to be a superman or superwoman to cope with everything, or to be good at everything and no 
one can do that unless you don’t have any life, or unless you have ten research assistants 
helping with stuff.” Another FemaleRead7 expressed her concerns about the workload saying: 
“The pressure that we have on every single front is just ridiculous. It's just ridiculous the 
amount of pressure. It's because you need to be good at everything. You need to be good at 
administration, you need to be good at dealing with students, you need to be good at 
teaching, you need to be good at research, you need to be good at engaging with companies, 
you need to be good at applying for grants and other things, you need to engage with other 
universities and be the external examiner, you need to go for external PhD panels. It's just 
shocking the amount of things that we must be good at.”  
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Certain academics even thought that performance management systems made them doomed 
to fail. A MaleProf25 explained how only a small number of academics were able to cope 
with the performance management systems in his university saying: “The department of 
management has been built about X (number of years deleted) years approximately, and a lot 
of people have been kicked out because they didn't manage the publications. People try to do 
their best, some of them succeed, the minority will manage, the overwhelming majority will 
fail.” Similarly, a reader discussed how 95% struggled to deal with performance management 
demands. She said: “Only a small percentage manages to get there. I don’t know if it's 10% - 
I doubt it - probably we are talking 5% and that doesn't mean that the remaining 95% don't 
have the skills or don't produce good work. I see myself very much in that 95% at the 
moment.” 
 
A MaleLect7 who felt that performance management systems set very high standards for 
early career researchers expressed the view that those responsible for such systems were 
inconsiderate to junior academics. He said: “I just think that the people that created it (the 
REF) should be shot; they are designing a system that is so demoralising, so unsustainable, 
so obvious. It's a system guaranteed to make people feel awful. It makes you just feel kind of 
why?, what’s the point in it?, because it just continuously makes you feel bad about yourself.” 
 
Resigned compliance 
Performance management systems are typically employed by organisations on the basis that 
they enable employees to be more engaged with organisational activities because when 
employees support the overall mission of their organisation, and are able to identify with their 
organisational activities, they become more motivated to perform and contribute to their 
organisational performance (Schleicher et al., 2018). 
 
In the sample universities, performance management systems did not motivate academics in 
this manner because while they propelled academics to meet performance management goals, 
they failed to inculcate organisational goals in employees. As mentioned earlier in this 
section, academics did not believe in performance management systems, which indicates that 
performance management systems were unable to achieve their intended goal of encouraging 
employees to be committed to organisational goals. For instance, a MaleProf8 explained how 
not believing in performance management systems made it difficult for him to commit to 
performance management systems. He said: “I would find it easier if I thought this is 
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important, this is contributory, this is really making a difference to the world, to the world of 
science, to the world of research, to the academic world. But when I think of it, it’s just 
bullshit, so it’s hard to feel committed to it.” 
 
In the sample universities, the reason many academics were motivated to meet performance 
management goals was not because they saw value in performance management systems, but 
because they felt obliged to do so. These academics felt very much disempowered by 
performance management systems. They more or less accepted the status quo, and focused on 
providing what their university demanded. These kinds of psychological responses are 
labelled as resigned compliance, and are considered as unintended outcomes of performance 
management systems here. This is because the goal of performance management systems is 
to have motivated committed employees (Schleicher et al., 2018), and not resigned complaint 
ones. Resigned compliance refers to instances when academics went along with performance 
management goals while having little or no confidence in the system. This quote from a 
FemaleLect1 is illustrative. She said: “I’m against performance evaluations, but on the other 
hand, this is a reality, they are there. So you have to find a way to deal with them.”  
 
Displaying a resigned compliant attitude helped academics to cope with performance 
management systems, and they did so in different ways. For example, there were those who 
accepted the situation, devoting less energy to focusing on the inadequacy of the system, and 
more on ensuring that they ticked the boxes by which they were measured. They said that 
they published in certain top tier journals because they felt it was incumbent on them to do 
so. However, they did not think that the work they published in those journals made 
meaningful contributions to their field, nor did they consider it to be any better than what 
they published elsewhere. A MaleProf17 who actively resisted performance management 
systems lamented the compliant attitude of academics in his university, saying: “So what do 
academics do? They moan. That’s it. And there are very few who have the courage to stand 
up and say no more.” 
 
For other academics, engaging in resigned compliance did not help them to overlook the 
inadequacies of the system, but instead gave rise of an assortment of negative psychological 
reactions such as stress, frustration and loss of purpose. However, academics who 
experienced these negative reactions also managed to find ways to comfort themselves by, for 
example, considering other work opportunities outside academia, changing universities, or 
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moving to teaching contracts they had long fought to avoid. This point is illustrated by a 
FemaleLect12 who described herself as having experienced six years of mental anguish 
before starting to adopt a careless attitude, and contemplating different career prospects. She 
said: “Actually, I am relaxed. I was worried this time last year and I was worried in October, 
but now it's more clear that I'm not getting tenure, so my detention has passed and I am 
preparing for a change. I don't know what the change will be but it's definitely better than 
being in this limbo of not knowing where I stand, whether they will kick me out or keep me in 
the group, so it's okay now.” Another FemaleLect8 expressed her regret about having joined 
academia, and spoke of her intention to go into industry, stating: “I feel slightly conned to be 
honest with you. I came into this profession because I thought we would have a better 
work/life balance. Probably in a naïve way, but I thought that academics have more 
freedom…I actually used that as one of the key reasons for not going into the practitioner 
side of things, which is why increasingly now I am kind of reconsidering if I want to move 
back into the more corporate side of things.”  
 
Self-inflicted pressure 
Performance management systems are one of the important human resource management 
tools used by organisations to instill organisational values in employees (Den Hartog et al., 
2004). For example, Hofstetter and Harpaz (2015) argued that performance appraisals are one 
of the tools used by organisations that reflect organisational culture to employees. In the 
sample universities, performance management systems were successful at communicating to 
academics that they were expected to perform well in terms of performance metrics. As a 
FemaleRead8 stated: “You know, if you work here, it's a Russell Group University. We’re one 
of the best research departments in the country and also you know what you’ve got to do.”  
 
By being repeatedly reminded about their performance metrics via their performance 
management systems, over time, academics internalised the systems. They became very alert 
to their performance, and the way it was judged against performance management systems. 
For example, there were some academics who met or even exceeded performance 
management goals, but like academics who fell short of the goals, experienced a high degree 
of pressure and anxiety. In this thesis, these kinds of reactions are labelled as self-inflicted 
pressure and categorised as unintended outcomes. While performance management systems 
strive to intrinsically motivate employees to work harder (Armstrong and Baron, 1998), for 
many academics, self-inflicted pressure was experienced as distress. A MaleRead9 described 
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how he agonised over his performance at four o’clock in the morning on the day the 
interview was conducted, although this academic also stated at the beginning of the interview 
that he was on track to meet his performance goals. He said: “Last night at four o’clock in the 
morning I was thinking about my REF return. As an academic, you internalise everything in 
terms of long-term goals and research output… I'm always under pressure, you always feel it, 
it's always hanging over you in our job.” Self-inflicted pressure was not normally caused by 
imminent performance management threats, but by many other factors (explained below in 
section 6.5 under the heading of ‘the relationship between self-inflicted pressure and 
unintended behavioural outcomes’). A MaleLect7 explained: “The problem is that you can't 
stop and stand still and then wait for six months and then start up a new idea. You’ve got to 
continuously do stuff, so in a sense, it feels like a continuous cycle of pressure, really, and 
part of it's self-inflicted. I can’t just say ‘no I don’t want to do it’, I'll just not publish and not 
get promoted.”  
 
Considering that performance management systems, like any human resource management 
practice, are supposed to enhance employees’ well-being and not the opposite (Guest, 2002), 
the self-inflicted pressure caused by performance management systems is considered an 
unintended outcome of the system. In the interviews, being under pressure was frequently 
used by academics as a justification for engaging in behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems. The reasons self-inflicted pressure occurred in the sample universities 
are discussed below in section 6.5 under the heading of ‘the relationship between self-
inflicted pressure and unintended behavioural outcomes’ because this helps to explain why 
self-inflicted pressure led to the above noted unintended behavioural outcomes. 
 
6.5 The relationship between the unintended psychological and behavioural outcomes  
This section discusses how each of the above unintended psychological outcomes encouraged 
academics to engage in the unintended behavioural outcomes previously presented. 
 
The relationship between cognitive dissonance and unintended behavioural outcomes 
Cognitive dissonance led to the above unintended behavioural outcomes in the sample 
universities because as stated by Festinger (1957), cognitive dissonance creates psychological 
tension that motivates individuals to seek cognitive consistency. For example, where an 
individual holds two conflicting ideas, cognitive consistency is achieved by altering one of 
the ideas so that it is more aligned with the other (Aronson, 2011). In the sample universities, 
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academics reduced their cognitive dissonance in two ways. Either they brought their 
cognitions closer to their behaviour and engaged in behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems, or they brought their behaviour closer to their cognition 
and refrained from engaging in behaviours not intended by their performance management 
systems (the ways academics refrained from behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems are discussed in Chapter 7 section 7.4). 
 
The following quote illustrates how a MaleProf15 who reported engaging in behaviours not 
intended by their performance management systems reached cognitive consistency. He said: 
“Everybody does gaming. The only people who don’t do it don’t have academic jobs any 
more. I think some level of gaming if you want to be even half successful, you're going to have 
to do it.” The conflict for this professor was between the idea that gaming is wrong and the 
idea that he engages in gaming. He achieved cognitive consistency by convincing himself 
that gaming is a necessary and not an optional activity in which academics must engage, so 
the idea that ‘I am an academic’ and ‘I game the system’ not only become harmonious but 
also causal: in order to be an academic, I need to engage in gaming. Moreover, by stating that 
everyone does gaming, the academic further legitimised his actions. Likewise, when 
academics compromised their teaching in favour of research, they engaged in a similar 
thinking process. This process enabled them to justify thoughts such as ‘I don’t pay enough 
attention to students’ by also thinking that ‘only research outputs matter to my university’, 
thereby achieving psychological consistency.  
 
Overall, when academics expressed cognitively dissonant thoughts in the interviews, they 
frequently mentioned performance management systems in their subsequent discussions. 
Referring to performance management systems was generally an effective tool that lessened 
the dissonance academics experienced. This was because academics considered that their 
behaviour was a consequence of performance management systems, and that they were 
simply trying to produce outcomes they were asked to attain. Hence, although cognitive 
dissonance created some psychological disturbance for academics, performance management 
systems enabled them to find arguments that helped to restore their cognitive consistency. 
However, doing so meant that academics no longer faced much of a psychological dilemma 
that could prevent them from engaging in the previously discussed behaviours not intended 
by their performance management systems, and instead perpetuated these behaviours. 
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Performance management systems also generated psychological conflict in academics who 
did not report engaging in gaming. These academics observed the behaviour of their 
colleagues who, according to performance management systems, were successful academics, 
but they did not think that their colleagues’ behaviour corresponded with the behaviour they 
thought successful academics should exhibit. This was illustrated by a MaleLect20 whose 
conflict was between wanting to become a professor and not wanting only to have to focus on 
publications in order to achieve this. He said: “If you want to become a professor, it's only 
about publication, it's not about impact, it's not about PhD supervision, it's not about 
teaching, or whatever activities that you do. So I think with this very focused performance 
measurement what you also get is very young professors who are extremely narrowly focused, 
maybe also do not have a lot of experience in life in general, and my idea of a professor is 
more like a rounded job - it’s not only about publishing, it's also about teaching, it's also 
about many other things.” 
 
The relationship between feelings of inadequacy and unintended behavioural outcomes 
Feelings of inadequacy led to unintended behavioural outcomes because academics felt 
unable to meet their performance management demands. When they felt inadequate, they 
engaged in the behaviours not intended by their performance management systems identified 
earlier as a way of overcoming their performance difficulties. For example, a MaleProf9 
explained how engaging in what is described as collusive alliances in section 6.3 was the 
result of academics finding their goals difficult to achieve, so this behaviour was seen as a 
solution to the difficulties they experienced. He stated: “You get this game playing around 
publication groups, you basically just put each other’s name on papers and stuff like that, 
that’s again playing. And that’s a reflection of the fact that it's difficult. It was difficult for the 
last REF, and it's even harder now because all the rejection rates are going up. It was hard 
and it's getting harder.”  
 
As mentioned above, in addition to academics finding performance management goals 
difficult, they also found them unrealistic. However, while having what was seen as 
unrealistic goals generated much frustration for academics, it also enabled them to justify the 
previously noted behaviours in which they engaged and convince themselves that their 
performance management goals were more manageable if they engaged in those behaviours.  
 
Overall, when academics felt that they were inadequate for the job, they engaged in the 
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behaviours categorised as unintended in this thesis in order to retain their positions, or save 
themselves from facing undesirable consequences that could be engendered following poor 
performance evaluations. Furthermore, as academics had little confidence in being able to 
meet performance goals, they searched for other means to meet their goals that were not 
exclusively dependent on competency in performance management tasks, but also dependent 
on, for example, how well they were able to game the system or able to allocate their efforts 
to tasks that brought them the most gains.  
 
The relationship between resigned compliance and unintended behavioural outcomes 
Resigned compliance led to unintended behavioural outcomes because when academics 
experienced this and behaved accordingly, their motivation to do good research and teaching 
drastically diminished. As academics realised that they had little power to challenge 
performance management systems, they yielded to the systems by containing or discarding 
their negative thoughts about the systems and psychologically detaching themselves from 
their job roles. As explained by a FemaleRead8: “You've got to be focused but also be a bit 
detached, because otherwise I think you'd go mad... I'm just more cynical, because every time 
we're told to do something to put up our NSS scores, you think, well we tried that ten years 
ago, it didn't work. So here we are trying it again. And you just don't say anything. You just 
get on with it really. There's no point.” Another FemaleRead7 explained how she gave up her 
vocational goals, ensured that she met performance management goals and stopped caring 
about achieving other educational outcomes, saying: “I think I try to be much more light-
hearted than I would be in normal circumstances. I think my mechanism is to just not care. I 
think that's the consequence, it's just not caring.” 
 
Resigned compliance very much explained the existence of the unintended behavioural 
outcomes noted above because by becoming psychologically detached from their work, 
academics put aside personal values that could have deterred them from engaging in 
inappropriate conduct (Bandura, 2012). For example, a MaleProf25 explained how he 
managed to engage in behaviours he strongly condemned by focusing on performance 
management systems and becoming detached from his values. He said: "You sidestep what 
you think your obligation is, and your real calling in this profession, you sidestep it; and you 
learn to liaise and write in ways that would go into the journal publications. All of this for me 
is not 100% bad learning, but to a considerable degree it's a negative and not a positive 
game. It does have some positive things that you shouldn’t rule out, but overall it's rather 
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negative in my view. And this is something which I have learned: irrespective of the essence 
or depth or social relevance which my work might have and which is the thing that matters 
for me, the relevance, the integrity, its depth, so I sidestep this just to package my article in 
legitimate ways that give it the better chance of being published.” This way of reasoning is 
described by Bandura (2012) as moral disengagement: individuals morally disengage 
themselves from appropriate forms of conduct in a way that eases their qualms about 
engaging in inappropriate conduct. 
 
Furthermore, by accepting performance management systems and conforming to them, 
academics took away responsibility from themselves and attributed it to performance 
management systems. In other words, when academics engaged in the behaviours noted 
above as not intended by performance management systems, they did not feel a strong sense 
of accountability, and instead blamed performance management systems. This shift in the 
causal explanations of individuals’ actions is explained by attribution theory (Cima et al., 
2007). Attribution theory identifies two kinds of causes: internal and external, where in the 
former, individuals ascribe the cause of their actions to themselves, and in the latter, 
individuals ascribe the cause of their actions to external factors (Gudjonsson, 1984). The way 
individuals interpret the causes of their behaviour plays a significant part in the way they 
rationalise their behaviour (Kelley and Michela, 1980).  
 
In the interviews, many academics thought that the causes of the behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems were located in the external environment (i.e., 
performance management systems). As a FemaleLect2 stated: “I don't necessarily always 
blame the individual because the system has created the problem; I think if the system wasn’t 
so harsh, people wouldn't necessarily engage in that… It becomes playing the game, it's 
about playing the game and I think the system rewards and promotes those kinds of negative 
qualities, and that's where the root of the problem is. It's the system I think; not people as 
individuals.” By denying responsibility and placing it on performance management systems, 
academics did not feel a strong sense of guilt, continuing to rationalise their actions and 
engage in the above behaviours not intended by their performance management systems. This 
quote from a FemaleLect15 further illustrates this point: “I think some journals that are four-
star publish a lot of rubbish research. In my opinion, they're not always the best journals to 
get four stars. But, you know, that's just how the system is and you have to play the game." 
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The relationship between self-inflicted pressure and unintended behavioural outcomes 
Self-inflicted pressure led to the above unintended behavioural outcomes for various reasons. 
These reasons primarily depended on a) the extent to which academics internalised 
performance management systems, b) the personal motivation of academics, and c) 
academics’ perceived threats posed by performance management systems. 
 
Considering that the sample universities had high performance expectations for their 
academics, academics also strongly internalised these expectations and imposed high 
performance standards on themselves. Despite some academics having reservations about 
performance management systems (which are discussed at the beginning of the chapter), they 
still aspired to score highly in performance management systems. Hence, while these 
academics were motivated to meet performance management goals, they were also equally 
motivated to exceed their goals, constantly putting themselves under pressure to better 
perform.  
 
The motivation of these academics was generally driven by the desire to gain extrinsic 
rewards, build or maintain a reputation that could easily be tainted by poor performance 
ratings in their department, and the perceived threats posed by performance management 
systems to their career.  
 
With regard to extrinsic rewards, some academics strove to do well in performance 
management systems so that they could use their performance outputs as a medium for 
getting promoted or commanding higher salaries in their universities. A MaleLect4, who 
exceeded his goals for the REF explained how, following his high performance outputs, he 
intended to demand a salary increase from his university. He said: “I'll compare my 
performance to the (performance) criteria and I think in terms of market value, then I think I 
should have higher market value than others. And I want to kind of have that market value in 
the school by raising my salary. So you can say that's a good or negative influence. I don’t 
know. Maybe you can say that's a good influence because it keeps me motivated. But that 
would be a negative influence for the university when they want to manage researchers in the 
school because the researchers may always use this as a criterion to request salary increases. 
I don’t know whether that’s a good or bad thing, but that’s how the system influences me. 
Because I would say, okay four (papers) is enough and now I have more than four (papers), 
then you should give me more.”  
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Some academics used their performance management outputs to get promoted in their 
university within short periods of time. Because performance management systems specified 
low, average and high performance, these academics believed that they would progress faster 
if they achieved high performance. Hence, they became eager to do so. This quote from a 
MaleLect16 who, when interviewed, had been recruited six months earlier by his university is 
illustrative: “I want to become a senior lecturer faster, so if I was just doing the three 
(papers), which is the minimum then it’s like well, this is another guy who has got ten 
(papers), so there you go. So no, what I'm trying to do, I'm trying to be as productive as 
possible. It’s not because I've reached my goals and now I just chill. No, I want to do as many 
as I can.” Similarly, a MaleRead4 (associate professor who recently successfully passed his 
probation) explained: “I'm an early career researcher, I'm 35 years old. If I'm going to 
publish five papers per five years, then it's going to take me a long time to get a full 
professorship in a good school, so for me it's important to publish as much as I can at the 
highest level that I can with good people, so I think it's a no-brainer to over perform.”  
 
A MaleProf22 criticised junior academics for being in a hurry to get promoted and attributed 
this to performance management systems. He said: “My impression of more junior colleagues 
these days is that a lot of them are in much more of a hurry than they previously were to get 
promoted. You know, a lot of young people are in a hurry, which again, might be related to 
performance management because if you're good at it, you know, if you're getting research 
income and if you're publishing, going back to the issue of rewards, you're more likely to get 
promoted. And so those are the things that are being encouraged.” 
   
For other academics, reputation was a key motivator and this mostly applied to professors. 
Because performance management systems assessed academics’ performance on a regular 
basis, academics’ recent performance was made visible to everyone in their department. For 
example, many universities made teaching performance scores available online for all the 
department/school members to access, and in terms of research, the REF raised academics’ 
research performance to the surface by segregating academics who participated in the REF 
from those who did not. In so doing, academics, particularly professors, felt it was incumbent 
on them to do well in performance management systems in order to maintain or build their 
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reputation in their department6. As a MaleProf17 stated: “Your reputation is very important, 
so defending your reputation, being conscious how your reputation can be undermined is a 
reality. And that's the other side of interest - defending your reputation and wondering 
whether you're going to get a bad name. It's an important issue.” Hence, when academics 
reached a high level of seniority in their department, they faced the added pressure of keeping 
their reputation by performing in ways that was commensurate with their position. 
 
The other motivation is linked but different from the two just mentioned because it relates to 
the perceived threats of job insecurity inflicted by performance management systems. By 
being subjected to constant performance reviews and assessment checks, not only academics 
who were on probation but also those who had more permanent positions felt that their jobs 
were insecure, and experienced a great sense of anxiety and pressure. In order to counteract 
these feelings, they strove to perform as highly as they could. A MaleProf22 head of group 
explained how such feelings were prevalent in his group. He said: “This is a very high 
performance environment at (name of the university removed), without a shadow of a doubt. 
But the thing is that we have a slight problem here, that a lot of people here feel insecure, 
insecure in their performance and performance ratings. And I picked up on this, and said: 
look, there are number of people in the academic category who say they feel their job is 
insecure.” 
 
As can be seen, self-inflicted pressure resulted from a number of motivations. These 
motivations were positive in the sense that they kept academics motivated to perform. 
However, they also encouraged them to engage in the behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems discussed in the earlier sections because by feeling under 
pressure to do well in performance management systems, academics were encouraged to 
engage in such behaviours.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter started by describing the main performance management practices used by the 
sampled universities that were found to have led to unintended outcomes. The way these 
 
6 Academics were also concerned about their reputation outside their department. However, because this is an 
issue not directly linked to the performance management systems internally used by universities, this point is not 
discussed in the thesis.  
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practices were perceived by academics was also explained. Subsequently, the unintended 
behavioural outcomes together with unintended psychological outcomes were individually 
discussed. Following this, the relationship between the unintended psychological and 
behavioural outcomes was presented and a conclusion was then provided.  
 
Having illustrated the unintended outcomes that resulted from performance management 
systems, the thesis now turns to explaining how the behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems discussed in this chapter were learned by academics, and what 
motivated academics in the sample to perform the learned behaviours. 
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Chapter	7:	The	way	behaviours	not	intended	by	performance	management	systems	are	learned	and	practised	in	universities:	A	social	learning	perspective	
7.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter answered the first research question of the thesis. It started by 
illustrating how performance management systems were implemented in the sampled 
universities and the way they were perceived by academics. Following this, the chapter 
presented the unintended behavioural psychological outcomes that emerged from 
performance management systems.  
 
This chapter addresses the second research question of the thesis by demonstrating how the 
unintended behavioural outcomes presented in the preceding chapter were learned by 
academics and disseminated in the sampled universities. In Chapter 4, I provided a 
provisional analysis of how different behaviours are socially learned by individuals in 
organisations, and I used social learning theory to suggest that behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems can be socially learned by employees at work. In this 
chapter, I start by examining the main ways participants reported having socially learned 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems together with my own analysis 
of other ways these behaviours appeared to have been learned by academics which did not 
directly rely on social learning. Following this, as academics in the sample did not necessarily 
perform all the behaviours they learned, the chapter explains what motivated academics to 
engage or not engage in behaviours not intended by performance management systems. Then, 
the chapter illustrates how such behaviours were disseminated in the sampled universities and 
finishes with a conclusion. 
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7.1 The role of social learning in performance management systems  
As noted in the previous chapter, academics generally agreed that performance management 
systems provided some clarity and guidance as to what goals they were expected to achieve. 
As a result, most academics in the sample tended broadly to know the steps they needed to 
take to advance their career. However, while performance management systems played an 
important role in enabling academics to understand the way their universities managed their 
performance, they did not provide academics with all the information they needed about the 
way their universities assessed their work. Hence, to better understand the performance 
standards of their universities, academics did not only rely on the information provided 
through performance management systems, but also on the information they gathered from 
their social environment. As explained in the previous chapter, considering that to meet their 
performance goals, academics displayed various behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems, when academics attended to their social environment they 
also learned these behaviours from others. In so doing, academics became aware of the 
various strategies that could help them to do well in performance management systems. 
 
The social context also helped academics to meet their performance goals by encouraging 
them to compare their performance to their colleagues. When they did so, academics became 
aware of their performance gaps and what they needed to do to improve their performance. 
Performance management systems provided academics with specific performance goals and 
as a result, they enabled academics to self-assess their performance based on their 
understanding of performance management goals and compare it to that of their colleagues.  
 
However, when academics benchmarked their performance against others, they did not 
always understand how theirs or their colleagues’ performance was assessed. This was 
because although performance management systems set standards for academics to meet, it 
seemed that universities were not only using these standards but also other criteria in 
assessing academics’ performance, about which many academics were unclear.  
 
Hence, when academics used these standards to compare their performance they did not 
always understand the relationship between performance management and performance 
outcomes. A FemaleLect10 who after comparing her performance to a colleague who bought 
herself out of her teaching responsibilities stated: “We have a colleague recently who has 
managed to get out of all her teaching duties because she's got some kind of funding. And I'm 
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like what kind of funding is this? We don't even know how much it is and where she got this 
funding from. How come she doesn't have to do any teaching when we have funded projects 
too? So there are these things that you don't know and it's not clear what admin everyone is 
doing.” A MaleSeniorLect8 lecturer also explained how academics in his institution were 
unsure about the level of performance needed to get a promotion because while the university 
set a specific number of papers that academics needed to reach, the university remained 
vague about the quality standards papers needed to reach to qualify academics for a 
promotion: “There were things like to get to a senior lecturer, you have to have at least four 
up to eight articles and then they put underneath it quality over quantity will be used. So I 
think it makes people worried that they have to get eight articles and they have to all be 
really good quality in the top journals, but I kind of read it as different that you can have 
eight, but you could have five and if some of them are in really good journals, then that might 
be enough, so there is a lot of interpretation, so there is still some ambiguity in them.”  
 
In situations like these, academics’ understanding of performance management systems 
became based on both the official line and their own social understanding of how to work 
within performance management systems. Sometimes these two were complementary in the 
sense that performance management requirements were consistent with what academics 
observed others do. Other times, academics’ tacit social understanding of performance 
management systems ran counter to official policy. An example of this was when universities 
claimed in their official communications their commitment to both teaching and research, but 
academics observed that in practice, their universities were more committed to publications 
and less to teaching. 
 
In this sense, the information and social cues academics received from their social context 
played a significant role in shaping their views about their job role, and strongly affected their 
subsequent behaviour. A MaleProf10 explained: “What people observe and what they hear 
from their colleagues, then it hugely influences the way people understand the system. I 
would say that is the strongest kind of factor influencing how people understand the system 
and the formal communications kind of come second.” The importance of being alert to the 
social context was explained by a FemaleProf12 who stated that the way universities are run 
necessitates academics using their social context for information: “In an environment like 
higher education, and obviously I've been in it for a long time, just about all the learning for 
me has been informal because very little is written down, so it's a very strange 
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environment…unlike working in the private sector, where you get properly inducted and there 
are systems and protocols, there is nothing like this here.” 
 
Overall, social learning was thought to have helped participants develop themselves as they 
were able to acquire many useful skills from other academics that made important 
improvements to their performance, but the caveat was that behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems were also informally learned by and to some extent 
normalised among academics in universities. The main ways in which this learning occurred 
are presented below in the order of observational learning, verbal communication, and self-
discovery (see Table 7.1). Observational learning and verbal communication are among the 
important ways suggested by social learning theory that enable individuals to learn 
behaviours in their social environment (Bandura, 1977). Self-discovery, on the other hand, 
has not been addressed by social learning theory, but has been discussed by goal setting 
theory, particularly with regard to people devising strategies in the face of challenging tasks 
(Locke and Latham, 2013).  
 
Before discussing how academics in the sample learned behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems, an important distinction to make is that the goal of the 
next section is to explain how academics learned/became aware of the such behaviours 
performed by academics in response to performance management systems. Some academics 
reported personally engaging in the behaviours they discussed and others did not. In social 
learning theory, as explained in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2, there is a difference between 
learning and performing an action. Individuals learn various behaviours, but learning a 
behaviour does not automatically mean that individuals will perform the learned behaviour 
(Bandura, 1977). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
191 
7.2 Mechanisms through which academics learn behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems 
 
Table 7.1: The way academics learned behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems7 
First-order codes Second-order themes 
Observing others engaging in behaviours 
not intended by performance management 
systems 
Observing academics being rewarded after 
engaging in behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems 
Observing academics being penalised for 
not meeting performance management goals 
Observational learning 
Academics having conversations about 
behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems 
Academics giving/receiving advice to 
engage in behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems 
Verbal communication 
Guessing the behaviours that led to other 
academics achieving positive performance 
results 
Individually devising strategies that lead to 
meeting performance management goals  
Self-discovery 
 
7.2.1 Observational learning 
Academics reported having learned behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems by observing what was happening around them. Typically, academics learned 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems by observing other academics 
 
7 Observational learning and verbal communication are social learning mechanisms. Self-discovery is unrelated 
to social learning theory, but was found to be an important way in which academics learned behaviours not 
intended by their performance management systems. 
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performing such behaviours and observing the rewards and penalties enforced by universities 
on academics following certain performance outcomes. These ways of learning are called 
here observational learning (Bandura, 1977). 
 
Observing other academics performance behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems 
There were academics who reported having directly observed other academics engaging in 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems. It typically happened 
accidentally when academics simply found themselves faced with a situation where they 
observed other academics performing such behaviours. For example, a FemaleLect14 
explained how she became aware of what her colleague did to increase her teaching scores 
from students: “I saw one of my colleagues and I find it quite funny.  She sent them (students) 
customised cards before the performance appraisal and she did it online. I was, like, why? In 
the beginning I thought it's cute, but when I found it's because of the performance appraisal I 
was, like, yes, that's disgusting, honestly.” A FemaleProf5 also stated that by attending her 
colleague’s class she discovered a way that the colleague tried to keep students entertained 
and achieve high teaching grades: “I was running a module and I had to cover somebody and 
see his lecture. And the students loved him, and a lot of it was video clips, a lot of it wasn’t 
even that relevant to what he was talking about, so I think that's the issue. It does discourage 
us from being challenging and stretching people really. There is a danger: let’s keep people 
amused and entertained rather than aiming for education. So that's a big problem. The 
indicators are really blunt so everyone knows how to get around them.”  
 
Academics not only directly observed behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems related to teaching but also to research. A FemaleLect11 explained how she learned 
one of the ways academics increased their publication numbers saying: “I think one thing that 
I have seen others do that I have not done is like just cranking out incremental things that get 
you lots of publications, but maybe you don't feel as attached to it yourself or it's not 
contributing as much to your area of research.”  
 
Unlike in many other types of work where employees have daily interactions with their co-
workers, academics generally worked in their own private spaces (for example, their own 
office or at home). In spite of this, it was informative to find that academics still learned a 
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host of behaviours not intended by performance management systems simply through the 
occasional observations they made.  
 
Observing rewards, absence of rewards and penalties  
As noted earlier in this chapter, the official line did not always reflect what academics 
socially learned, and so academics did not only rely on the official line to make decisions 
about the way they interacted with performance management systems. One important reason 
for their reliance on the social context was their observations of the way their university 
allocated rewards, deprived academics of rewards and/or imposed penalties. By observing the 
way their university responded to various performance outcomes, academics learned various 
behaviours not intended by their performance management systems as a response to the 
systems. 
 
Returning to the example of instrumental effort allocation discussed in Chapter 6, a 
MaleLect16 who admitted to focusing on research at the expense of other activities stated 
how his observations of the way his colleagues were treated by his university led him to make 
such a decision. He said: “I've seen people organising all these events and things, which is 
good for students’ experience, and they may get good ratings in the NSS survey, but I see very 
little impact on progression in doing all that. Unless you're on a teaching contract, that’s 
different, but if you're on a teaching and research contract, it seems that it should be called 
just research or something, because it’s the only thing that matters. So yes, taking on too 
many things that don’t count towards your progression, that’s a bad practice that I would try 
to avoid at any cost.” 
 
Academics did not only observe other academics whose promotion was denied despite much 
effort to contribute to their departments through activities other than research. They also 
observed academics who were penalised for not meeting the publication standards set by their 
university. A FemaleSeniorLect5 explained how her university, in her words, punished 
academics through a yearly research exercise that the university did to measure academics’ 
progress towards the REF. She said: “One of the things (name of university removed) has 
done for the research exercise (name of the research exercise removed) - if I'm not seen to be 
performing at three star level, then you are being prevented from doing any additional work. 
Part of our job role is if we are up to our workload, then we choose to do additional teaching, 
for example executive education, or MBA teaching, then we get paid for that teaching on top 
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of our salary. If we choose to, we don't have to, but we can choose to, but one of the things 
they've done recently is that they've determined that if you don't perform to an adequate 
standard in the research exercise, they're not going to allow you to do any additional 
teaching, so there's this kind of almost a punishment really for not publishing quickly.” 
 
Other forms of penalties included changing academics' contracts from research and teaching 
to teaching only contracts, or retaining the same contract but with a dramatic increase in 
teaching and administration loads, and/or having to attend underperformance meetings with 
managers. In three universities, academics reported that they were told by their university that 
those who were not going to be entered into the next REF would no longer have the 
possibility of switching their contact from research and teaching to a teaching only contract in 
the future, but could have their employment contract terminated with the university. A 
FemaleLect8 explained: “The university here sent this really interesting email where they 
basically started congratulating us on doing such a great job so far and performing so well 
and kind of meeting the REF requirements from the last round. And then kind of wove in the 
fact that we’re introducing new performance management systems and people who don’t 
comply, there’s going to be on a capability procedure, which is a very serious thing to 
highlight basically. Because that essentially means if you don’t kind of meet your 
requirements we’re going to put you on probation and, you know, we all know what capability 
procedure means…when you use the words capability procedure you’re very much 
introducing the conversation that could eventually lead to termination.” 
 
Despite the importance that universities placed on research, there was a small number of 
academics who did not report having focused on research over other duties to meet their 
research goals for reasons explained below in section 7.4.  Most of these academics thought 
that their performance management regime went against the interests of students as it 
overwhelmingly rewarded research. In fact, some of them reported that not performing well 
in teaching was even indirectly rewarded in their institution. This was because, as a 
MaleLect5 stated, academics who performed well in research and not in teaching were 
allocated less teaching duties and spared more time for research, which he regarded as a 
reward in itself. He explained: “This is something that I constantly complain about is that bad 
teaching normally gets rewarded. How? Bad teachers get less teaching. Right? So they get 
more time to do research because of the fame of the university and the reputation, so they get 
less teaching and probably they do more admin stuff. As a result of that, the better teachers 
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have to carry on the heavier load of teaching. So being a good teacher would end up with not 
much incentives and rewards, at the same time being 'rewarded' by a heavier load of teaching 
because you teach well. In contrast, let’s say the worst teachers, they get less teaching and 
they get more time for doing research, and as a result they get probably better publications, 
and as a result they get promoted faster than the good teachers.”  
 
In view of the reward structure in universities, a FemaleSeniorLect4 recommended that 
universities be more transparent with academics in their official communication channels 
about the way their work is compensated. She said: “There's a lot of noise that adds to 
uncertainty. I think universities would be much better served if they just said you need to 
publish, I mean, you can’t be a bad teacher, there is a minimum, but you have to publish, 
period, that’s it. So if you want to use your time on something, use it on publishing. I think it's 
very straightforward.”  
 
7.2.2 Verbal communication 
Academics had different opportunities for face-to-face interactions with other academics. 
Some of these interactions were in formal performance management meetings, others were 
less structured as they took place informally between academics. Through these interactions, 
academics verbally exchanged information about their own or others’ behaviours in response 
to performance management systems, enabling them to learn behaviours not intended by the 
performance management systems. Academics learned such behaviours from various groups 
of other academics including colleagues of similar seniority levels, more senior professors, 
co-authors, mentors and managers.   
 
Academics had different motives for sharing with others behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems. For example, as most academics in the sample opposed 
performance management systems, some of them, in their own ways, resisted the systems in 
order to buffer the damage they thought the systems were inflicting on academics. For 
instance, there were academics, especially more senior or more experienced ones, who felt 
that the current performance management systems were unjust, harsh, and inconsiderate of 
junior academics. Therefore, they felt that it was incumbent on them to support junior 
academics, for example, by giving advice and sharing with them behaviours not intended by 
their performance management systems in order to spare them possible unpleasant 
experiences with the systems. A FemaleRead1 explained: “I try whenever with more junior 
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colleagues, I try to give them quite a lot of time and tell them things that I didn’t know and 
make them feel that it's okay not to know them and it's quite normal not to know them. I also 
try to encourage people not to work so hard, not to be hard on themselves and I try to give 
people advice about how you can play the game, how you can do that and get into a position 
that's stable or permanent while not completely undermining your self-confidence or not 
leaving you with any time.” 
 
There were other senior academics acting both as appraisers and heads of group who at times 
also shared behaviours not intended by their performance management systems with their 
academics because they personally benefitted from having high performing employees in 
their groups. For example, there was a MaleProf11 who said: “I keep saying (to academics in 
his group), you'll be told many things. Just keep your head down, concentrate on writing in 
the early years. That's very, very important. At least, the couple of papers through which 
you'll be known, and you're just coming out of your PhD, and this is the most productive time 
in your life. Be selfish. Don't allow anybody to take it away from you.” Later on in this 
interview, this professor was asked about the way his own performance was assessed and he 
said that he relied on his team to do well in order for him to receive a promotion, and he even 
said that he explicitly told academics in the group: “I've got a vested interest as a manager to 
see you achieve that goal.” As Pulakos (2009) argued, when managers’ interests are 
dependent on their employees, performance management systems become more difficult to 
manage because personal interests may cloud managers' judgements, obstructing the 
achievement of organisational goals.   
 
On other occasions, the reasons academics communicated behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems to other academics were not very clear. However, it 
seemed that the overall aim was to support other academics in achieving their performance 
goals. A FemaleLect14 described how her colleague explained to her how to mark exam 
scripts faster: “I'll tell you something I observed and I learned that was a bad thing. When I 
was moderating exams, so moderating exams you get, like, ten scripts and you have just to 
check them and check if the marking is the same and fair. I spent one day reading them 
because this is what I am supposed to do, and then one of my colleagues, she was moderating 
for me and it took her, like, one hour. I was like, how on earth did you finish it? And she was, 
like, you don’t read it all, you just scan it because moderating is this. And I started doing that. 
I noticed everyone's doing it. Why am I reading it in detail?” Another FemaleProf7 explained 
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how she learned the way to design her work from her colleague who told her the way to get 
published in a top rated journal: “It affects your topic selection, methodology selection - you 
start doing things like the expectation is to publish in particular journals, so you go to the 
journal and you figure out what the characteristics are of the papers they publish, so you 
meet them. I have somebody here who has perfected management journals to perfection, so 
what he says is ‘no, if you mention more than two theories in your paper, it won't get 
published in this journal’.”  
 
Another way in which academics learned behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems through conversations with other academics was by being in situations 
where other academics tried to take advantage of them. A MaleLect21 explained his 
frustration about some academics who had asked him to be co-authors of his papers without 
contributing to them. He said: “It comes down to the pressure and some people feeling the 
pressure to get stuff published and not being able to do it. I mean, you see bad practice and 
poor ethics quite often I suppose, including people stealing papers from each other. I've 
observed that. People very bluntly asking you 'Can I be in your paper?' without making any 
contribution. I mean, once one former colleague asked me 'So what are you working on at the 
moment? Can I join you in that paper that you're submitting to this journal?'”  
 
So far, the chapter has presented the two common ways academics socially learned 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems. Although these were the 
primary ways such behaviours were learned, academics also learned these behaviours 
individually. This was done through self-discovery by observing the outcomes of other 
academics’ performance and guessing the behaviour that led to that outcome, and/or by 
considering possible ways to achieve their goals driven by their motivation to do well in 
performance management systems. These are discussed in turn here. 
 
7.2.3 Self-discovery  
Observing performance outcomes and guessing behaviours  
Given that academics did not often perform their work in the same geographical location as 
their colleagues, they did not always personally observe all the behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems that they learned. Sometimes academics only observed the 
outcomes of other academics’ performance and deduced the behaviours that could enable 
them to achieve those outcomes. For example, they might have seen that another academic 
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was a prolific writer, so they started to deliberate over his/her behaviour. Other times, they 
found out about behaviours not intended by performance management systems unexpectedly, 
simply by reading the work of their colleagues and of other academics and noticing some 
content details that raised doubts. These doubts in turn encouraged them to ponder the way 
the authors conducted their work. As a FemaleLect9 explained: “Some people write just to 
play the game and get published. You see some people publish like ten papers, but when you 
read these publications it doesn’t make any sense. It's just that they play the game, they 
publish with that person and they go with this person and they include this person in the 
paper…they just publish for the sake of publishing and getting a promotion. I can, instead of 
publishing a paper that I feel will have an influence in the field, I can publish a paper that 
would be accepted because it fits the field and journals will like it, but it doesn't make sense 
to me. So, I think it's more about the person. And you can see a lot of people just playing the 
game, they are just publishing to get promoted.”  
 
In sum, by contemplating the performance of others, academics were able to discover 
different types of behaviours not intended by performance management systems without 
having first-hand experience of them. For example, a MaleLect5 observed that his colleague 
published several papers every year with many co-authors, and he concluded that the 
academic was colluding with them. He said: “You see six, seven sometimes, which is 
interesting, co-authors on the same paper. So I think that’s the strategy adopted to react to 
this need and high pressure. I mean, we have a professor (personal details removed) - he 
published maybe seven four star articles last year. So if you look at him publishing five or I 
think maybe six, maybe even seven four star publications in top journals, no human being can 
produce more than one or two. I mean this is beyond anyone’s capabilities.”  
 
Discovery through task strategy 
According to goal setting theory, having specific difficult goals encourages individuals to 
search for strategies that enable them to achieve their goals (Locke and Latham, 2013). This 
is in effect what happened to academics in the sample because in addition to socially learning 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems from others, they also learned 
other such behaviours by devising their own strategies to respond to performance 
management systems.  
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By reflecting on their practice, academics devised their own strategies, but overall, the types 
of behaviours that they came up with which were not intended by their performance 
management systems were not radically different from the other such behaviours displayed 
by other academics. Generally, the behaviours academics devised were primarily an 
extension of the behaviours they socially learned. For example, if an academic was told by a 
colleague that he/she needed to please students in order to get high teaching scores, the 
academic would then try to figure out what additional actions could be taken to please 
students. A MaleProf4 reported the various tactics he developed to ensure high teaching 
scores: “You're very nice to students. I'm not saying you should be horrible, but you kind of 
become obsequious, you're pleasant, you encourage them to think a lot of the things they 
think are interesting, you suggest they're learning a lot all the time, you try to be fairly 
entertaining. I think you have to be hugely engaging, enthusiastic both with the material and 
with them. You have to show that you love teaching this stuff because again it’s part of a 
performance.”  
 
Similarly, a MaleLect7 explained how, after understanding ‘the publication game’, he 
engaged in an extensive thinking process to figure out a strategy for papers he was 
developing in order to increase the chances of getting them published. He said: “This 
morning I was thinking about a couple of new research projects I'm doing, and thinking 
‘okay, what kind of design would work in terms of getting it in a top journal’, because top 
journals are very, very particular now about making sure that everything's very sophisticated 
and that you're thinking a bit more. In that sense, it does help develop your ideas and to kind 
of make you think a bit more carefully, but in another sense it just constrains you a little bit. 
So I know, for example, some of the outcomes I'm looking at, I'm like well, they don’t really 
like that kind of outcome that I'm measuring, so I need to change it because I know that 
reviewers are going to question it even though I think it's an interesting thing.”  
Another MaleLect19 also explained the strategy he developed to increase his publication 
output. This academic found that more or less gambling with ideas without spending much 
time considering any was a more efficient technique for getting papers published. He said: 
“The thing it (performance management) makes me do - I'm being very honest now - which I 
wouldn’t admit to because it doesn’t sound good as a strategy, it makes you clutch at straws a 
bit. And you say such and such is interested in that, that sounds interesting, let’s try a 
publication on that. I often will clutch at straws, I'll try to take lots of opportunities, not really 
knowing which ones are any good, just hoping that one of them will work out. It makes you a 
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bit nervous about which bits of work you can comfortably focus on, you're not sure which 
topics are the best, so you kind of have different papers on the go, and you think some of them 
are not so great maybe, but I don’t really know which ones, so I'll keep on experimenting. It 
makes you very experimental, but that can take you away from your focus. Because you are 
thinking maybe this will be the one that gets accepted in the journal, maybe it will be this one 
over here, and you spread yourself quite thin, which I think that’s the risk. You're unfocused 
and you're not giving to any one thing the depth of attention that it deserves. You're thinking 
where my next publication is going to come from.” 
 
As can be seen, academics were creative in the way they handled performance management 
systems. Academics not only adopted the behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems that they learned, but also developed them by extrapolating from what 
they learned. This process enabled academics to have a wide range of unintended behaviours 
in their repertoire that they performed whenever required. The next section explains the 
factors that motivated academics to perform the behaviours they learned. 
 
7.3 What motivated academics to perform the learned behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems 
Through the processes discussed above, academics became very familiar with the way their 
performance was assessed. They learned the performance goals they needed to meet and also 
how to achieve them. Based on the interviews, although as suggested by social learning 
theory, being aware of behaviours not intended by performance management systems did not 
mean that academics enacted them (Bandura, 1965a), there was a lot of evidence showing 
that being aware of such behaviours motivated many to engage in them, or at least motivated 
academics to consider them. The following quote from a FemaleSeniorLect5 illustrates this 
point: “I heard that when you have certain co-authors or being able to target particular 
journals, or even citing journals, you may be more likely to get published. I've heard of that, 
I'm aware of it, but I'm not doing it. Maybe I should, maybe that's the way forward.” In this 
sense, although learning behaviours not intended by performance management systems did 
not necessarily lead to those behaviours being enacted, at times, it was as a precursor to 
enacting them.  
 
Academics had various motivations for engaging in behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems. These motivations are organised here around the themes 
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of career benefits, internalised threat and social reinforcement (see Table 7.2). While 
explaining each theme, social learning theory is used at the beginning of each section to 
explain what motivated academics to display behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems in the sampled universities.  
 
Table 7.2: Motivators for engaging in behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems 
First-order codes Second-order themes 
Keep existing research/teaching contract 
Protect position 
Get promoted 
Gain advantageous workload model 
Receive pay increase 
Career benefits 
Fear of current performance management 
systems 
 
Fear of future performance management 
systems 
 
Feelings of uncertainty about one’s 
performance 
 
 
 
 
Internalised threat 
Colleagues/management performance social 
appraisals  
 
Academics needing social reassurance 
Social pressure to meet performance 
management goals  
 
Social reinforcement 
 
 
 
7.3.1 Career benefits 
As universities in the United Kingdom have become performance oriented (Kallio et al., 
2015) high performing academics have been able to reap a variety of rewards, some of which 
are financial, and others are non-financial. For example, in addition to promotion, increased 
basic pay, and other concomitant benefits associated with positive performance8 (see Table 
 
8 The way academics are rewarded/penalised has been discussed throughout this chapter and also in the 
preceding chapter. Therefore, the goal of this section is not to explain how academics’ performance is assessed 
but to demonstrate how rewards, a lack of rewards, or explicit penalties act as motivators for academics to 
engage in behaviours not intended by their performance management systems.  	
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7.2), three out of thirteen universities in the sample directly linked the outcomes of the annual 
performance reviews to financial rewards. The role of rewards in influencing individuals’ 
behaviour has been considered in different theories such as operant conditioning, classical 
conditioning and social learning (Davis and Luthans, 1980; Atkinson et al., 1987; Staddon 
and Cerutti, 2003). In the interview, academics gained different rewards when performing 
well in performance management systems and these rewards acted as a strong motivator for 
them to engage in behaviours not intended by performance management systems. Academics 
also engaged in such behaviours to avoid aversive consequences that could result from 
performance management systems. 
 
In the interviews, academics from all backgrounds and levels of seniority had strong 
incentives to perform well in performance management systems. A MaleProf25 explained 
different academic groups' motivation to, in his words, play the game. According to him, 
irrespective of their career stages, academics, himself included, had to engage in behaviours 
not intended by performance management systems. He said: “This (performance 
management) has an enormous impact because you have to administer your time and plan 
your day in ways that literally help you maximise your chances of first writing an article and 
then publishing it. Otherwise, you face the danger, specifically at the lower level, not at my 
level. At the lower level, if you don't have tenure, or the kind of tenure that we have in Britain, 
you risk being kicked out. For me and others at my level, it has the risk of reputation. You 
also play these games even if you're not immediately touched upon.” Hence, while the main 
motivation for professors was typically not about getting promoted, they were nonetheless 
affected by performance management systems, particularly by the REF. The REF exposed 
academics’ performance to others every six years (in some universities every year) and when 
failing to meet performance management goals, professors risked losing their stature in their 
university as well as the other privileges associated with their position including having 
favourable workloads and being part of decision making boards.  
 
Another FemaleProf7, who was also a head of group, explained that academics in her group 
engaged in behaviours not intended by performance management systems because they were 
driven by fear that any performance deficiency would lead to severe consequences for them. 
She stated: “In (university name removed), this system of performance evaluation ruins lives, 
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so depending on how many stars your paper is, different things happen to you…the reason it 
ruins lives is because to pass probation, you have to have published at least two three star or 
four star papers during your probationary period... so if they don't do that, they don't pass 
probation, so it affects human destinies. If you don’t have three or four star publications, you 
won't be included in the next REF exercise, which means that you'll be under pressure to 
change your employment contract from 60% 40% to 80% 20%.” 
 
Not all academics reported having engaged in behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems because performance management systems posed imminent threats to 
their career. There were certain academics who met their performance management goals but 
were still heavily engaging in such behaviours. For example, a MaleLect16 explained his 
motivation for doing so, although he technically met his performance goals. He said: “I think 
it’s damaging to just publish for the sake of publishing, as opposed to publishing to really 
advance knowledge, which is what we're supposed to try to do. So I think that damages our 
practice as academics. But again, it’s like a game. You need to learn how the rules work if 
you want to progress so it’s really up to each academic to decide, okay, I will maybe just have 
two or three publications, which is what I need to do to keep my job, but they're going to be, 
like, top star and really with the sole aim of advancing knowledge. But my personal opinion 
is that approach, even though it's a sensible approach, will not get you promoted as fast as 
other people that try to do as much as they can, build a network of other researchers and 
publish a lot. So if you don’t mind taking longer to progress, then it’s fine. But if you mind, 
then you have to do the other thing.” As can be seen from the quote, this academic 
recognised the negative implications of his behaviour, but was nonetheless not deterred from 
performing behaviours not intended by his performance management system as his desire to 
become a professor quickly eclipsed all other concerns. In these instances, academics’ 
behaviours were not the result of trying to meet the goals, but the result of trying to exceed 
the goals. However, their behaviour was still considered an unintended outcome of 
performance management systems because it was a response to the promotion criteria 
designed by performance management systems (Pulakos. 2009) to manage academics’ work.  
 
In sum, the above mentioned motivations encouraged academics to perform the learned 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems. In this sense, awareness 
combined with these motivations often led to the unintended outcomes found in the sampled 
universities. 
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7.3.2 Internalised threat 
In the former section, the way academics behaved was in line with classical conditioning 
principles: individuals’ behaviour is based on their association of the behaviour with rewards 
and punishments (Atkinson et al., 1987). However, as suggested by social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1977), academics' choices to engage in behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems was not always the result of experiencing rewards or penalties, but 
based on their perception of possible rewards or penalties that could ensue from their 
behaviours, which was also evident in some of the quotes presented above. Based on the data, 
the perceived rewards and threats proposed by social learning theory played a key role in 
influencing academics’ propensity to engage in behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems.  
 
This section extends this line of thinking to explain another motivator for academics to 
engage in behaviours not intended by performance management systems, termed as 
internalised threats, which was based on academics personally having negative experiences 
with performance management and/or simply based on their perception of possible future 
negative consequences. This motivator is called internalised threats here because it refers to 
academics’ internalising performance management systems. Internalisation is defined as 
“people “taking in” a value or regulation” (Ryan and Deci, 2000: 71). It is a socialisation 
process where individuals assimilate external regulations and transform them into their own 
(Deci and Ryan, 2000).  
 
In the sample, academics were apprehensive about performance management systems even 
when they met their performance management goals. By being repeatedly confronted with 
performance management practices, receiving performance emails and newsletters, and 
having one-to-one performance meetings together with other performance interactions, 
academics gradually internalised performance management systems, and became alert to their 
performance as they knew that their university was closely monitoring them. A FemaleProf12 
explained what happened to academics who did not meet the requirements of the last REF in 
her university: “If you were not submitted in the previous REF, you kind of have to sit through 
an unpleasant meeting, possibly with the head of school. And the head of school goes oh you 
are so crap, you underperform, you can't do this, and then you just say whatever, whatever. 
And then you just wait for them to move, but I think a lot of people are terrified.” 
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Academics’ fears were instigated by the very existence of performance management systems 
in universities, and the way systems were implemented and reinforced by the perceived costs 
associated with low performance. A FemaleLect1 explained: “When you know that you will 
be evaluated, it increases my stress as an employee. Because I'm always thinking, they will 
evaluate me next month, what is it that they will say?” A MaleProf8 also discussed how the 
existence of performance management systems affected him, although this professor was a 
high performing academic and was also a former head of the department in which he was 
working at the time of the interview. He said: “In this environment, if you didn’t have stuff out 
every four years or something, it's as if everything that you've done in the past no longer 
counts, which is very weird. As far as the management system is concerned in the university, 
they tell you of course things that you've done in the past count. But it doesn’t count for your 
short-term survival - it’s irrelevant. You need to achieve whatever it is they expect otherwise 
your life is going to be tougher. And there is always the threat that's lurking in the 
background, although nobody has ever done this here, that you can end up on a 100% 
teaching contract.” As could be seen from the quote, this professor reported never having 
seen such an action take place in his department, but he was nonetheless concerned about it. 
 
Overall, certain academics who internalised performance management systems and felt 
threatened by them engaged in behaviours not intended by performance management systems 
because their fears propelled them to do so. In the interviews, academics’ fears were not only 
related to their current performance but were also sometimes related to their future 
performance. Perhaps academics were concerned about their future performance because, as 
many reported, they felt that they lacked control over the outcomes of their performance, and 
also, as mentioned in the previous chapter, they found their performance goals difficult to 
attain. As academics struggled to meet their goals, they found alternative unintended routes to 
meeting them. A MaleProf9 explained: “I'm lucky because I still have collaborations where I 
don’t actually make huge contributions towards it in terms of actually doing the hard work, so 
I’m just lucky, and you also get this game playing around publication groups - you basically 
just put each other’s name on papers and stuff like that’s again playing, and that’s a reflection 
of the fact that it's difficult. It was difficult for the last REF, and it's even harder now because 
all the rejection rates are going up. It was hard and it's getting harder.” 
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7.3.3 Social reinforcement  
Academics viewed their work as being mostly a solitary activity for which they heavily 
depended on their own judgment. However, they also depended on other academics to get 
some kind of external reinforcement or validation. A FemaleLect10 explained how she found 
the annual reviews useful because they provided her with an opportunity to receive 
information about her performance from a senior academic. She said: “I guess someone looks 
at my research and what I'm doing overall and says yes, it seems okay. That’s a bit of 
validation that what I'm doing is all right. It always makes me feel better afterwards that 
someone goes okay, you're doing all right there, you're on the right track.” The role of social 
reinforcement is emphasised in social learning theory because as Bandura (1977) explained, 
social reinforcement has an informative function in that through the process of differential 
reinforcement, individuals are able to identify behaviours and outcomes that are successful 
and unsuccessful. In the interviews, the social context motivated academics to perform 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems because they operated in an 
environment that reinforced certain performance outcomes, and in their attempt to achieve 
these outcomes, academics were motivated to engage such behaviours. 
 
In this sense, the feedback academics received from their colleagues and others was 
important to them, but the feedback received from colleagues had slightly different effects on 
academics from the feedback received from managers. For example, in some cases, feedback 
from managers led academics to feel pressure to meet their goals, but feedback from 
colleagues, on the other hand, created social pressure on academics to perform in accordance 
with others in their group. A MaleProf10 stated: “Informally, we're evaluated and assessed 
all the time by colleagues.” A Femalelect10 explained how this informal assessment and 
social pressure took place in her university: “If you got promoted through teaching, they'll be 
like oh, you got promoted through teaching, you're not really a researcher, are you? So that 
would be looked down upon. We have quite a strong central group who's responsible for 
improving teaching and you can go through from the postgraduate certificate up to getting a 
Master’s in education, so that's really pushed by the centre of the university. I'd say it's not 
pushed by my colleagues or my boss, who'd say, if I'm doing teaching, let’s focus on 
research.” Hence, although the university made attempts to encourage academics to improve 
their teaching, the social environment undermined university teaching goals, which meant 
that academics continued to engage in behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems like instrumental effort allocation discussed in the former chapter. 
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As highlighted at the outset of this chapter, academics gave greater value to their social 
environment and they sometimes dismissed the university messages in favour of the 
messages learned from their environment, and that in different ways, the social environment 
also supported the achievement of certain performance management goals, especially 
publication related ones. Because performance management systems were embedded in 
universities’ day-to-day activities, academics internalised the systems, and so the systems 
also became part of the day-to-day conversations academics had with each other.  
 
This meant that the social environment acted as a reminder for academics to do well in 
performance management terms, reinforcing the value of performance management systems 
in universities, and encouraging them to engage in behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems. A FemaleRead1 explained: “It becomes in your interest because of the 
general environment you are working in to play the game even if you're not that interested in 
it for your own career.” Another FemaleLect8 described how, independently of performance 
management systems, her colleagues constantly pressurised her to publish by repeatedly 
asking her about the progress of her papers. She said: “The problem there is with publication. 
The game is long-term. Yes, you go, you get something accepted in a journal, it comes out like 
in two or three years’ time basically. So in the meantime, you’re essentially getting these 
kinds of conversations and emails with your colleagues basically saying oh, have you 
submitted? Have you published? And then there is a huge amount of pressure, a huge amount 
of pressure.”  
 
In some universities, academics created a culture of celebrating achievements related to 
research published in top journals. A FemaleLect12 recounted her experience: “This last 
paper, they got a notification that my publication was finally published and they were like 
let’s go out and celebrate. I didn't even plan to celebrate. For me, this paper has been a pain. 
Seven years working on it. I just want it out of the way. I don't want to celebrate. But they're 
like it's a top journal. We need to go out for drinks. My colleagues keep reinforcing this - and 
I'm more like give me a break, I’ve been struggling seven years to publish it. What is there to 
celebrate? And they don't see it. They think it's a great accomplishment, we should celebrate 
it, full stop.”  
 
In the interviews, some academics also reported that their university made their performance 
public to their colleagues, for example, by circulating performance emails and Excel 
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spreadsheets, academics became aware of each others’ performance. However, some 
academics felt that such an approach created social comparison between them and/or social 
pressure to perform. A FemaleLect14 described how by making academics’ performance 
known to others, her university created tension among academics in her group. She said: 
“There's a lot of competition and comparison. They'll say that oh, this person published this 
paper. I had a paper published. And I thought it's quite nice to send an email to my line 
manager and say that my paper got accepted, and then she made a big deal of it. She cc'd the 
head of the group and she cc'd the Deputy Dean and everyone emailed congratulations, 
congratulations, well done, and then my colleagues, congratulations. They made a big deal of 
it that you published a paper.”  
 
By receiving those emails, this academic received social confirmation from colleagues and 
management that she was performing well, however, she also found the experience to be 
overwhelming and thought she did not warrant so much attention. Exposing employees’ 
performance to others is similar to the ‘naming and shaming’ strategy used by organisations 
in various public sector organisations (Bevan and Hood, 2006). For example, Bevan and 
Hood (2006) explained how such a strategy subjects employees to various unpleasant 
outcomes, such as endangering their reputation and threatening their job security, linking this 
strategy to employees engaging in gaming in public health care in the United Kingdom as a 
result. 
 
7.4 What dissuaded academics from performing the learned behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems 
Earlier in this chapter, it was stated that academics did not always perform all the behaviours 
they learned, but did not explain why. This section returns to this point and presents the two 
main factors found in the interviews that prevented academics from performing behaviours 
not intended by performance management systems (see Table 7.3).  
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Table 7.3: Demotivators for engaging in behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems 
First-order codes Second-order themes 
Feelings of guilt about engaging in 
behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems 
 
Prioritising moral values over career 
interests 
 
Moral self-regulation 
Discrediting the value of 
performance management systems 
 
Pursuing personal goals as opposed 
to performance management goals 
 
Resisting the redefinition of academic 
work 
 
7.4.1 Moral self-regulation 
Social learning theory places great importance on the concept of self regulation, which is 
defined as individuals’ ability to self regulate their behaviour (Bandura, 1986). By setting 
internal standards for themselves, individuals are able to control their actions in a way that 
weakens the influence that external factors can have on them (Bandura, 1977).  
 
During the interviews, moral self-regulation played a significant role in discouraging 
academics from engaging in behaviours not intended by their performance management 
systems. The following quote illustrates how a FemaleSeniorLect3 refrained from engaging 
in such behaviours because she felt that it was morally wrong for her to do so. She said: “I 
was reading (students) assignments and I thought like okay, I’ll just really do speed reading 
here and then just kind of copy based on last year what I gave for this mark – say, I don’t 
know, 63%. I mean, I’ll just go and find 63% feedback from last year and just copy it. But I 
felt bad. I mean, I heard it from others. I heard that some people just do that and get away 
with it... So when it comes to marking I’m tempted to do this not from the beginning but in the 
middle because it’s too cumbersome, it’s just too tiring and the deadline to submit the marks 
is in two days. But then I feel like no, no, no, no, no, listen, listen, stop, stop because that’s 
not fair, you’ve done half and you’ve done half well. You can't now be unfair to the other half. 
And it’s really bad practice.”  
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Except for very few academics, generally, moral self-regulation prevented academics from 
engaging in certain types of behaviours not intended by performance management systems, 
but did not prevent them from engaging in all such behaviours. There may be two possible 
explanations for this. The first may be related to the extent to which academics were able to 
allow themselves to perform behaviours they knew were inappropriate. The second may be 
related to the extent to which academics were able to rationalise their behaviour and justify 
their actions, possibly to others, but more importantly to themselves (Bandura, 1977). For 
example, going back to the example discussed in the previous paragraph, moral self-
regulation stopped this lecturer from inadequately marking students’ essays, but she engaged 
in other behaviours behaviours not intended by her performance management system such as 
playing safe, neglecting performance domains, and balancing sufficiency against interest (see 
the previous chapter for definitions of these behaviours). In this sense, moral self-regulation, 
depending on individual academics, worked in certain situations, but not in others.   
 
Overall, moral self-regulation was crucial for lessening the occurrence of behaviours not 
intended by performance management systems in the sampled universities. Moral self-
regulation made academics take decisions that sometimes worked against their personal 
interests. Because academics found the behaviour in which they considered engaging to be 
morally inappropriate, they chose not to do it. A FemaleSeniorLect5 explained how, although 
her teaching efforts were not adequately appreciated by her university, she still dedicated 
herself to providing a good teaching experience to students. Her motivation to do so did not 
come from performance management measures, but from the moral obligation she felt she 
had to her students. She said: “I don't want to be the kind of person who doesn’t have time for 
my colleagues and doesn't have time for the students. I'm not interested in being that person 
so almost I'm self-handicapped in a way because I know that this is detrimental for my 
career…going back to the demands of research quality versus the time you spend doing 
teaching. So nominally, my role is meant to be 60% teaching and 40% research, but I'm only 
rewarded on the research part of it, so I should really spend less time on my teaching and 
more time on my research. I don't really do that.”  
 
7.4.2 Redefinition of academic work 
Performance management systems have to a large extent defined what good academic 
performance is and what is not (Mingers and Willmott, 2013). A very small number of 
academics agreed with those definitions, but the majority did not, and some refused to engage 
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in behaviours not intended by performance management systems to meet performance 
management goals. For example, academics did not think that publications in top rated 
journals signified good research, nor did they think that good teaching scores signified good 
teaching. A MaleRead10 explained how policy makers were out of touch with academic 
work: “It’s like, as many aspects of education policy, it has a complete misunderstanding of 
things they put us under. I don’t think students are consumers of education, which is the 
model that's been adopted - that somehow they are buying education. They are given an 
opportunity to engage in a process which may or may not work for them in developing their 
independent thought and it’s not a sausage machine, and the idea that an undergraduate or 
postgraduate student are making informed decisions about a known package of education is 
just crazy.” 
 
A MaleRead3, who was found to be one of the academics who did not engage in any 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems, reported that performance 
management systems had little impact on him. When asked about the reasons for this, he 
said: “For me, if they (other academics) win by doing things that I didn’t appreciate and they 
were getting results, I wouldn’t regard them as results, so if you succeed by exploiting your 
co-authors and faking the results of something, why would I want to copy that?” According 
to him, achieving good performance results through dubious means was not an outcome he 
valued, and because he did not value the outcome, he did not want to engage in such 
behaviours. 
 
This academic and others were not motivated to meet performance management goals as 
much as they were motivated to meet other goals they personally valued in a manner they 
viewed appropriate. In other words, their behaviour was not motivated by the reinforcements 
the university set for them through performance management systems but by the 
reinforcements they set for themselves (Bandura, 1986). For example, a MaleProf19 
explained that his goal from publishing was to reach out to the community of scholars in his 
area and contribute to this community as opposed to meeting performance management 
goals. He said: “There are people - their whole life is built around their university and the 
business school. And there is another group of academics who don’t really care very much 
about the university and they're just not interested. If it collapses, they'll just go to another 
university. They're not bothered very much. They're much more interested in what their 
colleagues around the world, not even in the UK, think about them and their work, so what 
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drives them is how well they are regarded in that community on their topic... so if I think that 
more people that I'm interested in will read my paper if I put it into a one star journal, then 
I'll put it in there, and I don’t care whether it meets the university requirements.” 
 
However, a point to note is that in the sample, academics who took this stance were all in 
permanent positions and had been in academia for many years (no less than ten years). Some 
of them were in professorship positions but others were in less senior positions. The large 
majority of this group of academics were not eager to get promoted and, unlike other 
academics who viewed promotion as 'the goal' they strove to achieve, these academics 
viewed promotion as merely a desirable outcome, not the main determiner of their behaviour 
at work. The rewards that they gained predominantly came from other sources, such as being 
able to do research they found interesting and publishing it in outlets they thought had a 
larger readership. These academics also defied their university performance management 
systems, and they were more or less not threatened by them.  
 
At the time of the interviews, some of these academics stated that they intended to leave 
academia as they could not accept the way performance management systems treated 
academics and academic work. Others simply did not take the threats very seriously and did 
not think that for example, being dismissed from their work or having their contract changed 
from research and teaching to teaching only was a disastrous outcome. If this happened, they 
said that they would just deal with it or seek employment elsewhere.  
 
In sum, by not accepting modern performance management definitions of academic work and 
assigning value to different performance outcomes, academics were able to dismiss 
performance management systems. This in turn discouraged academics from engaging in 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems as their focus was on pursuing 
goals they personally valued as opposed to meeting performance management goals. 
 
The chapter has so far presented the way academics learned behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems, and explained what motivated or demotivated them to 
perform what they learned. In what follows, the chapter explains how such behaviours were 
disseminated in the sampled universities.   
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7.5 The way behaviours not intended by performance management systems were 
disseminated in universities  
During the interviews, it was found that behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems were practised by various academics in the sampled universities. The 
question that arises from this is how these behaviours moved from being individual responses 
to being social responses of performance management systems. Based on the interviews, 
academics’ imitation of the learned behaviours was a main contributor to their dissemination 
in the sampled universities. Academics’ imitation of behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems was also evident in some of the quotes above.  
 
7.5.1 Social leaning: Imitation of behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems 
After having learned behaviours not intended by their performance management systems, 
academics either imitated these behaviours or did not. However, choosing to imitate or 
choosing not to imitate such behaviours both contributed to spreading the behaviours. Those 
who imitated the behaviours spread them by performing them and acting as an exemplar for 
others to follow and imitate. Those who did not imitate the behaviours spread them not by 
performing them, but by discussing them with others, and as others became aware of them, 
they sometimes chose to imitate the behaviours. A FemaleSeniorLect5 explained how while 
she did not engage in such behaviours, she advised other academics not to imitate her and 
instead to adopt the behaviours of other successful academics by doing what it took to get 
published. She said: “I do speak to others. I recently had to meet with a probationer although 
I don't supervise them formally, but I had a meeting with them. On the one hand, I'm saying 
look, you really need to focus on your papers if you want to get off probation, you’ve got to 
get the publications, there's no other way of doing it. But at the same time, I don't necessarily 
put that same emphasis myself, but I am quite open with them about that, so I'll say this is 
what I'm doing, and they haven’t sacked me yet, but really the expectations are probably 
different for somebody who's entering fairly new.” 
 
As most academics in the sampled universities were motivated to perform well in 
performance management systems, when they observed another academic displaying 
behaviours or were told about strategies that could help them to meet their performance 
management goals, they were more prone to imitating them. A MaleProf4 explained: “I think 
you're more likely to add the others' practices if you're trying to look for practices to help you 
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become successful in a context where maybe you feel a bit more unsuccessful or you are quite 
worried it, or where you really, really need this thing.” 
 
Academics did not imitate every behaviour they observed that was not intended by their 
performance management system, but were selective about the behaviours they adopted. 
They mainly adopted the behaviours they saw leading to positive results for others. For 
example, a MaleLect16 described how he imitated the practices of his former supervisor 
because they enabled his supervisor to get promoted to a professor within six years. He said: 
“I've benefitted a lot from mentorship from my PhD supervisor, who is a professor, so he 
really helps me a lot with things, and then he advised me that when I do my annual review, 
like the goals that I set, it’s better if you already have them, or you're like 80%. Like that you 
aren't under pressure. So the kind of things that I went to speak about to my head of school 
were basically about papers that were almost already finished for submission. So I said yes, 
I'll do this, that and that, and then I was confident that I could achieve it within that year. 
That was my approach. But I think I wouldn’t have known this if someone else didn’t provide 
me the support of how to approach this.” This academic reported that his former PhD 
supervisor acted as a role model for him and that he tried to imitate him and ask for his 
advice all the time: “I'd consider him as a role model. I think he's a person who understands 
the system, how it works, and there's evidence of it, because as I said to you, he went from 
lecturer to professor in six years or something, so it was a very short period of time.”   
 
Another MaleLect19 explains how by working with academics who engaged in behaviours 
not intended by their performance management systems, he indirectly picked them up and 
imitated them. He said: “People who don’t care about top down going in with hypotheses, 
they just fish around in data looking for something interesting which is a little bit suspect. All 
they care about is getting good interesting findings for a publication and they don’t care 
about doing good science in the process. Some of that can rub off on you when you're 
working with someone like that.” 
  
In summary, by imitating others’ behaviour, the behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems kept circulating from one academic to another, so academics had a 
good idea of the behaviours that could help them do well in performance management 
systems. This probably explains why although academics did not have opportunities to 
observe a large number of other academics in their department because they did not have had 
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daily interactions with their colleagues, they did not need to observe many academics to learn 
the behaviours. It also explains why a large number of the same behaviours were described in 
many interviews. However, because many academics were aware of them, and there were 
also those who reported performing them, the behaviours were, to a great degree, normalised. 
A FemaleLect1 explained: “When a lot of people do things, in some way, this becomes, let’s 
say, the way things are done. If a certain specific way of working starts being considered 
successful, then others try to imitate it as well.” 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the various ways in which academics learned behaviours not intended 
by their performance management systems. Following this, the chapter presented the main 
factors that encouraged academics to perform or not perform the behaviours learned. The 
chapter then explained how through imitation, such behaviours were disseminated in the 
sampled universities. Then, a conclusion was provided.  
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Chapter	8:	Discussion	and	conclusions	
 
8.0 Introduction 
This research had two aims. The first was to explore the unintended outcomes of performance 
management systems and design a typology of these outcomes. The unintended outcomes 
were considered unintended from the perspective of the employer. The second aim was to 
explain how behaviours not intended by performance management systems are learned, 
performed, or avoided by academics in universities from the perspective of social learning 
theory. These research aims were addressed by conducting a literature review, and an 
explorative qualitative study using 65 semi-structured interviews with academics working in 
13 research intense universities ranked in the upper quartile of the REF 2014 in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
This chapter starts by discussing the main findings and theoretical contributions related to 
each research aim. It then discusses the methodological contributions, implications for 
practice, and study limitations together with recommendations for future research. 
 
8.1 Summary of research contributions 
The first major contribution is to provide a critical review of performance management 
systems, contributing to the literature looking at the shortcomings of performance 
management systems in organisations (e.g., Coens and Jenkins, 2000; Halachmi, 2011; 
Bawole et al., 2013). However, unlike previous studies that focus on identifying the 
deficiencies in the way performance management systems are designed or implemented (e.g., 
Thorpe and Beasley, 2004; Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011), this research explored how 
performance management systems do not work as intended, and lead to different negative 
unintended outcomes in organisations. Given that this research found that performance 
management systems led to unintended outcomes in all the sampled universities, it contended 
that irrespective of how performance management systems are implemented, they lead to 
unintended outcomes. In so doing, this research showed how assessing the unintended 
outcomes of performance management systems provides a useful lens for assessing the 
effects performance management systems have on employees, and articulates their 
limitations.  
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The second contribution of this research is that it is one the first empirical studies providing a 
systematic account of the range of negative unintended outcomes that can result from 
performance management systems. It contributed to the literature on the unintended outcomes 
of performance management systems (e.g., Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006; Koning and 
Heinrich, 2013; Kerpershoek et al., 2016) by offering a detailed typology that reviewed the 
three unintended behavioural outcomes of gaming, effort substitution and myopia, and 
presenting the conceptual nuances between and within them. Furthermore, as this research 
found that the three performance management practices of goals, measurements and rewards 
encouraged academics to engage in questionable behaviours, this research also contributed to 
research looking at the relationships between performance management systems and 
inappropriate work practices (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Ordóñez et al., 2009; Werbel and 
Balkin, 2010; Welsh et al., 2015). 
 
The third contribution is to show how performance management systems led to both 
behavioural and psychological outcomes. This is important because current research on the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems views the unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems as primarily behavioural (Smith, 1995; Koning and 
Heinrich, 2013; Kerpershoek et al., 2016). However, this research showed that performance 
management systems led to four unintended psychological outcomes which influenced 
academics' propensity to engage in behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems. In so doing, this research contributes to the literature on the unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems by firstly distinguishing between the unintended 
behavioural and psychological outcomes of the systems, and secondly providing an analysis 
of the unintended psychological outcomes. This research also showed how the unintended 
psychological outcomes relate to the behavioural ones.   
 
The fourth contribution is that this research responded to numerous researchers’ calls to 
examine the social context of performance management systems (Levy and Williams, 2004; 
Den Hartog et al., 2004; Haines and St-Onge, 2012; Denisi and Smith, 2014), and contributed 
to research examining how the social context in which performance management systems are 
implemented influences the impact they have on organisations. However, this research took a 
different approach to studying the social context of performance management systems than 
previous studies because unlike researchers who mostly provide conceptual papers (e.g. Levy 
and Williams, 2004; Den Hartog et al., 2004), and unlike researchers who focus on a small set 
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of variables that they quantitatively tested (e.g., Haines and St-Onge, 2012), this research 
examined how different social learning mechanisms influenced the way academics 
interpreted and interacted with performance management systems. Social learning theory has 
been applied to understand employees’ misbehaviour in different ways, for example, 
criminality (e.g., Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Akers and Jennings, 2009). However, it has not 
yet been used to understand misbehaviour relating to performance management systems. In 
this research, social learning theory provided a useful framework to explain the role that 
social interaction played in disseminating behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems in the sampled universities, and illustrated what motivated academics to 
perform or not perform the learned behaviours.  
 
The fifth contribution is to study the higher education sector in the United Kingdom as the 
research context for this thesis. This research examined the performance management 
practices used in the sampled universities based on the unintended outcomes to which they 
lead. The findings of this research contributes to the literature on the higher education sector 
in the United Kingdom by showing how the government’s agenda to make universities more 
accountable and performance managed through the implementation of various performance 
management practices has led to undesirable unintended outcomes. This is important because 
since their introduction, the impact of the government’s reforms has prompted much debate in 
the literature about the actual outcomes the reforms will produce (Johnes, 1996; Prichard and 
Willmott, 1997; Power, 1997). This research provided empirical evidence of the negative 
unintended effects that performance management systems had on employees, therefore 
questioning their use in universities. By conducting an explorative study, this research 
identified a range of behaviours not intended by performance management systems that 
academics displayed in response to the systems and explained how they occurred. It derived a 
typology for the university sector in the United Kingdom. However, there is nothing in the 
wording of the types that would not make them relevant to other contexts. I will return to this 
point later in the chapter under the future research section, where I provide examples of how 
some of the behaviours not intended by performance management systems could occur in 
other organisations.  
 
The next section presents key findings with respect to this research, and highlights the 
contributions of the findings.  
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8.2 Key findings in relation to each research aim 
The previous two chapters provided extensive discussions regarding both the unintended 
outcomes of performance management systems and the way behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems were diffused in the sample, so they will not be reiterated 
here. Instead, this section synthesises the key findings, and locates their contributions and 
implications alongside previous research.  
 
In addressing the first aim of this research, section 8.2.1 starts by presenting a summary 
figure related to the unintended outcomes of performance management systems found in the 
data. It then turns to discussing the unintended behavioural outcomes arising from 
performance management systems followed by the unintended psychological ones. The 
section on the unintended behavioural outcomes relates to contributions one and two 
highlighted in the former section. The section on the unintended psychological outcomes 
relates to contribution three. 
 
8.2.1 Aim 1: To create a typology of the unintended outcomes that arise from 
performance management systems 
The unintended outcomes of performance management systems were examined through 
semi-structured interviews with academics. To address the first aim of the thesis, the 
interviews focused on understanding how academics perceived the performance management 
systems employed by their institutions, and on exploring the unintended effects the systems 
had on them and/or on others in their department.  
 
Figure 8.1 below summarises the findings of the research. The unintended outcomes in the 
typology are not mutually exclusive, and did not result from a single performance 
management practice, but from a combination of different practices. 
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Figure 8.1: The unintended outcomes of performance management systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The unintended behavioural outcomes arising from performance management systems 
This section begins by briefly describing again the behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems that arose from the interviews, and then moves to presenting some of 
the main theoretical and practical implications of the research findings. The first implication 
relates to the importance of making distinctions between different behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems. The second implication is about the inevitability of 
unintended outcomes arising from performance management systems. The third implication 
refers to a more nuanced understanding of the way engaging in unintended outcomes benefits 
and/or damages employees and organisations. The fourth implication pertains to how 
academics legitimised their behaviour.  
 
The potential of performance management systems to generate behaviours not intended by 
the systems is not a new notion in performance management literature as it has been 
highlighted by various performance management scholars (e.g., Smith, 1995; Hood, 2006; 
Kerpershoek et al., 2016). However, few have empirically examined the unintended 
behavioural outcomes that can result from performance management systems. The 
unintended behavioural outcomes identified have mostly been in the form of theoretical 
speculations on the part of researchers (e.g., Smith, 1995; Otley, 2003). 
 
Unintended behavioural 
outcomes 
• Gaming 
• Instrumental effort 
allocation 
• Myopia Performance management 
practices 
• Goals 
• Performance 
measurements 
• Rewards 
Unintended psychological 
outcomes 
• Cognitive dissonance 
• Feeling of inadequacy 
• Resigned compliance 
• Self-inflicted pressure 
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Prior to data collection, a literature review was conducted and three unintended behavioural 
outcomes were found, namely gaming, effort substitution and myopia. These outcomes were 
also found in this thesis. However, this research explored them in more detail, and explained 
important distinctions between them. The typology presented here allowed a move from 
broad categories to more specific ones as it explored each unintended outcome of 
performance management systems in great depth, leading to a much more refined 
understanding of them. In so doing, this research contributes to the small set of studies that 
seek to conceptualise the unintended outcomes of performance management systems (e.g., 
Bevan and Hood, 2006; Smith, 1995; Kelman and Friedman, 2009; Franco-Santos and Otley, 
2018). 
 
The findings of this research showed that gaming took the forms of gratuitous proliferation, 
cooking the books, hoarding performance, collusive alliances, pandering to customers, and 
playing safe. It replaced the concept of effort substitution with instrumental effort allocation 
for reasons explained in Chapter 6 section 6.3.2, and further explained that instrumental effort 
allocation took the form of neglecting performance domains, and balancing sufficiency 
against interest. With regard to myopia, the chapter distinguished between time-related 
myopia, and non-time related myopia. Detailed discussions of the subcategories of gaming, 
instrumental effort allocation and myopia were provided in Chapter 6 section 6.3. 
 
The first implication of the findings is the importance of making distinctions between 
different behaviours not intended by performance management systems. Making distinctions 
between such behaviours is important to the study of performance management systems 
because, as was shown in Chapter 6, performance management systems gave rise to different 
kinds of behaviours not intended by the systems, and each behaviour was conceptually 
different from the others. These distinctions emerged as important in the data, and it would be 
simplistic to label them all as gaming without showing how they differ. For example, when 
individuals engage in gaming in organisations, they display different kinds of behaviours that 
can result from different factors and can have different consequences for employees and 
organisations (e.g., Smith 1990; Hood, 2006). Furthermore, performance management 
systems can sometimes lead to certain types of behaviours and not others, which means that 
addressing different types of behaviours not intended by performance management systems 
requires different management interventions. Identifying the specific behaviours that can 
result from performance management systems can also help to understand how the systems 
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specifically influence employees at work. Given that the effectiveness of any human resource 
intervention is ultimately assessed according to the outcomes it produces (Den Hartog et al., 
2004), having a better understanding of the specific unintended outcomes that arise in 
working systems could greatly advance the theory and practice of performance management 
systems. 
 
The second implication relates to the inevitability of unintended outcomes arising from 
performance management systems. The common presentation of unintended outcomes in the 
interviews can be explained in two ways. The first, which is the dominant argument made in 
performance management literature, is that performance management systems lead to 
unintended outcomes when the systems are inappropriately implemented (e.g., Aguinis, 
2014). The second is that irrespective of how performance management systems are 
implemented, they lead to unintended outcomes. Based on the interviews, unintended 
behavioural outcomes featured in interviewees’ accounts across all the sampled elite 
universities, which likely devoted many resources and much consideration to performance 
management issues and implementation. Hence, the findings of this research give more 
credence to the latter argument that performance management systems are highly likely to go 
awry and lead to negative unintended outcomes, indeed, perhaps inevitably. These findings 
are in line with many performance management scholars who have contended that 
implementing fool-proof performance management systems that lead to their intended 
outcomes is incredibly difficult to achieve in practice (Coens and Jenkins, 2000; Pulakos and 
O’Leary, 2011). The findings of this research contribute to this debate by showing that in 
addition to performance management systems not achieving their intended outcomes, they are 
also likely to lead to negative unintended outcomes. Hence, the findings of this study 
challenge the argument made by Aguinis (2014) that performance management systems only 
lead to unintended outcomes if they are inappropriately implemented. 
 
This research did not examine in depth the different ways in which performance management 
systems were implemented in the sampled universities. While such an analysis could be 
informative, it was not done here because the aim of the thesis was to design a typology of 
the unintended outcomes of performance management systems, and explore how behaviours 
not intended by performance management systems were diffused in universities. Going into 
more detailed questions of how different ways of implementing performance management 
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systems could lead to unintended consequences would involve a whole programme of 
research, and was therefore considered outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
The third implication is to gain a more nuanced understanding of the way engaging in 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems benefits and/or damages 
employees and organisations. The analysis shows that the effects of employees engaging in 
such behaviours can be multifaceted. When employees engage in these behaviours, the 
behaviours can both benefit and harm their organisations. For example, employees engaging 
in behaviours not intended by their performance management systems may enable their 
organisations to meet their short-term targets, but simultaneously go against their 
organisations’ long-term goals, an argument echoed by different researchers (Merchant and 
Bruns, 1986; Smith, 1995; Zhao et al., 2012). Likewise, when employees engage in 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems, they might meet their short-
term performance goals, but hamper the achievement of their long-term goals. For example, 
as noted by some interviewees in Chapter 6, academics’ focus on meeting their publication 
goals negatively affected some academics’ long-term research goals to develop a coherent 
and meaningful research profile. This is in addition to the psychological costs associated with 
doing research in which academics found less meaning as opposed to doing research in which 
they saw more value.  
 
Therefore, when studying the unintended outcomes of performance management systems, it 
is important that researchers consider questions such as how employees and organisations 
benefit from behaviours not intended by performance management systems, how long 
employees and organisations benefit from the behaviours, and who benefits from behaviours 
and who does not. This is important because depending on which perspective one takes, 
different behaviours could be classified as intended or unintended by performance 
management systems and organisations. For instance, with regard to academics’ performance, 
it is generally agreed that the aim of academic performance management systems is to 
improve the quality as well as the quantity of academics' work (Mingers and Willmott, 2013; 
Tsui, 2013). From this perspective, performance management systems could be viewed as 
promoting behaviours not intended by the systems when they support quantity over quality. 
Given that the performance management systems in the sample motivated academics to focus 
on quantity at the expense of quality, the behavioural outcomes could be viewed as 
unintended from the perspective of actors such as university boards, REF committees, human 
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resource departments and managers. The behaviours could be viewed as such from the 
perspective of these actors on the grounds that they all explicitly voice their dedication to 
achieving both quality and quantity in academic work.  
 
However, a point to note is that as universities are an important beneficiary of academics’ 
engagement in behaviours not intended by their performance management systems, the 
position of universities becomes less clear, particularly because such behaviours were not an 
unknown phenomenon to academics and the management in the sampled universities. In this 
sense, the position of universities could also be interpreted as turning a blind eye to 
academics engaging in such behaviours. This might be because by discouraging these 
behaviours, universities could go against their own interests. By meeting their institutions’ 
performance targets, not only academics benefited from unintended behaviours, but also their 
universities. As these behaviours enabled both parties to perform well in performance 
management systems, it could be argued whether the behavioural responses categorised as 
unintended by performance management systems in Chapter 6 were indeed unintended and 
undesirable, or the opposite. 
 
The findings of this research show how the reality of organisations is complex. Organisations 
might know that their employees engage in behaviours not intended by their performance 
management systems, but instead of discouraging employees from performing these 
behaviours, they might not. Ashforth and Anand (2003) argued that managers who authorise 
employees to engage in inappropriate work behaviours do not have to do so explicitly and 
formally because turning a blind eye to employees’ misbehaviour is a form of consent. Given 
the various ways in which behaviours could be interpreted, it is important that a nuanced 
understanding of the unintended outcomes of performance management systems is achieved. 
Any discussion of unintended outcomes needs to consider different perspectives, appreciating 
that whether an action is unintended or not will vary depending on the stakeholder's 
perspective.  
 
The fourth implication is about the way academics legitimised their behaviour. In the 
interviews, participants attributed academics’ enactment of behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems to the systems, and typically used the term gaming to 
encapsulate many of the behaviours discussed in Chapter 6 section 6.3. However, academics’ 
remarks about gaming could also be seen as emerging from a desire to achieve their targets in 
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an easier manner while seeing this as a necessary consequence of their employers’ behaviour 
towards them. While both explanations are possible, this research did not test academics’ 
accounts as the goal was to understand interviewees’ perceptions, and not to check their 
narratives. In the literature, researchers generally attributed employees’ engagement in 
behaviours not intended by their performance management systems to the systems (e.g., 
Keasey et al., 2000; Conrad and Uslu, 2012; Guilfoyle, 2012; Koning and Heinrich, 2013). 
However, in their discussion, they also sometimes explained that performance management 
systems encouraged employees to search for easy routes to meeting their goals, which 
sometimes meant performing behaviours not intended by their performance management 
systems (e.g., Smith, 1990; Kelman and Friedman, 2009). 
 
Like other studies that looked at employees’ misbehaviour at work (Werbel and Balkin, 2010; 
Thau et al., 2015), this research found that when academics performed behaviours not 
intended by performance management systems, they normally engaged in purposeful acts 
where they made deliberate decisions to bypass performance management systems and 
benefit their career. In the sample, academics performed such behaviours knowing that the 
means they used were, if not outright misconduct, moderately inappropriate. However, 
because of the blurred definition of what appropriate academic conduct is and is not in 
contemporary universities, some academics legitimised engaging in behaviours not intended 
by their performance management systems, notably relating their actions to the constraints of 
performance management systems. This finding is in line with Fisher and Downes’ (2008) 
argument that employees could game performance management systems by taking advantage 
of the ambiguities surrounding the systems, behaving in self-serving ways. Furthermore, 
some academics even capitalised on the lack of clarity surrounding academic conduct and 
framed certain behaviours not intended by their performance management systems as 
appropriate. For example, some academics viewed what was termed as collusive alliances in 
Chapter 6 as working in groups, emphasising that group work is beneficial for academics. 
This finding confirms Ashforth and Anand’s (2003) argument that employees who engage in 
inappropriate work practices tend to rationalise their behaviour by negating unfavourable 
explanations, and replacing them with more favourable ones. 
 
Having said that, while academics legitimised behaviours not intended by their performance 
management systems, a large majority generally recognised the problems associated with 
such behaviours, which was also evident in the quotes presented in Chapters 6 and 7. In the 
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interviews, academics repeatedly referred to their actions as gaming when describing 
inappropriate work practices. Academics use of the term indicates academics’ awareness of 
the inadequacy of engaging in such behaviours. However, academics also knew that in order 
to do well in performance management systems, they needed to strategise their actions in 
such a way that their performance was positively assessed against performance management 
metrics, which often entailed academics engaging in behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems. 
 
As a result, academics started to see performance management systems as a game, possibly 
because of the parallels that exist between playing a game and doing well in performance 
management systems. To win any game, players normally develop strategies to succeed, and 
in order to do well in performance management systems, academics also developed a number 
of strategies to achieve their goals. Devising strategies to meet one’s goals is not necessarily 
negative, and proponents of goal setting theory claim that it is a positive outcome of goal 
setting as it encourages employees to be more innovative and creative in the way they 
approach their tasks (Locke and Latham, 2013). The findings of this research support this 
claim because goal setting not only encouraged academics to design their own strategies, but 
as shown in Chapter 7, even encouraged them to imitate those of others. However, perhaps 
what advocates of goal setting have considered less is that when goals motivate employees to 
look for strategies, they are not only motivated to design strategies desired by organisations 
but also those that are less desired (Ordóñez et al., 2009) as was the case in the sampled 
universities.  
 
The next section summarises key findings related to the unintended psychological outcomes, 
and is related to contribution three.  
 
The unintended psychological outcomes arising from performance management systems 
Based on the interviews, four unintended psychological outcomes were found. These were: 
cognitive dissonance, feelings of inadequacy, resigned compliance, and self-inflicted 
pressure. As in the former section, this section states the contributions and implications of the 
unintended psychological outcomes. The implications discussed here relate to the importance 
of distinguishing the unintended psychological outcomes from the unintended behavioural 
ones. The first implication is about the unintended psychological outcomes being early 
indicators of performance management systems not operating well. The second implication 
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relates to the relationship between the behavioural and psychological unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems. The third implication is about the relationship between 
the unintended psychological outcomes. The fourth implication is about the unintended 
psychological outcomes being important consequences of performance management systems.  
 
The first implication is that unintended psychological outcomes are early indicators of 
performance management systems not operating well. Earlier in this chapter, it was stated 
that the concept of unintended outcomes has previously been highlighted by other 
researchers. However, in the literature, unintended outcomes of performance management 
systems are often discussed in relation to behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems in the sense that researchers use the term unintended outcomes to mean 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems (e.g., Koning and Heinrich, 
2013; Kelman and Friedman, 2009; Kerpershoek et al., 2016). Accordingly, the original aim 
of this research was to understand the that result from performance management systems but 
are not intended by the systems. However, during the interviews, academics’ accounts were 
imbued with a range of negative unintended psychological outcomes. Considering that 
performance management systems are not supposed to create psychological discomfort 
among employees (Armstrong and Baron, 1998), or at the very least are intended to motivate 
rather than demoralise, the existence of these psychological outcomes can therefore be 
considered as an indication of deficiencies in performance management systems.  
Research on the unintended outcomes of performance management systems has largely used 
the negative behavioural outcomes of performance management systems as a means of 
assessing the adequacy of performance management systems (e.g., Smith, 1995; Hood, 2006; 
Kelman and Friedman, 2009; Conrad and Uslu, 2012; Guilfoyle, 2012). However, examining 
the unintended psychological outcomes as a vehicle for evaluating the systems is also 
essential because in addition to signifying issues with performance management systems, 
they have other theoretical implications, some of which are discussed below in implications 
two, three and four. Identifying when performance management systems operate well and 
when they operate less well has been an ongoing debate in the literature (Den Hartog et al., 
2004; Jones and Culbertson, 2011; Pulakos and O’Leary, 2011). This research contributes to 
this debate by noting the value of considering the unintended psychological outcomes as 
another way of assessing the adequacy of performance management systems.  
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The second implication is about the relationship between the behavioural and psychological 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems. This research shows that the 
unintended psychological outcomes of performance management systems played an essential 
role in explaining academics’ motivation to perform behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems because they acted as precursors to the behaviours. In the 
interviews, academics did not necessarily experience all four unintended psychological 
outcomes before engaging in the behaviours, nor did all academics who performed the 
behaviours automatically face any of the four unintended psychological outcomes. However, 
those who were found to have engaged in behaviours not intended by their performance 
management systems often reported having faced one or more of the psychological outcomes 
identified.  
 
As explained in Chapter 6, unintended psychological outcomes escalated to behaviours not 
intended by performance management systems because they enabled academics to take a 
psychological position that facilitated and perpetuated their engagement in those behaviours. 
This is important both to the theory and practice of performance management systems 
because by limiting the analysis of unintended outcomes to the behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems, researchers primarily look at the consequences of 
performance management systems, and overlook important antecedents to the behaviours. 
Hence, it is important that when considering the unintended outcomes of performance 
management systems, both researchers and practitioners attend to the unintended 
psychological outcomes experienced by employees to prevent the psychological outcomes 
from escalating to undesirable behaviours. The use of psychological indicators to predict 
employees’ behaviour has been noted in various areas of research such as in the 
psychological contract (Conway and Briner, 2005). For example, Levinson et al. (1962) 
explained that negative emotions displayed by employees could be used to indicate early 
warning signs of psychological contract problems among employees such as frustration 
reflecting employees' concerns about promises not being fulfilled. 
 
By articulating the role of the unintended psychological outcomes, and explaining their 
effects, this thesis contributes to discussions about the factors that lead to unintended 
outcomes of performance management systems. Doing so enables not only a better 
understanding of the various types of unintended outcomes that can result from performance 
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management systems, but also of the relationships that exist between the unintended 
behavioural and psychological outcomes.  
 
The third implication pertains to the relationship between the unintended psychological 
outcomes. In Chapter 5, the unintended psychological outcomes were presented as being 
distinct unintended outcomes of performance management systems because each had its 
unique features and driving mechanisms that differentiated it from the others. However, they 
were not always discussed as such by participants. In the interviews, academics’ accounts 
sometimes reflected the interconnection between the different unintended psychological 
outcomes. For example, through having dissonant ideas about their work, some academics 
started to question their adequacy for their job roles, or attempted to reduce the dissonance by 
adopting a position about which they were not fully convinced, leading them to develop 
feelings of resigned compliance. Other times, for instance, through frequently experiencing 
feelings of inadequacy, academics became apprehensive about doing well in performance 
management systems. In so doing, they put pressure on themselves to perform even after 
meeting or exceeding their performance goals.  
 
This thesis did not explore the relationships between the four unintended psychological 
outcomes because based on the data, there was no clear pattern showing how they interacted 
with each other. Examining the relationships between the psychological outcomes required 
further data collection and analysis, and due to time constraints, it was not possible to do so 
in this thesis. Furthermore, the unintended psychological outcomes emerged as unexpected 
findings from the interviews, and were not part of its original aims. As a result, investigating 
the relationships between the unintended psychological outcomes was considered beyond the 
bounds of the thesis. However, the four unintended psychological outcomes provide an 
important step in understanding psychological processes that affect academics’ performance 
of behaviours not intended by performance management systems.  
 
The fourth implication is about the unintended psychological outcomes being important 
consequences of performance management systems. In addition to the various reasons 
discussed above for considering the unintended psychological outcomes of performance 
management systems, employees’ experiencing negative affective outcomes are in 
themselves problematic consequences of the systems (Armonstrong and Baron, 1998). In the 
sample, the resultant unintended psychological consequences of performance management 
  230 
systems had negative effects on academics’ wellbeing, which ranged from moderate 
symptoms to more severe ones. 
 
The need for human resource management systems to consider employees’ well-being has 
been noted by different authors (e.g., Veld and Alfes, 2017). For example, Guest (2017) stated 
that human resource management had largely focused on employees’ performance, and did 
not very much consider employees’ well-being, arguing that employees’ well-being should 
not be overlooked by human resource management. Accordingly, Guest (2017) suggested that 
human resource management literature do more to understand how human resources practices 
could improve the well-being of workers.  
 
In performance management literature there is a great concern about the consequences of 
performance management systems for organisational performance (Molleman and 
Timmerman, 2003; Aguinis and Pierce, 2008; Biron et al., 2011; Poister et al., 2013) rather 
than taking an ethical position about how the systems affect employees’ psychological well-
being. This research contributes to performance management literature as it highlights the 
unintended psychological outcomes of performance management systems, and calls for the 
need to consider the unintended psychological outcomes in performance management 
literature.    
 
8.2.2 Aim 2: To explore how behaviours not intended by performance management 
systems are learned, performed, or avoided by academics in universities from the 
perspective of social learning theory 
This section relates to contribution four noted in section 8.1, and it discusses the implications 
and key findings pertaining to the second aim of the thesis. The first implication refers to the 
role of social learning in advancing current understanding of performance management 
systems in organisations. The second implication is about performance management systems 
encouraging social learning at work. The third implication relates to social learning being an 
important means of diffusing behaviours not intended by performance management systems. 
The fourth implication notes the discrepant views between the actor/observer on the 
importance of role models. The fifth implication is about the slippery slope to behaviours not 
intended by performance management systems. The sixth implication is about negative affect 
being displayed by individuals, witnessed, observed and adopted by other academics.  
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Figure 8.2 (below) illustrates where social learning is located in the findings. Social learning 
resulted from performance management systems and moderated the relationship between 
unintended outcomes and the propagation of unintended outcomes.  
 
Figure 8.2: Relationships between performance management practices, behaviours not 
intended by performance management systems and social learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first implication refers to the role of social learning in advancing current understanding 
of performance management systems. This research is the first to apply social learning theory 
to performance management systems. The findings of this research showed that social 
learning theory was highly relevant in explaining how the social environment influenced 
academics’ behaviours in the sampled universities, and understanding academics’ propensity 
to perform or not perform behaviours not intended by their performance management 
systems. 
 
Research into the way the social context influences the operation of performance 
management systems has been called for by many researchers (e.g., Levy and Williams, 
2004; Denisi and Smith, 2014). This research contributes to the literature by demonstrating 
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one way in which the social context enables employees to learn and perform behaviours not 
intended by their performance management systems. However, while this research used 
social learning to understand such behaviours, social learning can also be a useful way of 
understanding how social learning could enable performance management systems to achieve 
their intended outcomes. To do so, organisations could draw on social learning theory 
principles to encourage employees to interact with the systems in ways they see appropriate. 
For example, organisations could create situations where employees are able to observe 
instances of performance management systems operating in an optimal manner, and where 
other employees being rewarded for displaying appropriate work behaviours. Organisations 
could also use social learning theory to establish a climate in which employees have a 
common understanding of performance management systems, and of the aims organisations 
seek to achieve through the systems. The role of the social context in supporting or hindering 
the operation of performance management systems has been noted by various researchers 
(e.g., Pichler, 2012; Haines and St-Onge, 2012). This research shows how social learning 
theory influenced the way academics understood performance management systems and how 
academics responded to the systems as a result.  
 
The second implication is that performance management systems encourage social learning at 
work. Performance management practices led to social learning because the practices 
encouraged academics to actively search their environment for information about the way to 
deal with performance management systems. Performance management practices particularly 
led to social learning when there was uncertainty on the part of academics about the exact 
ways in which their university managed their performance, or when academics found a 
discrepancy between the systems and their informal observations of the way their 
performance was measured by the university. By attending to their environment, academics 
learned about performance management systems, and about how their colleagues handled 
performance management practices, which then enabled them to make personal decisions 
about the way they interacted with the systems. This research therefore only partly supports 
the argument that performance management systems enable employees to have a clear idea 
about their work (Aguinis, 2014) because it showed that while performance management 
systems informed academics about the performance goals they were expected to reach, 
academics still had to use their social context to understand how their universities managed 
their performance.  
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In addition to performance management systems being ambiguous for employees, in the 
sample, there was a deficiency on the part on universities in the way they managed social 
learning that took place among academics. Academics largely learned behaviours from their 
peers rather than from representatives of university management, and this indicates the 
relatively weak role of university management in influencing employees’ behaviour. The 
implication of this finding for organisations is that performance management systems need to 
be straightforward and unambiguous so that employees rely less on their environment for 
information about their performance while also having mechanisms in place that manage 
what and how employees socially learn work practices.  
 
The third implication is about social learning being an important means of diffusing 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems. In the data, these behaviours 
were discussed by many academics, and their knowledge of the behaviours was largely due to 
the social learning that took place among them. Through the process of observation, social 
interaction and reinforcement, social learning enabled academics to learn, and motivated 
some of them to perform the behaviours. While learning the behaviours did not mean that 
academics automatically performed them (Bandura, 1977), it meant that it encouraged 
academics to engage in them. If academics were not aware of the behaviours, they would 
perhaps have been less likely to perform them because they would simply not know them, or 
know as many of them. The social context enabled academics to learn behaviours through 
different means, and these were detailed in the former chapter. This has important 
implications for organisations because it shows how employees learning behaviours not 
intended by their performance management systems can lead to employees performing the 
behaviours. This finding suggests that if organisations wish to preempt unintended 
behavioural outcomes, they need to consider preventing employees from learning the 
behaviours in the first place. 
 
In addition to enabling employees to learn behaviours not intended by their performance 
management systems and motivating them to perform these behaviours, the social context 
facilitated the diffusion of these behaviours, and to a great extent normalised them. By 
encountering and performing the behaviours, academics started to trivialise the behaviours, 
and more frequently perform them. In so doing, they enabled more and more academics to 
observe, learn and sometimes perform the behaviours. Through social interactions, academics 
largely rationalised and accepted the behaviours as being part of academic work. Even some 
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of the academics who reported not having engaged in the behaviours were sympathetic to 
those who did, and justified their conduct. The behaviours were not really viewed as acts that 
were peculiar to a group of academics, but more as actions that academics collectively both 
condoned and justified, and emphasised that they were the result of performance management 
systems. By showing how through social learning, such behaviours were diffused among 
academics, and how they were legitimised in the sampled universities, this research 
contributes to the literature on the way inappropriate work behaviours become 
institutionalised and normalised in organisations (Vaughan, 1999; Greve et al., 2010).  
 
In the sample, the way universities allocated rewards and penalties also contributed to the 
normalisation and diffusion of behaviours not intended by performance management systems 
because academics observed that not only did performing such behaviours go unpunished, 
but were even rewarded by their university. Lack of penalties related to engaging in such 
behaviours was perhaps due to the difficulties of detecting the behaviours and categorically 
labelling them as inappropriate because explanations vindicating academics were often 
possible. Lack of penalties may also have been due to the very small effort on the part of 
universities to identify them. This meant that in practice, being caught or penalised for 
engaging in such behaviours was viewed as a rather farfetched outcome whereas being 
rewarded for performance was viewed as being relatively more likely. In this sense, the 
presence of rewards combined with the lack of penalties motivated academics to perform, 
imitate, and sometimes even advise their colleagues to engage in these behaviours, which in 
turn accelerated the rate at which the behaviours were disseminated in the universities. Like 
theories and research that reported the powerful effects of rewards and penalties in 
influencing employees’ behaviour (e.g., Davis and Luthans, 1980; Staddon and Cerutti, 
2003), this research indicated ways in which external reinforcement affected academics 
willingness to learn and perform behaviours not intended by their performance management 
systems. 
 
As academics found that the behaviours they informally learned but which were not intended 
by their performance management systems made a positive contribution to their and their 
colleagues’ performance, they started to place greater value on their social environment. In so 
doing, they gradually increased their knowledge of their environment, and as they observed 
the frequency and diversity of behaviours in their institution not intended by the institution, 
they became more confident to perform and recommend the behaviours to other academics. 
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Hence, the findings of this research corroborate those of other researchers who found a 
positive relationship between social groups and employees’ willingness to perpetrate immoral 
acts (e.g., Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly, 1998; Thau, et al., 2015). This research also supports 
the argument made by researchers about employees’ malpractice that the social context plays 
a key role in abetting employees’ engagement in dysfunctional behaviours at work (Maclean, 
2008; Thau, et al., 2015). 
 
The fourth implication is the actor/observer discrepancy around the significance of role 
models. Academics did not identify other academics who engaged in behaviours not intended 
by their performance management systems as role models because they viewed role models 
as individuals they idealised. As a result, there was a low incidence of academics identifying 
other academics as role models from whom they learned such behaviours. Accordingly, it 
could be considered that role modeling was not a significant factor in the dissemination of 
such behaviours. However, from an observer standpoint, academics were imitating others 
around them who engaged in these behaviours, and their behaviour therefore resembled 
Bandura’s definition of a role model. Bandura (1977) refers to role models as individuals who 
model a particular behaviour to others. From this perspective, it can be suggested that role 
modeling played an important role in the diffusion of behaviours not intended by 
performance management systems in the sampled universities. 
 
The fifth implication concerns the slippery slope to behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems. This thesis presented different types of these behaviours in Chapter 6. 
These ranged from the most extreme behaviours such as what is termed in Chapter 6 as 
falsifying and fabricating data to milder versions such as playing safe. Both outcomes were 
deemed in this thesis to be unintended consequences of the systems, however, they 
significantly differ in their implications. For example, fabricating data is not only considered 
unintended but also illegal whereas playing safe is more viewed as immoral and 
inappropriate, but not illegal as such.  
 
Irrespective of the gravity of the unintended outcomes, the implications of all the behaviours 
not intended by performance management systems in the typology should not be 
underestimated because they can all have important ramifications. This is because, as Welsh 
et al. (2015: 114) explained, “committing small indiscretions over time may gradually lead 
people to commit larger unethical acts that they otherwise would have judged to be 
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impermissible”. In a series of experiments, Welsh et al. (2015) showed how, through a 
process they termed as the slippery slope, participants gradually performed more serious and 
immoral acts. In a different study, Gino and Bazerman (2009) also demonstrated the role of 
the slippery slope in facilitating the gradual erosion of individuals’ moral standards, creating 
what they described as ethical lapses.  
 
Given these findings, it is therefore important that the behaviours found in this research are 
given sufficient attention. While there were academics who performed relatively minor 
indiscretions, there is a danger that these academics might progressively include more 
behaviours not intended by performance management systems within the bounds of what they 
see as permissible conduct, and possibly carry out acts that could be both professionally and 
personally damaging for themselves and others who could be affected by their actions.  
 
The sixth implication relates to employees displaying negative psychological states that are 
observed by other academics. This thesis has used social learning theory to explain how 
academics learned and performed different behaviours as the theory has traditionally been 
used to explain individuals’ behaviours (e.g., Hanna et al., 2013). Perhaps social learning 
theory has focused on the way people acquire new behaviours as people likely witness others 
displaying these behaviours in their day-to-day lives (Bandura, 1977). However, an important 
point to note is that in addition to behaviours, employees normally witness other employees 
expressing emotions or psychological states at work (Visser et al., 2013). This thesis has 
found that performance management systems have triggered various psychological states in 
academics, which have been grouped under the four unintended psychological outcomes of 
cognitive dissonance, feelings of inadequacy, resigned compliance and self-inflicted pressure. 
As has been shown in previous research, when these psychological states are displayed by an 
individual, they are likely to be noticed by others (Lewis, 2000). For example, when people 
are anxious, it is often visible to others, and as it is observable, it can also be socially learned 
and imitated by others. This is important to note because employees’ psychological responses 
at work have not been sufficiently explored in social learning theory. Likewise, research on 
the unintended outcomes of performance management systems has primarily focused on 
employees’ behaviours and largely ignored the possibility of employees adopting 
psychological dispositions from others at work. Hence, this research advocates the analysis of 
employees’ psychological experiences both when using social learning theory and when 
examining the unintended outcomes of performance management systems.  
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The chapter has so far discussed the contributions and implications of the research findings of 
this thesis. The remainder presents the methodological contributions of the thesis, and 
implications for practice, followed by the limitations of the research together with 
recommendations for future research. 
 
8.3 Methodological contributions  
This research examines universities in the United Kingdom, using a semi-structured interview 
approach novel to the study of the unintended outcomes of performance management systems 
in a university setting. The use of universities as a research context for this thesis relates to 
contribution five noted in section 8.1. Face-to-face semi-structured interviews provided me 
with a unique opportunity to understand the way academics interacted with performance 
management systems, and allowed the collection of a wealth of information that would have 
not been possible to obtain using other methods such as quantitative questionnaires. 
 
The approach employed in this research made valuable methodological contributions to 
performance management literature, the higher education sector literature, and to the 
literature on employees’ inappropriate work behaviours in organisations. With regard to 
performance management literature, in addition to there being scant empirical research on the 
unintended outcomes of performance management systems in general, to my knowledge, 
there is no qualitative study looking at the unintended outcomes of the systems on academics 
in particular. By conducting extensive interviews, this research addressed the conceptual 
complexities, and illustrated the subtle ambiguities associated with the concept of unintended 
outcomes of performance management systems. Furthermore, it empirically investigated the 
participants' stated connections between performance management systems and their 
unintended consequences, introducing a novel and informative approach to studying the 
concept of unintended outcomes. 
  
With regard to the literature on employees’ inappropriate behaviours, the use of an inductive 
methodology provided valuable insights that could be used to complement existing 
knowledge in the area. The methodology adopted is particularly important because empirical 
studies on employees’ inappropriate behaviours has been predominantly conceptual or 
quantitative in nature, and as different researchers confirmed, there is a need for in-depth 
studies to help further current understanding of the subject (Denisi and Smith, 2014). The 
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interviews provided information that allowed understanding of both the role that social 
learning played in the universities, and the way the social context exactly affected academics. 
 
Furthermore, although this research focuses on universities in the United Kingdom, the 
findings suggest a relevance in other contexts, and could be used to understand other sectors. 
Section 8.6 below presents examples of how the typology could be used to understand 
employees’ behaviour in other contexts. The findings of this research can be used to 
understand performance management systems in both the public and private sectors in the 
United Kingdom and beyond, particularly in western economies, where similar performance 
management practices are applied (e.g., Ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012; Sousa, et al., 2010; 
Kallio et al., 2015). Currently, there is a growing body of literature showing that the 
challenges associated with performance management systems are not limited to the United 
Kingdom, but extend to other western countries. 
 
8.4 Implications for practice  
For the industry, performance management systems consume a substantial amount of human 
and financial resources (Denisi, 2011). Despite the enormous costs incurred, the role these 
systems play in organisations remains unclear. Being aware of the unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems would enable organisations to use the systems in a way 
that both increases the frequency of the behaviours they desire, and forestalls the behaviours 
they wish to prevent. The data derived from this project demonstrates how the seemingly 
straightforward practices of performance management systems regularly do not function as 
intended in practice, and therefore organisations are advised to take account of the potentially 
adverse consequences identified in this study. 
 
Organisations can also take practical steps to deal with unintended outcomes in organisations. 
While it is perhaps not possible for organisations to eradicate unintended outcomes, their 
occurrence can be limited. For example, as mentioned earlier, organisations could forestall 
behaviours not intended by their performance management systems being learned by other 
employees, and in cases where such behaviours are learned, organisations could have 
measures in place to limit the damaging consequences that might be caused by the 
behaviours. This might be achieved by organisations explicitly expressing their disapproval 
of the behaviours, and setting clear disciplinary procedures for employees who engage in the 
behaviours. Furthermore, when organisations introduce performance management practices, 
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they could encourage desirable ways of achieving good performance, and state ways in which 
employees should respond to the practices. This might involve organisations almost 
anticipating what the behaviours not intended by their performance management systems 
might be, and then communicating to employees that these behaviours are not acceptable. 
Managers could also look out for early warning signs related to performance management 
systems such as the emotions and unintended psychological states identified in this thesis, 
and address them before they develop into something else less desired.  
 
For society, there is abundant evidence showing that the aftermath of the unintended 
outcomes of performance management systems is usually not constrained to particular 
organisations or industries, but often affects society at large. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, research showed that performance management systems encouraged practices that 
severely compromised patient care in National Health Service hospitals (Kelman and 
Friedman, 2009). Likewise, in the United States, Bedeian et al. (2010) found that the practice 
of managing academics’ performance based on their ability to publish in highly ranked 
journals led academics to engage in highly questionable practices such as plagiarism, 
assignment of undeserved authorship credit, falsification and fabrication of data, and 
selective reporting. The consequences of such behaviours taking place in universities are 
legion because, for instance, they do not only shape the course of the higher education sector, 
but affect the education students receive, and the quality of the scholarship available for 
policy makers, which at times influences government policies and future legislation. It is 
therefore important that the unintended outcomes of performance management systems are 
given sufficient attention, particularly now, when the popularity of performance management 
systems is on the increase, and studies have shown that the threat of these systems 
endangering society looms large (e.g., Bevan and Hood, 2006; Tsui, 2013). 
 
8.5 Limitations of the research  
This research provided a detailed analysis of the unintended outcomes of performance 
management, and of how they occurred in universities. However, there are a number of 
limitations that might have influenced the data collected which are important to acknowledge. 
 
The first limitation relates to respondents’ reluctance to disclose sensitive information. This 
research used semi-structured interviews to understand academics’ engagement in behaviours 
not intended by their performance management systems, and this was not an easy area to 
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research. The topic was viewed as sensitive by many academics, some of whom reluctantly 
shared their experiences with me.  
 
The second limitation is similar but different from the former one as it relates to the prospect 
of social desirability arising from the sensitivity of the topic. In addition to academics’ 
unwillingness to reveal personal information, it is also possible that they provided distorted 
socially desirable answers which cast them in a positive light. During the interviews, 
academics tended to follow the strategy of distancing themselves from the behaviours they 
reported. They discussed behaviours not intended by their performance management systems 
along a spectrum of proximity to themselves - sometimes they reported doing them 
themselves, sometimes they reported seeing them in their department or seeing their 
colleagues doing them, sometimes they were less clear about how they learned the behaviours 
they described or whether they engaged in those behaviours. For example, there were 
academics who said that they saw others engaging in behaviours not intended by their 
performance management systems, but did not necessarily admit to engaging in them 
personally. They used expressions like ‘I've heard of it’, ‘I know of it’, or ‘I've seen it’ to 
dissociate themselves from what they discussed. However, some of them also indirectly 
confessed to engaging in such behaviours in more subtle ways by using expressions like “I'm 
lucky to be working with some academics who are prolific publishers” when they referred to 
collusive alliances.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
This is important for two reasons. First, it is an articulation of the idea that the behaviours 
discussed by academics that were not intended by their performance management systems 
were not viewed as permissible by them, so they used distancing expressions as a device to 
protect themselves from any allegation that they might have done something wrong. Second, 
it raises the interesting issue of how much these behaviours are actually taking place in 
universities. Based on academics’ narratives, these behaviours were prevalent in their 
institutions. However, because academics not only reported the behaviours they engaged in, 
but also the behaviours their colleagues engaged in, the scale of such behaviours in 
universities becomes less clear. As this research followed a qualitative interpretative 
paradigm, establishing these facts goes beyond the scope of the study, which is on 
understanding academics’ perceptions of the systems as opposed to seeking to quantify the 
incidence of such behaviours.  
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The third limitation pertains to the generalisability of the research case study. This study 
focused on universities in the United Kingdom because there is a growing body of research 
that indicates the deficiencies of performance management systems in generating positive 
intended outcomes across different public sector organisations in the United Kingdom, of 
which British universities are a notable example (e.g., Lucas, 2006). However, as this 
research focused on the case study of universities, there is always the question of the extent to 
which the research findings can be applied to other contexts. Generalisability is a well-
publicised challenge for any qualitative research, but as explained in Chapter 5, 
generalisability neither undermines the valuable contributions of qualitative studies, nor is it 
the purpose of conducting qualitative work (Creswell, 2012). However, this does not mean 
that the findings of this research cannot be transferred to other contexts, and Table 8.1 in the 
next section provides examples of how the gaming typology could apply to different private 
sector organisations.  
 
8.6 Recommendations for future research 
This thesis found different unintended outcomes related to the university sector in the United 
Kingdom. However, it is also possible to imagine how the outcomes could take place in other 
sectors. In order to demonstrate how the behaviours found in the data could be used to 
understand the impact of performance management systems in other organisational settings, 
the six unintended behavioural outcomes identified in the gaming table presented in Chapter 
6 section 6.3 are used here to illustrate how the behaviours could happen, for example, in 
private sector organisations. Each of the six behaviours related to gaming is presented here 
once again in Table 8.1 with illustrative examples which are supported by reference to 
research reports, news data, parliamentary reports, company websites and research papers. 
However, a point to note is that while the gaming behaviours in the examples appear to be 
related to performance management systems, it is not possible to attribute the behaviours to 
performance management systems with certainty as there is also the possibility that these 
gaming behaviours arose from more general business imperatives like increasing profit. 
Future research could empirically assess their relationships to performance management 
systems, and evaluate the relevance of the typology to different organisations. 
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Table 8.1: Examples of unintended behavioural outcomes in private sector organisations 
Unintended 
behavioural 
outcomes 
Examples in private sector organisations 
Gratuitous 
proliferation 
Technology companies who are engaged in manufacturing consumer 
electronics like mobile phones could be seen as engaging in gratuitous 
proliferation by, for example, gradually releasing new features of their 
products to continue engaging consumers’ interest. Perhaps, the 
gradual release of new iPhone products and the transition from iPhone 
1 to iPhone 10 is an illustration of such a practice.  
 
Cooking the 
books 
A former trader at Société Générale called Jerome Kerviel engaged in 
cooking the books, which involved both falsifying and fabricating data, 
costing the bank over $7 billion (Iskyan, 2016). Kerviel initiated trades 
in financial securities with no authorisation from the management to do 
so, and concealed the transactions from the management until the 
trades he made lost billions of dollars on the market (Clark and Jolly, 
2008; Iskyan, 2016). As Kerviel was trading on behalf of the company, 
the bank had to cover the losses, and bank regulators also fined Société 
Générale for not having enough control mechanisms in place to 
prevent these kinds of behaviours from taking place (Société Générale 
website9). 
Hoarding 
performance 
In a study conducted by Chung et al. (2015) in South Korea, the 
researchers found that managers who worked in organisations that have 
a strong union presence withheld positive performance news from the 
labour union, and disclosed negative news during the negotiation 
periods between managers and unions. Managers only shared positive 
news when it did not adversely affect their bargaining position with the 
union. Chung et al. (2015) explained that managers used this strategy 
in order to lower the perceived ability of the firm to meet the demands 
of the unions to increase employees’ salaries. 
Collusive 
alliances 
The collusion that took place between Enron management and its 
auditor Anderson Consulting. Anderson Consulting knowingly 
approved false financial statements of Enron so that senior 
management of Enron could demonstrate the exceptional profitability 
of the business. In return, Anderson Consulting earned hundreds of 
millions of dollars in fees for auditing the financial accounts of Enron. 
By allowing Enron to overstate the value of the business, Anderson 
Consulting enabled Enron executives to falsely demonstrate that the 
company met their financial performance goals. Upon the collapse of 
Enron, both Anderson Consulting and Enron executive managers were 
legally held accountable (Coffee, 2006). 
 
 
9	https://www.societegenerale.com/en/content/pageqace 
 
  
 
243 
Pandering to 
customers 
A large number of audit firms pander to their clients in order to retain 
the clients' business. Audit firms are responsible for independently and 
truthfully verifying the financial accounts of their clients (Power, 
1997), for example, insurance companies and banks. However, 
numerous audit firms have willingly and knowingly approved financial 
statements that have not reflected the true state of their clients' 
companies (Mathiason, 2009; Osborne and Dunkley, 2011). Audit 
firms’ actions have been condemned by The House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom (Osborne and Dunkley, 2011), and research reports 
have found that these practices were one of the key contributors to the 
2008 financial crisis (Mathiason, 2009).  
Playing safe Montier (2010) reported that in investment management, managers 
often avoid making risky but potentially beneficial investments, and 
they instead make investments where they are less likely to miss their 
targets. This is because in the event of underperformance, managers 
could lose their reputation and contracts with their clients. 
 
 
Future research wishing to explore the unintended outcomes of performance management 
could consider pursuing other methodologies and approaches to develop and test the findings 
of the research.  
 
Future research could also consider other methodologies such as ethnographic research. 
Ethnographic research might be suitable for sensitive topics such as those covered in this 
thesis because it allows researchers to build a stronger rapport with participants. 
Ethnographic studies typically allow researchers to establish rapport through the process of 
immersion whereby researchers become deeply involved in participants' day-to-day activities 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). Using such a method might encourage participants to be more open 
and freely answer interview questions without distancing themselves or being selective about 
what to disclose. During data collection, I made a lot of effort to build trust and try to make 
participants feel at ease, which I have discussed in Chapter 5. This helped to elicit a lot of 
information from participants, but there were certain academics who I observed were less 
open in their answers. Ethnographic research was not selected for this study because 
academic work does not lend itself to such a methodology. Academics generally work in their 
private spaces, and unless they exchange personal information about behaviours not intended 
by their performance management systems, it is difficult to detect. However, ethnographic 
research could be an effective means of collecting data from organisations where employees 
perform their work in ways that are visible to the researcher.  
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Vignette studies could also be used to offset the challenges of academics’ reluctance to share 
personal information and lessen responses that are socially desirable rather than accurately 
reflective of their actions. When vignettes are designed in a way that requires participants to 
respond from the position of the vignette characters, they shift the focus away from 
individual participants, which might encourage respondents to be more candid in their 
answers (Hughes and Huby, 2004). Vignettes could also be used to quantitatively test the 
effects of the three performance management practices of goal setting, performance 
measurement and rewards on employees’ inclination to engage in behaviours not intended by 
their performance management systems.   
 
This research presented some of the different ways academics performed behaviours not 
intended by performance management systems in universities, and designed a typology 
accordingly. Perhaps other researchers could attempt to develop questionnaire scales to 
quantitatively test the typology. The typology could also be tested in different contexts in 
order to assess whether there are differences in the way the identified unintended outcomes 
might manifest themselves in different organisational settings. Quantitative research might 
also help to articulate whether any of the outcomes in the typology are more prevalent or less 
prevalent within different industries. 
 
As mentioned in this thesis, the unintended psychological outcomes of performance 
management systems are largely overlooked by researchers studying the unintended effects of 
performance management systems on employees. This research has shown how performance 
management systems triggered a range of unintended psychological responses in academics, 
which also encouraged the occurrence of unintended behavioural outcomes. Future research 
could quantitatively test the effects of the unintended psychological outcomes on the 
behavioural ones and vice versa. Due to logistical constraints, this thesis did not explore the 
relationships between the unintended psychological outcomes found in the data. Using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, future research could examine the relationships between 
these psychological outcomes.  
 
Instead of taking a narrow approach to studying performance management systems by 
focusing, for example, on the impact of goal setting on employees’ behaviour (e.g., Welsh et 
al., 2015), this research mapped broader terrains of performance management systems. The 
merit of the approach taken here is that it is more encompassing, and it gives numerous 
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stepping off points for future researchers. Furthermore, considering that current knowledge 
about the unintended outcomes of performance management systems is very limited, a more 
inclusive method examining different areas was viewed as more appropriate than selecting a 
small range of variables to test. In addition, performance management practices are normally 
collectively implemented in organisations, so employees’ behaviour is usually the result of 
different performance management practices, and not just one. However, there are of course 
merits to the narrower approach to studying performance management systems because 
taking a more specific trajectory means that the researcher has fewer variables, which allows 
for a more detailed analysis. Given that in-depth analysis of the unintended outcomes of 
performance management systems is very much lacking in the literature, such studies can 
make important contributions to the literature, and also provide fruitful avenues for future 
research. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis significantly contributes to performance management literature and 
provides unique insights to understanding the role of performance management systems in 
organisations. This research explored the unintended outcomes of performance management 
systems, illustrated ways in which the systems can lead to unintended outcomes, and showed 
the role that social learning played in disseminating behaviours not intended by performance 
management systems. Studying performance management systems on the basis of the 
unintended outcomes they generate was an insightful way of assessing the systems, and 
understanding the manner in which they influence employees. 
 
The findings of this research show the powerful effects that the performance management 
systems have on employees. This thesis presented a typology that identified various 
unintended outcomes and presented distinctions between them. These distinctions are 
important because they articulate important differences in the way employees behave in 
response to performance management systems, highlight the importance of understanding 
unintended psychological outcomes of the systems, and explain the relationship between 
unintended behavioural and psychological outcomes.  
 
Social learning theory proved to be a valuable instrument for understanding how the social 
context in which performance management systems are implemented prevents the systems 
from achieving their intended outcomes. Through the process of social interaction, social 
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learning enabled academics to learn, perform, and to some degree normalise behaviours not 
intended by their performance management systems. However, while this thesis used social 
learning theory to understand how such behaviours are disseminated at work, the theory 
could also be used to understand the contextual factors that affect the operation of 
performance management systems more generally.   
 
In summary, this thesis presents strong evidence showing the potential for performance 
management systems not to work as intended, leading to an assortment of unintended 
outcomes. The thesis also explains how and why unintended outcomes occurred in the 
sampled universities, and uses social learning theory to explain the way behaviours not 
intended by performance management systems were disseminated in the sampled 
universities. This thesis also notes a number of ways in which researchers could develop and 
extend the findings of research, with the hope they open up new debates in performance 
management literature. Based on the findings of this thesis, this research invites academics to 
reevaluate and reassess the value of performance management in organisations, and give 
special attention to the negative unintended outcomes they can engender. 
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Appendices		
Appendix I: Invitation to participate in a research project 
 
Research Title 
A Social Learning Approach to Understanding the Effects of Performance Management 
Systems on the Higher Education Sector 
 
Introduction 
This research project is conducted by Btissam Aboubichr, a PhD student at Royal Holloway 
University of London with the supervision of Prof Neil Conway and Prof Alice Lam. 
 
Research Background 
Performance management practices have become ubiquitous in organisations, consuming 
substantial human and financial resources. Despite the popularity of performance 
management systems, the extent to which these systems help or hinder individuals’ work 
remains unclear. Therefore, this research seeks to understand the actual effects that these 
systems have on individuals working within them. Such information could help individuals 
make more informed decisions about the way they approach and respond to various 
performance management practices. 
 
Research Purpose 
This project seeks to explore how performance management systems can result in unintended 
outcomes. Social learning theory is used to explain the way in which individuals respond to 
performance management practices. 
 
Research Design  
This research seeks to collect data from individual academics in various university business 
schools in the United Kingdom. This research does not focus on one particular university and 
participation is sought directly from individuals.  
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Around 50 semi-structured interviews with academics will be conducted, with the aim of 
gaining an in-depth understanding of individuals’ experiences of performance management 
systems. The interviews are expected to last 60 minutes, and are scheduled to take place from 
May 2016 to February 2017. 
 
All information provided will be treated with the strictest confidence and care will be taken to 
ensure that the anonymity of participants, their department and their university are preserved 
at all stages of the research. Interviews will be transcribed and kept on my password-
protected computer, and no one will have access to the data. Information will be shared only 
with my supervisors. The participants’ particulars will not be disclosed.  
 
Benefits to Participants 
Once data is collected and analysed, all participants will be sent a report on how academics in 
the United Kingdom higher education sector perceive performance management practices, 
and how the context of performance management systems influence academics’ performance, 
as well as the effects that performance management systems have on academics’ 
performance. In light of the research findings, recommendations will be included. Reports 
will be available in May 2017.  
 
Further information 
This document provides a brief outline of the proposed research. Should you require any 
further information or if you have any queries, please contact Btissam Aboubichr or her 
supervisors at the email addresses below. 
 
Btissam.Aboubichr.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk 
Neil.Conway@rhul.ac.uk 
Alice.Lam@rhul.ac.uk 
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Appendix II: Interview consent and data processing statement 
 
Interview Consent and Data Processing Statement 
 
Project Title: A Social Learning Approach to Understanding the Effects of Performance 
Management Systems on the Higher Education Sector. 
 
Researcher: Btissam Aboubichr, A PhD candidate at Royal Holloway University of London. 
 
Email Address: Btissam.Aboubichr.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the 
researcher will explain the project to you.  
 
If you have any questions arising from the information sheet or explanation given to you, 
please ask the researcher. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep.  
 
If you consent to being interviewed, please print and sign your name, and date the form in the 
spaces provided.  
 
• All data will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the 
provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
• Interviews will be recorded by the researcher and some of the interviews will be 
transcribed by an independent transcriber who has signed a confidentiality agreement 
with the researcher.  
• A copy of your interview transcript will be provided, free of charge, on request.  
• Data collected will be processed manually and with the aid of NVivo computer aided 
qualitative data analysis software.  
• Neither you, nor your university, will be identified in this research project, or in any 
publications. All personal data will be anonymised.  
• Participation is voluntary; participants can withdraw from the study at any time and 
do not have to give any reasons why they no longer want to take part. 
 
Please print your name:....................................................................... 
 
Signature:.................................................... Date:................................  
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Appendix III: Interview guide 
 
The below is a rough guide because the ordering and the laddering of the questions 
changed across interviews. 
 
Interview Questions 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study. My name is Btissam Aboubichr and I am a 
PhD student at the School of Management at Royal Holloway University. I am carrying out 
my research on the effects of performance management systems and on how the social 
context affects academics’ performance. The interview is completely confidential and 
anonymous. With your permission, I would like to record the interview. This is so that I can 
concentrate on what you are telling me rather than spending the time taking notes. All the 
recordings will be destroyed as soon as I have written up the study.  
 
Background Information 
Sex:   Male    Female 
How long have you worked in (name of the business school/school of management)? 
When did you start working in academia? 
Are you working full time or part time? 
Are you research focused or teaching focused? 
 
General questions about performance management systems 
How are performance management systems implemented in your department?  
How do performance management systems help you develop your performance? 
How do you find your annual reviews? How do you set your goals in your annual reviews? 
 
Can you think of a time when you had a good experience with performance management 
systems? 
 
Can you think of a time when you had a bad experience with performance management 
systems? 
 
How difficult do you find the goal of publication as stipulated by your institution? How 
achievable is the goal? 
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The school here did well in the REF, do you think that performance management practices 
played a part in achieving this score? If the answer is yes, in what way did performance 
management influence those results? If the answer is no, why do you think performance 
management had no influence?  
 
The effects of performance management systems on academics 
What effects do performance management systems have on you?  
If there were no performance management systems in place, would you have worked 
differently? How? 
 
Given your workload, what kind of trade-offs do you find yourself having to make? What led 
you to make that decision? What trade-offs do you make with regard to tasks within work? 
What trade-offs do you make with regard to work and things outside of work? 
 
How does knowing that you need to publish a certain number of papers in particular journals 
influence the way you go about your work? 
 
What do you do to increase your publication output? 
 
What do you think of the practice of getting students to rate lectures and lecturers? How does 
it influence the way you teach?  
 
Social learning theory  
How would you describe the working environment in this department? 
 
Do you mainly work alone or with other colleagues? If the answer is alone, why do you 
choose to work on your own? If the answer is with colleagues, how does working with 
colleagues influence your performance? 
 
How are you expected to perform in response to the goals and measurements that are part of 
performance management systems? Where do these expectations come from?  
 
What has helped you understand what you need to do to get a promotion? 
 
Have you observed other academics who have behaved in ways that have led to positive 
results and felt inclined to do something similar? Can you give me an example? Why did you 
choose to adopt that practice? 
 
Have you observed other academics who have behaved in ways that have led to positive 
results and didn’t want to do something similar? Can you give me an example? What was 
your reason for not wanting to do the same? 
 
Is there a similarity between the official line and what other academics say about what you 
need to do to get promotion or a pay increase? How? 
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Is there a difference between the official line and what other academics say about what you 
need to do to get promotion or a pay increase? How? 
 
Since you have joined this institution, what have you learned from others about increasing 
your teaching scores? How did you learn this? 
 
Since you have joined this institution, what have you learned from others about increasing 
your publication output? How did you learn this? 
 
Role models 
Are there any academics who you would consider as role models who have had an influence 
on the way you work? If the answer is yes, how did they influence you? What are the features 
of your role model? 
 
Do you find enough academic roles models around you?  
Do you think you act as a role model for any academic?  
What does a role model mean to you? 
 
Closing questions  
Would you rather have performance management practices or not? Why? 
What generally motivates you to work in academia?  
How can performance management systems be improved? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
